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ABSTRACT
In 2003, flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Latin America and the Caribbean continued to shrink
for the fourth year running. With this latest decline, Latin America and the Caribbean turned in the worst
performance of any world region. This situation was exacerbated by the steady increase in profit remittances
and in outflows of other FDI-related resources, which has diminished its impact on the balance of payments.
The decrease in FDI inflows over the past few years has varied across subregions and countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean, however. In Mexico and the Caribbean basin, inflows have diminished less,
while South America has been more strongly affected. Within South America, inflows were quite stable in
the Andean Community but were down sharply in MERCOSUR and particularly so in Brazil.
This publication devotes special attention to the strategies employed by transnational corporations seeking
to heighten their efficiency with a view to moving into new markets. Accordingly, one chapter is devoted to
an examination of FDI trends in Latin America and the Caribbean, while the other two deal with different
aspects of this kind of corporate strategy. One analyses events in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
Honduras and Jamaica, which are regarded as cost centres for labour-intensive activities producing low
value-added goods, while the other looks at the challenges facing the Brazilian and Mexican automotive
industry production chain with regard to upgrading to manufacturing centres.
10 ECLAC
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has transformed Latin America, modernizing branches
of industry and improving many of its services and some of its infrastructure. The
evidence is everywhere, from the export platforms in Mexico and Costa Rica that
assemble competitive motor vehicles and microprocessors, respectively, to the upgraded
telecommunications network in Brazil, financial services in Argentina and road
infrastructure and airport services in Chile. Although transnational corporations (TNCs)
have been very active in recent years, some questions are now being raised as to the
net benefits of their operations in the region. These doubts revolve around the existence,
in some cases, of a disparity between host countries’ expectations at the time such
investments are made and the difficulties that have arisen along the way.
12 ECLAC
This process is attributable, in the first instance, to
the continuing shrinkage of FDI inflows. The volume of
these inflows has been declining for four consecutive
years now, after peaking in 1999, thus making the Latin
American and Caribbean region the only one in the world
to have experienced a protracted downtrend in such
investment. Average annual inflows of FDI to the region
almost quadrupled (from US$ 15.8 to US$ 61 billion)
between 1990-1994 and 1995-1999, but had receded by
40% (to US$ 36.5 billion) by 2003. The decrease from
2002 to 2003 amounted to 19%, the worst result out of
all regions in the world. This situation is compounded
by the fact that, while FDI inflows have been moving
steadily downward, profit remittances and other FDI-
related payments continue to climb, thereby dampening
the balance-of-payments effect.
The decline of FDI inflows has varied across
subregions and countries, however. In Mexico and the
Caribbean basin (Central America and the Caribbean),
they have been more stable, with average annual FDI
inflows doubling between 1990-1994 and 1995-1999
(from US$ 6.8 billion to US$ 15.4 billion) and then
remaining at that level in 2003. South America has had a
rockier ride, as FDI inflows increased by a factor of five
between 1990-1994 and 1995-1999 (from US$ 8.9 billion
to US$ 45.5 billion) before sliding to less than half that
level by 2003 (US$ 21.5 billion). Within South America,
FDI inflows to the Andean Community were much more
stable than those directed towards MERCOSUR and
Chile.
Figure 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FDI INFLOWS
AND FDI-RELATED PAYMENTS, 1990-2003
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance-of-payments statistics from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Notes: Net FDI inflows are equivalent to the FDI received by the reporting economy minus the FDI-related outflows generated by
the same foreign companies. It does not include FDI outflows generated by residents of the reporting economy.
FDI-related payments cover net external profit remittances by foreign companies. This category does not include net payments
made by residents to the reporting economy.











1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Net FDI inflows Net FDI-related payments 
Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean,  2003 13
The presence of TNCs remains significant in spite
of the decline in FDI inflows. The transnationalization
process which accompanied the surge in FDI during the
preceding decade is also still a powerful force in the
economic affairs of the region. For example, during 2000-
2002, TNCs accounted for 39% of the sales of the top
500 companies in the region, 55% of the top 100
manufacturing firms’ sales, 38% of the 100 leading
service companies’ sales, 42% of the exports of the top
200 exporters and 37% of the 100 largest banks’ assets.
Within this context, the possibility of a widening gap
between host-country expectations and emerging
problems in TNC operations has fuelled the debate
regarding FDI in the region. This is therefore a good time
to re-evaluate the impact of FDI in Latin America and
the Caribbean.
The point of departure for the present analysis is
therefore an awareness of the fact that FDI can be viewed
from a wide range of vantage points and that the choice
of analytic approach often determines the conclusions
that are drawn. There are two traditional schools of
thought which to some extent reflect the wide range of
Table 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FDI INFLOWS 1990-2003a
(Millions of dollars)
1990- 1995- 2000 2001 2002 2003c
1994b 1999b
Mexico 5 430 11 398 16 449 26 569 14 435 10 731
Central America 575 2 067 1 964 2 017 1 354 1 742
Costa Rica 222 481 409 454 662 466
El Salvador 12 282 173 250 208 140
Guatemala 88 213 230 456 110 104
Honduras 41 120 282 195 143 216
Nicaragua 20 194 267 150 174 241
Panama 192 777 603 513 57 576
Caribbean 840 1 949 2 014 2 420 2 710 2 466
Jamaica 124 285 468 614 481 500
Dominican Republic 171 594 953 1 079 961 700
Trinidad and Tobago 270 550 472 685 737 700
Other 274 519 121 42 531 566
Mexico/Caribbean basin 6 845 15 414 20 427 31 006 18 499 14 939
Chile 1 207 5 401 4 860 4 200 1 888 2 982
MERCOSUR 4 880 30 188 43 590 25 039 17 496 11 397
Argentina 3 027 10 599 10 418 2 166 775 1 103
Brazil 1 703 19 240 32 779 22 457 16 566 10 144
Paraguay 99 185 119 95 -22 19
Uruguay 51 164 274 320 177 131
Andean Community 2 843 9 945 9 266 9 289 7 096 7 148
Bolivia 85 711 736 706 677 357
Colombia 818 2 796 2 299 2 500 1 974 1 291
Ecuador 303 639 720 1 330 1 275 1 637
Peru 801 2 350 810 1 070 2 391 1 332
Venezuela 836 3 449 4 701 3 683 779 2 531
South America 8 930 45 534 57 716 38 528 26 480 21 527
Regional total 15 775 60 948 78 143 69 534 44 979 36 466
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of balance-of-payments statistics from IMF and national reporting agencies in the region. The 2003
figures are estimates based on information from the countries’ central banks. These figures differ from those published by
ECLAC in the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002, since in the Overview, net
FDI is calculated as the difference between inflows to the reporting economy and FDI outflows generated by residents of
that same economy.
a Does not include financial centres. Net FDI inflows are defined as FDI inflows to the reporting economy minus capital outflows




possible perspectives: (i) one views FDI in terms of
external financing from a balance-of-payments
perspective; and (ii) the other focuses on the
microeconomic impacts of FDI from an industrial
organization perspective. The first tends to evaluate FDI
in terms of the volume of inflows, taking a “the more
the better” point of view and sometimes linking the
analysis of FDI inflows to macroeconomic variables
such as growth, exports and employment. The second,
on the other hand, associates FDI with TNC operations
and assesses those operations based on their
contribution to the development of local production
based on criteria such as technology transfer and
assimilation, the establishment and deepening of
production linkages, the training of human resources
and enterprise development. In this case, the quality of
FDI or TNC operations is as important as its volume or
scale. This second school of thought tends to believe
that no matter how positive the impact of FDI might
be, it can always be improved upon. Both lines of
thought are necessary to achieve a better understanding
of FDI as an economic phenomenon, but they are rarely
found together.
There are several good reasons for combining
these different analytical perspectives. On the one
hand, considerable dissonance has emerged in the
specialized literature in this respect. Most of the
traditional studies tend to assume that elements
identified with the microeconomic perspective
(technology transfer, production linkages, human
resource training and enterprise development) are
spillovers that are generated once a critical level of
FDI has entered the host economy.  However, more
recent empirical studies based on more refined
methodologies have demonstrated that such outcomes
are by no means a foregone conclusion and that the
presence of such spillovers should be corroborated
rather than simply assumed for the purpose of
analysing FDI impacts. Furthermore, it can be shown
that the information upon which both schools of
thought are based, that is, official information on the
balance of payments and FDI flows and the available
data on the operations of TNC affiliates, suffers from
significant shortcomings in terms of its coverage,
coherence and usefulness.
The method used in this study draws upon a number
of different information sources in evaluating corporate
strategies in order to arrive at a coherent interpretation
of FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean. The result
makes it possible to define the four principal focal points
of FDI from the perspective of the corporate strategies
that drive them: (i) the natural-resource-seeking strategy
focuses on the petroleum and gas sector (Andean
Community, Argentina and Trinidad and Tobago) and
on the mining sector (Chile, Argentina and the Andean
Community); (ii) the market-seeking strategy is centred
on the larger economies of the region (in the case of
goods, the best examples are the automotive industry
of MERCOSUR and food, beverages and tobacco in
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, while in the case of
services, the clearest examples are the financial,
telecommunications and energy industries and retail
trade, especially in South America); (iii) the efficiency-
seeking strategy focuses on capturing new export
markets and is applied primarily in Mexico (automotive,
electronics and apparel industries) and the Caribbean
basin (apparel); and (iv) the technological-assets-
seeking strategy is based on TNCs that form
partnerships or alliances for purposes of innovation and
technological development (no clear examples of the
application of this strategy are evident in Latin America
or the Caribbean).
A great deal of research has gone into the preparation
of the annual editions of Foreign Investment in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Recent editions have
included chapters dealing with the experiences of
recipient countries (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina and
the Andean Community), investor countries (United
States, Japan, Spain and the European Union) and sectors
in which FDI in the region is concentrated (the
automotive, apparel and telecommunications industries,
the hydrocarbons sector and financial services). On the
basis of this research, the available statistical data on FDI
inflows and TNC operations and the information
compiled for this year’s study, a general picture can be
pieced together of FDI and TNC operations in the region,
which follow two main patterns:
• In Mexico and the Caribbean basin, the bulk of
FDI comes from efficiency-seeking TNCs which set
up export platforms in this subregion as part of their
regional or international systems of integrated
production. These local assembly operations –
mainly of United States-based TNCs– are primarily
cost centres for higher-technology activities, such
as the automotive and electronics industries, or low-
technology activities, such as apparel. The new
global competition faced by these industries obliges
TNCs to search for low-cost, large-scale production
sites near major markets for the labour-intensive
aspects of their production processes. Mexico offers
preferential access to the North American market
by way of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), while many Caribbean basin countries
offer special access to the United States market by
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way of the United States-Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act (CBTPA). As a result, Mexico and
the Caribbean basin have witnessed a dramatic
improvement in their international competitiveness
as it relates to their participation as sources of the
motor vehicles, electronics and apparel imported by
the United States.
• In South America, FDI is primarily generated by
TNCs following local-market-seeking and natural-
resource-seeking strategies. The first of these
strategies is most evident among European TNCs in
telecommunications, energy infrastructure and
finance, especially in the MERCOSUR countries and
Chile. The deregulation and liberalization of these
activities, coupled with broad privatization
programmes and the active internationalization
strategy of some (mainly Spanish) TNCs, have been
key factors driving FDI flows to this subregion. One
result of this type of FDI has been an improvement
in the systemic competitiveness of these countries,
specifically in terms of services and infrastructure
that facilitate export activity but do not in themselves
generate it. FDI that follows a natural-resource-
seeking strategy has been centred in the
Andean Community, Chile and Argentina, which
possess high-quality natural resources –especially
petroleum, natural gas, copper and gold– and
facilitating regulatory frameworks. One of the
outcomes has been an improvement in the
international competitiveness of these countries’
natural resources.
This simplified overview of FDI in Latin America
and the Caribbean can be taken as a starting point for the
interpretation of corporate strategies in the region. This
year’s report builds on that foundation by tracking the
progression of events with regard to natural-resource-
seeking and market-seeking (services) strategies in
chapter I, entering into a more detailed examination of
the situation in respect of efficiency-seeking strategies
in four countries of the Caribbean basin –Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Honduras and Jamaica– in chapter
II and comparing the situation in the automotive industry
in Mexico and Brazil in chapter III. This analysis, coupled
with the previous years’ reports, makes it possible to
examine the gap existing between host countries’
expectations and actual FDI flows in terms of the benefits
and costs associated with TNC operations driven by each
of these various types of corporate strategies.
Table 2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TNC STRATEGIES
Corporate Natural resource- Local market- Efficiency-seeking Technological
strategy/ seeking seeking (to capture asset-
sector (national or regional) export seekingmarkets)
Petroleum/natural gas: Automotive: MERCOSUR Automotive: Mexico
Andean Community, Chemical: Brazil Electronics: Mexico,
Argentina, Trinidad Food products: Caribbean basin
Goods and Tobago Argentina, Brazil, Mexico Aparel:
Mining: Chile, Beverages: Argentina, Brazil, Caribbean basin,
Argentina, Mexico Mexico
Andean Community Tobacco: Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico
Tourism: Mexico, Finance: Mexico, Chile, Business services:













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Table 3
IMPACTS OF CORPORATE STRATEGIES IN HOST COUNTRIES
FDI strategy Potential benefits Possible difficulties
Natural-resource- Increased natural-resource exports Enclave activities not integrated into local
seeking Improved international economy
competitiveness of natural resources Little local processing of resources
High local content of exports Cyclical international prices
Employment in non-urban areas Low tax revenues from non-renewable
Tax revenues and royalty income resources
Environmental pollution
Local-market- New local economic activities Production of goods and services not
seeking Increased local content internationally competitive (not world class)
(national or regional) New/deepened production linkages Weak position in terms of international
Local enterprise development competitiveness
Improved services (quality, coverage Regulatory and competition problems
and price) and improved systemic Disputes in relation to international investment
competitiveness obligations
Crowding out of local companies
Efficiency-seeking Increased exports of manufactures Becoming stuck in the low-value-added trap
(to capture export Improved international Focus on static rather than dynamic advantages
markets) competitiveness of manufactures Truncated production linkages: dependence of
Transfer/assimilation of technology assembly operations on imported components
Training of human resources Crowding out of local companies
New/deepened production linkages  ”Race to the bottom” in production costs
Local enterprise development (salaries, social benefits, exchange rate)
Evolving from an export platform into  “Race to the top” in incentives (tax,
a manufacturing centre infrastructure)
Limited cluster creation
Technological-asset- Technology transfer Low propensity to invest in technology
seeking Improved science and technology Stagnation of production
infrastructure Unfocused national policy
Specialized logistics development
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Generally speaking, FDI from natural-resource-
seeking TNCs has held steady because international
petroleum, natural gas, copper and gold prices have
recently been relatively high, and FDI in these activities
is usually independent of the host country’s
macroeconomic situation. Significant investments have
been made or committed to in the petroleum industry by
TotalFinaElf, Statoil and ChevronTexaco and by Royal
Dutch/Shell and Mitsubishi in Venezuela, Repsol-YPF
in Argentina and a group led by Alberta Energy Ltd. in
Ecuador. Hunt Oil and Tractabel have invested heavily
in the Camisea natural gas project in Peru. BHP Billiton
and Rio Tinto continue their major investments in the
Escondida copper mine in Chile. Barrick Gold has
undertaken major investment commitments in gold mines
in Argentina and Peru, as has Meridian Gold in Peru.
Host-country expectations with regard to FDI driven by
this type of strategy have been centred on increasing
exports of natural resources with a view to raising
international competitiveness in that industry. These
countries also hope that these operations will help
increase local content, create more non-urban jobs and
raise their tax revenues and royalty income. Chapter I
reviews some of the associated costs. For example, one
of those costs –environmental degradation– has become
a major factor in relation to past (the Texaco operations
in Ecuador), present (curtailing United States EximBank
credits to the Camisea project in Peru) and future (the
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suspension of the Alumysa aluminium project in Chile)
natural resource projects. In addition, the question as to
whether or not to tax production activities based on non-
renewable resources and charge royalty payments on such
projects have sparked controversies in Bolivia and Chile.
Despite these difficulties, natural-resource-seeking FDI
continues to be a major economic activity in the region.
This situation is quite different from that of services-
market-seeking FDI in the region, which has come to a
virtual standstill. Until recently, this was the most
significant category of FDI in Latin America and the
Caribbean; however, the contraction of domestic demand
in several of the major economies within the context of
macroeconomic adjustment processes involving sharp
currency devaluations has led to a sizeable drop in this
type of investment. Chapter I shows that many public
utility operators could not meet their external debt
commitments when rates were frozen and thus stopped
investing; in fact, some actually sold off their local assets.
One of the most serious problems of this sort arose in
Argentina, where in January 2002 the Public Emergency
and Exchange Rate Reform Act redenominated public
utility rates in Argentine pesos instead of dollars, froze
them and assigned the Ministry of Economic Affairs the
task of renegotiating the concessions of privatized service
providers. In July of 2003, the new Administration
created the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public
Investment and Services and decided to review and
renegotiate all public service contracts held by privatized
companies (telecommunications, electricity, gas, water,
railways, roads, postal service and airports) by the end
of 2004. This decision was met with anger by the service
providers, most of which are TNCs. More than 25 suits
have been brought against the Government of Argentina
by foreign investors for failure to comply with the
investment treaties that it has signed. Another
complicated case (but one in which a negotiated solution
was achieved) arose in the electricity sector in Brazil,
where the National Bank for Economic and Social
Development (BNDES) bailed out a number of TNCs,
including the United States firm AES Corporation. Given
the severity of these problems and the slump in domestic
demand, many of these firms are pulling out of the region,
including Vodafone, BellSouth, Verizon, France Telecom
and AT&T, among the telecoms, and Royal Ahold and
JC Penney in retail trade. Some TNCs, such as Telefónica
de España, have made further investments in order to
maintain their market power as new regional competitors
emerge, such as América Móvil; however, several local
groups in retail trade in Chile and in financial services in
Brazil have taken advantage of the new situation to
position themselves better vis-à-vis foreign firms.
In the case of efficiency-seeking FDI in Latin
America and the Caribbean that is focused on enabling
firms to conquer other markets, two variants are
associated with the relevant regional or international
systems of integrated production: the Caribbean basin
model for the apparel industry, and the Mexican model
for electronics and motor vehicles. With respect to the
Caribbean basin model, as exemplified by the experiences
of Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras and
Jamaica, chapter II demonstrates that FDI inflows are
shrinking because this model, which is based on relatively
low wages, export processing zone (EPZ) tax incentives
and special access to the United States market via the
HTS 9802 production-sharing mechanism, is losing its
comparative advantages as the United States market
opens up to new competitors. Host countries expected
this model to boost apparel exports, improve international
competitiveness and lead to positive impacts for the
country in the form of technology transfer and
assimilation, human resource training, new and deepened
production linkages and local enterprise development.
However, most countries have found that this model is
based on unsustainable incentives and that it locks them
into a low-value-added trap that has not permitted any
significant kind of industrial or technological upgrading.
The result has been illusory rather than authentic
competitiveness. Costa Rica’s experience has proved to
be the exception thanks to greater clarity in terms of the
country’s strategic objectives, appropriate national policy
instruments and solid institutions.
Chapter III indicates that a relatively large volume
of efficiency-seeking FDI is flowing into the Mexican
automotive industry.  This is chiefly attributable to the
fact that  United States-based TNC automobile and
vehicle parts makers are closing down plants in the United
States and opening up others in Mexico to serve the North
American market. The installed capacity for vehicle
production in Mexico doubled between 1994 and 2003,
and both the Mexican Government and the automotive
TNCs operating there hope to see it double again by
2010. Host-country expectations originally focused on
increased exports and gains in international
competitiveness; more recently, however, the desire to
improve local impacts in the form of technology transfer
and assimilation, human resources training, production
linkages, local enterprise development and the aim of
growing the export platform into an integrated
manufacturing centre have come to the fore. One of
the problems that has arisen is that the Mexican
automotive industry has tied its fortunes to the United
States market and the country has not yet succeeded
in attracting other, perhaps more competitive, firms such
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as Toyota and Honda. Another problem is that the
Mexican automotive supplier base is very closely
integrated into the United States production base and
is therefore unable to take advantage of the
opportunities offered by the different free trade
agreements to which Mexico is party while complying
with the established rules of origin for each one. The
Mexican supplier base is founded on strict cost-centre
criteria that inhibit investment in the technology needed
to turn the industry into an integrated production cluster.
In order to turn this situation around, the Mexican
authorities will probably have to use more active
policies to attract more innovative firms and their
suppliers, to improve upon the existing supplier base
and to promote the production of models that are
assembled solely in Mexico and that conform to the
rules of origin of the major markets.
In conclusion, the Latin American and Caribbean
region has benefited enormously from the FDI boom
of the 1990s. However, when FDI inflows started to
wane, specific problems related to the individual
corporate strategies driving that boom began to grow
more serious. Upon reflection, a very important lesson
can be drawn from the events in the region: host
countries should not only try to attract FDI but should
also be alert to its benefits and costs. Most Latin
American countries have fulfilled only the first half of
this equation. Recent experience in the region suggests
that the benefits to be derived from FDI by a receiving
economy are not a foregone conclusion and do not simply
“spill over” into the host economy merely by virtue of
the presence of FDI. Evidently, it is much easier to attract
FDI that will have quite limited effects through the use
of passive policies than to ensure adequate FDI benefits
through the use of suitable policies designed to attract
high-quality FDI and to minimize any problems that may
arise. Other regions, such as Asia and Europe, appear to
be employing more proactive policies. They are also
obtaining more benefits per unit of FDI. This
demonstrates that policy does indeed matter. The Latin
American and Caribbean countries should employ
productive development strategies that clearly set out
their national priorities as a basis for defining what they
expect to gain from FDI, with due regard for the
differences existing among the various corporate
strategies that are driving this kind of investment. This is
why policies on FDI must have clearly defined objectives
and be anchored in institutions equipped with rules and
with human and financial resources that ensure they will
be up to the task.
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Total foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America
and the Caribbean approached US$ 36.5 billion in 2003,
which represented a 19% retreat from the previous year’s
figure –the steepest fall recorded in any of the world
regions (UNCTAD, 2004). Flows of FDI to the region
have been trending downward since attaining an all-time
high in 1999 but, despite this new reduction, transnational
corporations (TNCs) still maintain a forceful regional
presence. This situation can be characterized as the
transnationalization of Latin American economic assets,
as foreign firms expand their presence in the various
activities of the local economies.
Understanding the FDI phenomenon and TNC
activities requires concepts and analytical frameworks
that go beyond merely describing their scale. The
following section sets out a framework for analysis based
on the main strategies of TNCs, which makes it possible
to gain a better understanding of the forces that drive the
regional FDI phenomenon.
A. INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment is a phenomenon that can be
analysed and interpreted from different standpoints, and
choosing one perspective rather than another tends
largely to predetermine the conclusions drawn about its
trends. There are two traditional views of FDI: one
focusing on aspects related to external financing from a
balance-of-payments perspective, and the other focusing
on productive development from an industr ial
organization standpoint. The first of these views generally
takes an aggregate approach and tends to evaluate the
FDI phenomenon in terms of the volume of net inflows.
Linked to this perspective is the analysis that directly
relates FDI flows to macroeconomic variables, such as
gross fixed capital formation, exports and employment.
Even more important, FDI is generally assumed to
automatically internalize more advanced technology in
the recipient countries, along with enhanced human
resource skills and better production linkages, among
other benefits.
The second approach seeks to evaluate FDI in
microeconomic terms. No assumption of automatic
benefits is made, and the quality of FDI is usually
considered to be as important as its volume. Moreover,
the main analytical focus shifts from “FDI” to “TNC
activities” in this approach. The analysis examines the
extent to which transnational corporations contribute to
the local economy, in terms of: (i) the emergence of new
activities that extend or deepen the industrialization
I. REGIONAL OVERVIEW
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process; (ii) technology access, transfer and assimilation;
(iii) the establishment and deepening of productive
linkages; (iv) human resource training and skill
development; and (v) local business development. Both
approaches are necessary to achieve a better and more
complete understanding of the FDI phenomenon; yet they
are seldom applied together.
There are additional reasons for using the two
perspectives to analyse FDI. Firstly, the specialist
literature displays considerable disagreement. For
example, the traditional analysis of spillovers arising from
FDI generally adopts a highly positive attitude, which
assumes that the larger the FDI inflows the greater will
be the benefits in the host economy. Nonetheless, recent
empirical work on this subject, especially in developing
countries, tends to adopt a more cautious stance, having
found mixed evidence for the benefits (see box I.1). This
suggests the need for greater precision when analysing
impacts.
Another reason for using both perspectives is the
poor quality of statistical data available at the aggregate
level, both on FDI flows and on TNC operations (see
box I.2). The shortcomings of official statistics on FDI
and on the operations of TNC subsidiaries in host
countries are examined in sections B and C of this
chapter, respectively. In this context, an adequate
analytical framework that integrates both views and also
draws on statistical data from a variety of sources, could
help to overcome the deficiencies described, thereby
leading to a better understanding of the fundamentals
of the FDI phenomenon and TNC activities.
Box I.1
A NEW MESSAGE IN THE LITERATURE ON SPILLOVERS AND THE IMPACT OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ON HOST ECONOMIES
During the twentieth century, in the
context of the Cold War, the traditional
western view of the impact of FDI on
host economies was excessively
favourable, based frequently on the
assumption that the effects would be
automatic and clearly visible. The
original criticism of this view, often
supported by the communist bloc,
claimed that the impact was by
definition negative since it was a
manifestation of imperialism or neo-
colonialism. In this sense, the original
debate on the effects of FDI was
framed in terms that were more
ideological than scientific. This has
now changed, however.
The most widely known aspect of
the western view is based on the
original literature on foreign investment
spillovers. The spillover concept
suggests that once foreign investment
flows into the host economy have
reached a certain level, a series of
benefits such as technology transfer,
productive linkages, human-resource
skill enhancement, and local business
development would “spill over” into the
local economy, just like water
overflowing from a glass.
Although this idea of automatic and
effective benefits prevailed for a long
time, this is no longer the case. A
complete reassessment of the
literature on FDI spillovers, based on
empirical case studies, has produced
new conclusions that suggest that the
impacts are neither exclusively –nor
necessarily– positive. In these new
studies, which use improved
methodologies, it is often argued that
the effects of foreign investment have
been neutral or negative; or, in the best
of cases, the resulting situation is
unclear, especially in the case of
developing and transition economies
(see table below).
The debate has thus shifted from
an ideological approach to a more
technical one, in which it is clear that
while positive impacts from FDI in host
countries are likely, they are far from
automatic; so positive effects need to
be demonstrated rather than assumed.
These new findings have major
implications, one of which is that policy
towards FDI should focus less on
achieving a critical mass of
investments and more on ensuring that
these are appropriate to the country’s
productive development goals.
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(Box I.1 concluded)
SUMMARY OF REPRESENTATIVE STUDIES FROM THE MODERN LITERATURE ON
FDI SPILLOVER EFFECTS
Author and year Country Period Type of data Level Results
      1. Developed countries
Liu et al (2000) United Kingdom 1991-1995 Panel Industry +
Branstetter (2000) United States 1990-1996 Panel Firm +
Girma et al (2001) United Kingdom 1988-1996 Panel Firm ?
Barry et al (2001) Ireland 1990-1998 Panel Firm -
Barrios and Strobl (2001) Spain 1990-1994 Panel Firm ?
Keller and Yeaple (2002) United States 1987-1996 Panel Firm +
2. Developing countries
Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) Mexico 1970-1975 Cross- Industry +
section
Kokko (1996) Mexico 1970 Cross- Industry +
section
Haddad and Harrison (1993) Morocco 1985-1989 Panel Firm and ?
industry
Kokko et al (1996) Uruguay 1990 Cross- Firm ?
section
Sjohom (1999) Indonesia 1980-1991 Cross- Firm +
section
Chuang et al (1999) Taiwan, Province 1962-1996 Panel Firm +
of China
Aitken and Harrison (1999) Venezuela 1976-1989 Panel Firm -
Cheng and Ku (2000) Taiwan, Province 1986-1994 Panel Firm +
of China
Kathuria (2000) India 1976-1989 Panel Firm ?
Kokko et al (2001) Uruguay 1988 Cross- Firm ?
section
Kugler (2001) Colombia 1974-1998 Panel Industry ?
Liu (2002) China 1993-1998 Panel Firm +
Romo (2003) Mexico 1992-1995 Panel Industry ? and –
3. Transition economies
Djankov and Hoekman (2000) Czech Republic 1993-1996 Panel Firm -
Konnings (2001) Bulgaria, Poland, 1993-1997 Panel Firm -?-
Romania 1994-1997
1993-1997
Damijan et al (2001) Bulgaria, Czech 1994-1998 Panel Firm ? or - ,




Sgard (2001) Hungary 1992-1999 Panel Firm - and +
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Box I.2
STATISTICAL SHORTCOMINGS IN FDI DATA
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)
have been working to unify the criteria
used by their member countries in
preparing balance-of-payments
statistics, one section of which records
FDI flows. The fifth edition (1993) of the
IMF Balance of Payments Manual
(BPM5), proposes an integrated
structure for recording economic
transactions and stocks of financial
assets and liabilities, which many
countries have adopted, or are in the
process of doing so. Surveys on the
degree of implementation of
methodological standards for recording
FDI, carried out by IMF and OECD in
1983, 1991, 1997 and 2001, reveal
steady progress in the adoption of
these criteria. The latest version of the
survey highlights major progress in the
quality of FDI statistics –specifically in
terms of their availability (such as the
use of criteria relating to the country of
origin and destination sector of FDI
flows), and coverage (e.g., the
inclusion of inter-enterprise loans, real-
estate property owned by non-
residents, and expenditure on natural-
resource exploration, among other
things). Progress, albeit less
substantial, has also been made in
other areas, including application of the
“10% rule” which infers a direct-
investor relationship when the investor
acquires 10% or more of the equity of
an enterprise. Lastly, there are other
areas where, despite some progress
being made, most countries are not yet
following international standards, for
example inclusion of the activities of
firms indirectly owned by a foreign
investor, and use of the “current
operating performance concept”
(COPC) to evaluate the gains from
direct investment. This involves
measuring the normal operating
revenues of the enterprise, before
capital gains and losses.
Most countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean have adopted the BPM5
guidelines, which results in
substantially homogeneous statistics
being available for the region. A major
exception is Brazil, which, despite
having implemented many of the
manual’s recommendations, only
considers inter-enterprise loans and
equity shareholdings as components of
FDI. The third component, reinvestment
of profits, is not currently recorded in
Brazilian statistics.
Foreign direct investment by
country of origin and destination
sector, does not appear in the balance
of payments, so the countries of the
region generally record such data in
separate statistics, if at all. In many
cases, this information is compiled by
independent foreign-investment
promotion agencies, whose recording
standards differ from those used by
their country’s central bank.
Accordingly, the FDI figures may not
coincide when the totals reported in the
balance of payments are compared
with totals by country of origin,
destination sector, or both. A case in
point is Chile, where FDI figures vary
depending on whether they come from
the Central Bank or the Foreign
Investment Committee, a body that is
independent of the central bank and
maintains FDI records by country and
sector. The Committee only classifies
investment as FDI if it enters the
country under the Foreign Investment
Statute (about 85% of investment
entering Chile since 1974), and it
records its entry when the investment
is agreed. In contrast, the Central Bank
registers investment flows carried out
under any mechanism, not only under
the Statute; and it records them when
they actually enter or leave the
country. Several Latin American
countries have taken steps to improve
their statistics and bring them up to
international standards. In Mexico,
which is the region’s only OECD
member, FDI statistics are prepared
by Banco de México and the Ministry
of Economic Affairs. In order to unify
methodologies and obtain
internationally comparable statistics,
since 2000 both institutions have
operated under common rules that
establish specific responsibilities for
their preparation and publication.
Formerly Costa Rica had several
institutions that maintained historical
records and prepared annual
estimates and forecasts of FDI flows;
but these did not always coincide with
one another owing to methodological
and coverage discrepancies. In 2000
an interagency group was created
under the direction of the Central
Bank of Costa Rica, with the key task
of preparing statistics on net FDI
flows entering the country, and
adapting them to internationally
prevailing methodological procedures.
Lastly, in Venezuela the Central Bank
has been in the process of adapting
its balance-of-payments data to
BPM5 guidelines since 1996, but only
in 2003 did it revise, adapt and
update all of its statistics dating back
to 1997.
In short, while FDI statistics are
very useful for gaining a better
understanding of the phenomenon in
question, the way they are prepared
needs to be borne in mind, along with
their virtues and defects, in order to
avoid falling into conceptual error
when working with them.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)/International Monetary Fund (IMF), Foreign Direct Investment Statistics: How
Countries Measure FDI 2001, Washington, D.C., 2003; and Report on the survey of implementation of methodological
standards for direct investment, 1999; International Monetary Fund (IMF), Balance of payments statistics [CD ROM],
December 2003.
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In recent years, in the context of preparing the
annual reports on foreign investment in Latin America
and the Caribbean, the research programme of the Unit
on Investment and Corporate Strategies, of the Division
of Production, Productivity and Management has shown
that a useful way to combine these separate, and
sometimes conflicting viewpoints is by analysing the
corporate strategies that lead TNCs to invest in
developing countries. Thus, based on the original model
of corporate strategies prepared by John Dunning (1980,
1988), an analytical framework has been developed for
the purpose of understanding the factors that determine
FDI inflows. Table I.1 shows that there are at least four
main motivations for FDI, ranging from the most
traditional, such as the search for natural resources and
markets for goods and services, to more modern and
complex goals such as the search for efficiency through
international operations or pursuit of strategic assets
relating to the presence of a technological or scientific
base, or both.
The Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of
the Division of Production, Productivity and Management
has used this simple, yet penetrating analytical framework
to describe the characteristics of FDI and interpret the
corporate strategies pursued by TNCs in Latin America
(see table I.2). The search for natural resources occurs
mainly in the Andean Community and Argentina
(hydrocarbons and mining), in Chile (mining), and in
Trinidad and Tobago (oil and gas). Market-seeking
strategies predominate in the region’s largest countries.
In the case of goods, the main examples are the
automotive industry in MERCOSUR, and the food,
beverages and tobacco industry in Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico. In the services sector, the leading areas are
finance, telecommunications, retail trade and energy
infrastructure in a variety of countries, especially in
South America. Lastly, the efficiency-seeking strategy
is concentrated in Mexico (the automotive, electronics
and apparel industries) and in the Caribbean Basin
(apparel).
Table I.1
DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, BY CORPORATE STRATEGY
FDI strategy Main determinants
Natural-resource-seeking Abundance and quality of natural resources
Access to natural resources
Trends in international commodity prices
Environmental regulation
Local-market-seeking (national or regional) Size, pace of growth and market purchasing power
Level of tariff and non-tariff protection
Entry barriers
Existence and cost of local suppliers
Market structure (competitors)
Sectoral regulation
Efficiency-seeking (to capture export Access to export markets
markets) Quality and cost of human resources
Quality and cost of physical infrastructure
Services logistics
Quality and cost of suppliers
International trade agreements and foreign investment protection
Technological-asset-seeking Presence of specific assets needed by the firm
Scientific and technological base
Scientific and technological infrastructure
Intellectual property protection
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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In the course of preparing successive editions of
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean,
qualitative and quantitative research, of a significant and
substantive nature, has been conducted to analyse the
situation of various recipient countries (Brazil, Mexico,
Chile, Argentina and the Andean Community), a number
of investor countries (United States, Japan, Spain and
the European Union as a whole), and some of the main
industries of the region in which FDI is present
(automotive, apparel, telecoms, hydrocarbons and
financial services), all of which have been accorded
chapters in previous editions of this report. Based on
those studies, supported by statistical data on FDI flows
and information available on TNC operations, and
placing all of this in the context of the corporate strategies
mentioned above, a simplified framework can be
constructed for FDI and TNC activities in the region, in
which the most salient feature is the existence of “two
worlds”:
• In Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, FDI essentially
reflects a TNC strategy that seeks efficiency to
conquer external markets, by integrating local
productive platforms into regional or international
production systems. The countries in this subregion
have cost centres both in high-tech (electronics and
automotive) and in lower technology industries
(apparel). The new patterns of competition in various
industries encouraged firms to seek out the
productive locations offering the lowest costs, and
geographic locations that were specially favourable
for large-scale exporting. The aim of the firms was
to bring about a form of internationalization that
would keep them in a competitive regional and
global position, while they also took advantage of
special access to the main markets available to
Mexico (since the signing of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA) and the Caribbean
Basin. This resulted in a significant improvement in
Table I.2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE STRATEGIES OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Corporate Natural-resource- Local-market-seeking Efficiency-seeking Technological-
strategy seeking (national or regional) to capture export  asset-seeking
and sector markets
Goods Petroleum and gas: Automotive: MERCOSUR Automotive: Mexico
Andean Community, Chemicals: Brazil Electronics: Mexico
Argentina, Trinidad Food industry: Argentina, and Caribbean Basin
and Tobago Brazil, Mexico Apparel: Caribbean
Mining: Chile, Beverages: Argentina, Basin and Mexico
Argentina, Andean Brazil, Mexico
Community Tobacco: Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico
Services Tourism: Mexico and Finance: Mexico, Chile, Business services:












Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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1 International competitiveness reflects the force of a country’s exports, which can be measured by their share of imports in the leading
markets of the world.
2 The term “systemic competitiveness” refers to the services and infrastructure in a given economy that support export activity without
directly generating exports themselves. Systemic competitiveness directly affects the logistics of TNC activities, and hence also their
location decisions.
international competitiveness,1 especially in Mexico,
and the emergence of dynamic trading sectors, such
as the automotive, electronics and garment
industries, destined mainly for the United States
market.
• In South America, FDI was basically established
through TNCs implementing strategies in pursuit of
natural resources and markets for services. The first
of these was implemented mainly in the Andean
Community countries and in Chile, given their high-
quality natural resources and regulatory frameworks
that favoured foreign investors. This fostered a
relative increase in international competitiveness,
albeit largely restricted to products that command
low prices in world trade. The services-market-
seeking strategy, meanwhile, was applied in the
telecoms, energy, infrastructure and finance
subsectors, especially in the MERCOSUR countries
and Chile. Deregulation and liberalization of
activities, wide-ranging privatization programmes
and an active strategy by new international operators
were key factors in this phenomenon. This type of
FDI produced significant improvements in systemic
competitiveness2 in these economies and, despite not
directly affecting their international competitiveness,
provided an opportunity to further the development
of new export-oriented productive activities.
This view of FDI and TNC activities can be used as
the basis for interpreting the following sections of this
chapter, which describe the dominant trends in both
investment flows and TNC activities, and provide a more
detailed consideration of two of the main corporate
strategies —the search for natural resources and the
search for local markets for goods and services— which
are not addressed in depth in the other chapters of this
report. Chapter II is devoted to the efficiency-seeking
strategy in Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras
and Jamaica. Chapter III also analyses this type of
strategy, but focuses on the changes experienced by the
global automotive industry and their implications for the
two main FDI poles connected with this activity in the
region, namely Brazil and Mexico.
B. RECENT FDI TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
1. Foreign direct investment worldwide
The year 2003 witnessed a halt to the downward trend
of global FDI flows seen during the two previous years,
with volumes holding steady roughly at their 2002
levels. Preliminary figures published by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), estimate worldwide FDI at nearly US$ 653
billion for 2003 (see table I.3). This static result at the
global level, however, is the outcome of diverging trends
among the various regions, country groupings and
individual economies. Among the developed countries,
the United States –which in the last two years suffered
the steepest reduction in net FDI inflows– in 2003
recorded a vigorous recovery that compensated for the
general decline in investment flows that affected all
other developed economies. In the developing world,
Latin America and the Caribbean has been the only
region in which FDI continued to retreat –for the fourth
straight year and at a still significant pace– whereas
flows picked up in both Asia and Africa. In the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, FDI
maintained the rising trend it has displayed since the
early 1990s.
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The fact that global FDI flows have not recovered
more strongly, following the steep falls recorded in
2001 (41%) and 2002 (21%), and despite the recovery
in the world economy in 2003, is the result of the
persistent decline in transborder merger and
acquisition activity, which had been the driving force
behind FDI growth in the 1990s. According to
UNCTAD, such operations decreased in 2003, by 25%
in amount and by 7% in number, to reach their lowest
levels since 1998.
In developed countries there was a 1% increase in
net FDI inflows, in developing countries a 4% decline,
and in Central and Eastern Europe a 6% expansion. In
the first case, the slight increase is wholly explained by
the performance of FDI in the United States, where its
2003 level virtually tripled the 2002 figure to reach
US$ 86 billion. In the other developed countries, declines
were widespread, albeit heterogeneous: 10% in the
European Union, 20% in Japan and 46% in Canada.
Among developing countries, those of Latin America and
the Caribbean as a whole were again the worst hit, posting
a 25% decline. The countries of Asia and the Pacific, in
contrast, recorded an increase of 4%, while flows to
Africa were up by 31%.
Table I.3
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NET FDI INFLOWS WORLDWIDE, 1991-2003
(Billions of dollars)
 1991- 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003b1996a
World total 254.3 481.9 686.0 1 079.1 1 393.0 823.8 651.2 653.1
Developed countries 154.6 269.7 472.3 824.6 1 120.5 589.4 460.3 467.0
Western Europe 91.0 139.3 263.0 496.2 709.9 400.8 384.4 345.8
European Union 87.6 127.9 249.9 475.5 683.9 389.4 374.4 341.8
Germany 4.8 12.2 24.6 55.8 203.1 33.9 38.0 36.4
France 18.4 23.2 31.0 46.5 43.3 55.2 51.5 36.3
United Kingdom 16.5 33.2 74.3 84.2 130.4 62.0 24.9 23.9
    Other Western European
 countries 3.4 11.4 13.1 20.7 26.0 11.4 10.0 4.0
North America 53.4 114.9 197.2 308.1 380.8 172.8 50.6 97.7
Canada 6.6 11.5 22.8 24.7 66.8 28.8 20.6 11.1
United States 46.8 103.4 174.4 283.4 314.0 144.0 30.0 86.6
Other developed countries 10.2 15.5 12.0 20.3 29.9 15.8 25.3 23.5
Japan 0.9 3.2 3.2 12.7 8.3 6.2 9.3 7.5
Developing countries 91.5 193.2 191.3 229.3 246.1 209.4 162.1 155.7
Latin America and the Caribbeanc 27.1 73.3 82.0 108.3 95.4 83.7 56.0 42.3
Africa 4.6 10.7 8.9 12.2 8.5 18.8 11.0 14.4
Asia and the Pacific 59.4 109.1 100.0 108.5 142.1 106.8 95.0 99.0
China 25.5 44.2 43.8 40.3 40.8 46.8 52.7 57.0
Central and Eastern Europe 8.2 19.0 22.5 25.1 26.4 25.0 28.7 30.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2003. FDI Policies for Development: National and International
Perspectives (UNCTAD/WIR/2003), New York/Geneva. United Nations publication, Sales No: E.03.II.D.8, 2003; and for
preliminary 2003 figures, Global FDI decline bottoms out in 2003, Press Release, 12 January 2004.
a Annual averages.
b Preliminary figures.
c The figures for Latin America and the Caribbean include financial centres.
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2. Foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean:
flows and trends
Table I.4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FDI INFLOWS, BY SUBREGION, 1990-2003 a
(Millions of dollars)
1990-1994b 1995-1999b 2000 2001 2002 2003c
Mexico, Central America
and the Caribbean 6 845 15 414 20 427 31 006 18 499 14 939
South America 8 930 45 534 57 716 38 528 26 480 21 527
Total 15 775 60 948 78 143 69 534 44 979 36 466
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance-of-payment statistics published
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and data from official sources in the respective countries. The figures differ from
those presented in Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 (ECLAC, 2002a),
since that document records investment in the reporting economy, less direct investment carried out by residents of that
economy abroad.
a Figures do not include financial centres. Net FDI inflows correspond to FDI inflows in the reporting economy, minus capital taken
out of the country by the same foreign firms.
b Annual average.
c Estimates based on information provided by central banks.
In 2003 net FDI flows into Latin America and the
Caribbean declined sharply for the fourth year running,
this time by an estimated 19%, falling to a level of
US$ 36.466 billion.3 This figure represents around 60%
of the annual average entering the region in the second
half of the 1990s (see table I.4). The behaviour of FDI
was very similar across subregions in 2003, since the
fall in relation to the 2002 figure approached 19% both
in the Mexico, Central America and Caribbean zone, and
also in South America. In the first-mentioned group of
countries, which have been the leading destination for
TNCs following an efficiency-seeking strategy, FDI has
maintained very similar levels to the average recorded
in 1995-1999. In South America, however, where it has
responded to natural-resource-seeking strategies
(especially in the Andean Community and Chile) and
market-seeking strategies (particularly MERCOSUR and
Chile), FDI in 2003 amounted to 47% of the 1995-1999
average. In this second group of countries, a deterioration
3 This report does not consider statistics on net FDI inflows to tax havens and/or financial centres in the Caribbean, because the data suffers
from problems of quality, coverage and possible double-counting.
in macroeconomic conditions undermined domestic
demand, which, when compounded by the financial
problems experienced by a number of the parent
companies of international firms present in the region,
caused foreign firms to postpone new business
initiatives.
The steep fall in FDI flows to Latin America from
1999 onwards has meant that these are no longer
sufficient to compensate for the negative balance of
financial flows observed since 1996. The net resource
transfer (NRT) towards the region turned positive in 1991
–for the first time since 1981– reflecting the return of
capital flows, both financial and FDI. In 1996, however,
financial flows started to have a negative effect on the
balance of payments, although the net resource transfer
remained positive until 1998 thanks to the dynamism of
FDI. The retreat of the latter began in 2000, and from
2002 onward it has been unable to offset the transfer of
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Figure I.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET RESOURCE TRANSFER, 1980-2003
(Percentages of GDP at current prices)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin
America and the Caribbean, 2003 (LC/G.2223-P), Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.II.G.186,
December 2003.
a To calculate the net resource transfer (NRT), the balance on the income account (net payments in respect of FDI profits, dividends
from portfolio investments and interest payments) is subtracted from the balance of total capital flows. The latter corresponds to the
balance on the capital and financial account, plus errors and omissions, loans, and the use of IMF credits and exceptional financing.
Negative figures indicate resource transfers abroad.
b Equivalent to the balance of foreign direct investment (FDI) less net profit remittances.
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Net FDI inflows Net FDI outflows
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance-of-payments statistics
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Notes: The figure for net FDI inflows only includes foreign direct investment entering the reporting economy, minus capital taken
out of the country by the same foreign firms. It does not include FDI made abroad by residents of the reporting economy,
which was included in figure I.1.
The figures for outflows of FDI-related income only consider net dividends sent by foreign firms abroad, and not net dividends
received by residents of the reporting economy, which were considered in figure I.1.
Figures corresponding to 2003 are estimates.
Figure I.2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FDI INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS OF
FDI-RELATED INCOME, 1990-2003
(Billions of dollars)
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The trend of net FDI inflows to the region, on the
one hand, and the net outflow of FDI-related income, on
the other, show that from 2000 onward the prevailing
pattern of the 1990s has been reversed (see figure I.2).
Net inflows have declined substantially, while net
outflows have grown. Although foreign firms are
investing less in the region, they have not cut back on
the dividends they send abroad, the level of which has
fluctuated around US$ 20 billion since 1997.
In sectoral terms, services have been the main
destination for FDI in recent years; in 1996-2002 this
sector absorbed about 57% of total FDI, followed by
manufacturing (28%) and the primary sector (15%).
Starting in 2001, however, FDI in services began to
decline, and a substantial drop was recorded in 2002;
preliminary estimates suggest that this trend has been
maintained in 2003 (see figure I.3). Accordingly, FDI
flows towards Latin America have been heavily
influenced by the dynamic of the services sector, the
behaviour of which explains both the vigorous expansion
recorded in the 1990s and also its abrupt decline from
1999 onward. As regards the main investor countries in
the region, the 10 largest are all developed economies
and members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The United States
is in first place, accounting for 32% of the total, followed
by Spain, with 19% (see figure I.4). The Netherlands,
France and the United Kingdom lead the next group.
European Union countries significantly increased their
presence as from the second half of the 1990s.
Figure I.3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FDI INFLOWS TO THE LEADING ECONOMIES,
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Raw materials Manufactures Services
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures provided by the central banks
of the respective countries, except in the case of Chile where the data are supplied by the Foreign Investment Committee.
a The six leading recipient countries are: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Colombia. These countries captured 83%
of net FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean (excluding financial centres) during the period 1996-2002.
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Figure I.4
THE TEN LEADING INVESTOR COUNTRIES IN THE SIX LEADING FDI
RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, 1996-2002a
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures provided by the central banks
of the respective countries, except in the case of Chile where the figures are supplied by the Foreign Investment Committee.
a The six leading recipient countries are: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Colombia. These countries captured 83%
of net FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean (excluding financial centres) during the period 1996-2002.
 












MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INWARD FDI, 1990-2002a
(Millions of dollars)
1990- 1995- 2000 2001 2002 2003c1994b 1999b
Mexico 5 430 11 398 16 449 26 569 14 435 10 731
Central America 575 2 067 1 964 2 017 1 354 1 742
Costa Rica 222 481 409 454 662 466
El Salvador 12 282 173 250 208 140
Guatemala 88 213 230 456 110 104
Honduras 41 120 282 195 143 216
Nicaragua 20 194 267 150 174 241
Panama 192 777 603 513 57 576
The Caribbeana 840 1 949 2 014 2 420 2 710 2 466
Jamaica 124 285 468 614 481 500
Dominican Republic 171 594 953 1 079 961 700
Trinidad and Tobago 270 550 472 685 737 700
Other 274 519 121 42 531 566
Total 6 845 15 414 20 427 31 006 18 499 14 939
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance-of-payments statistics
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and data from official sources in the respective countries. Figures for
2003 are estimates based on information provided by central banks. The figures shown in this table differ from those
presented in Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 (ECLAC, 2002a), since that
document records investment in the reporting economy, minus direct investment carried out by residents of that economy
abroad.
a Excluding financial centres. Net FDI inflows correspond to gross inflows in the reporting country, minus capital taken out of the
country by the same foreign firms.
b Annual average.
c Estimates, except for Mexico.
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(a) Foreign direct investment in Mexico, Central
America and the Caribbean
Mexico
Net FDI inflows to Mexico shrank for the second
straight year in 2003, to reach US$ 10.731 billion –down
by 26% on the previous year’s figure, although very close
to the average for the five-year period 1995-1999 (see
table I.5). There are two key factors explaining the retreat
of FDI from its 2002 level. Firstly, the process of market
penetration by foreign banks that had begun in 2000
culminated in 2002 with foreign control of over 90% of
the country’s banking system (ECLAC, 2003a, chapter
III). Secondly, competition from Asian countries,
especially China, for FDI seeking lower costs in order to
improve competitiveness in the United States market,
prevented the upturn in that country from generating a
more substantial increase in investment flows to export-
processing zones in Mexico. Even so, in 2003 Mexico
was still the leading FDI recipient in Latin America and
Caribbean, ahead of Brazil.
A sectoral breakdown shows that investment flows
have mostly been channelled to the manufacturing
sector, especially since the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994
(see appendix table I-A.2). The financial sector also
became a major pole of attraction from 2000 onward,
resulting in a wave of foreign takeovers of Mexican
financial institutions, in which the leading players were
Citicorp and the Spanish banks, Santander Central
Hispano and Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (ECLAC,
2003a, chapter III).
Foreign direct investment flows diminished in these
sectors in 2003. Flows to the services sector shrank by
36% compared the 2002 figure, and an even steeper fall
of 57% was recorded in flows to the financial sector. In
manufacturing industry, export assembly activities have
aroused major interest among foreign investors since the
signing of NAFTA –especially in the automotive,
electronics and clothing segments. The geographic
location of Mexico continues to represent a major
advantage for foreign investors eyeing the North
American market, and this has been boosted by the
significant upturn in economic growth in the United
States and a consequent increase in shipments to that
country. Nonetheless, Mexican industry still faces major
challenges, including competition from China as an FDI
destination.4
As regards the leading investor countries, Mexico is
highly dependent on the United States, which has
invested a cumulative net total of US$ 70.579 billion
between 1996 and 2003, representing 66% of total net
flows to the country. The next largest investors are the
Netherlands (9%), followed by Spain (6%) and the United
Kingdom (4%) (see table I-A.2). The five leading investor
countries accounted for 87% of net FDI flows entering
Mexico.
Central America and the Caribbean
Total FDI inflows to Central America and the
Caribbean in 2003 are estimated at US$ 4.2 billion,
which represents growth of 4% compared to the
previous year’s figure and also with respect to the 1996-
1999 average (see table I.5). As from the mid-1980s,
several countries in this subregion began to receive
investments  from  foreign firms seeking to exploit:
(i) the incentives offered by export processing zones
and preferential access to the United States market for
exports  with  a  high North  American  content;  and
(ii) low labour costs to improve their competitiveness
in the United States market. Several assembly firms
were established as a result, mainly in the apparel
industry. In 2003, economic recovery in the United
States gave a renewed boost to exports by these firms,
which had suffered a sharp slowdown since late 2000.
Nonetheless, the countries of this subregion, the vast
majority of which have specialized in the labour-
intensive assembly industry, will soon have to face
profound changes in the international arena, as a result
of competition from Asian countries, especially China,
and the ending of the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which abolishes import quotas as from 1 January 2005.
Chapter II of this report makes a detailed analysis of
the cases of Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras
and Jamaica.
4 In order to restore competitiveness to the maquila export industry (MEI), the Government of Mexico issued a new decree reforming the law
on MEI development and operations entitled “Diverso para el Fomento y Operación de la IME”. The new decree takes note of the key
demands made by maquila-sector representatives, including a request for correct definition of the terms “maquila controller” and “maquila
operation”, in order to resolve ambiguities; abolition of the requirement to present the rental contract for future plant location; and
extension of the exemptions granted under NAFTA Article 303 to indirect exports, rather than direct ones alone (Comercio Exterior, 2004).
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(b) Foreign direct investment in South America
MERCOSUR
Net FDI flows to  Brazil in 2003 amounted to
US$ 10.144 billion, which marks a fall of 39% compared
to the previous year’s figure and was 47% below the
average for the five-year period 1995-1999 (see table
I.6). As a result, Brazil dropped to second place behind
Mexico in the region’s FDI recipient ranking. The are
several factors behind this sharp decline: firstly, the
country has suffered a reduction in its foreign-currency
purchasing power, as result of the steep devaluation of
the real  and the economic slowdown that has
undermined demand and discouraged FDI targeting the
domestic market; secondly, the crisis that privatized
public utilities have been enduring since 2001 worsened
further in 2003. Since the second half of the 1990s, the
public-utilities sector had been the main focus of
investor interest (see appendix table I-A.2). In an initial
phase the sector received large privatization-related
flows, and then this was followed up by investments to
fulfil the commitments entered into with the regulatory
authorities.
Table I.6
SOUTH AMERICA: FDI INFLOWS, 1990-2003 a
(Millions of dollars)
1990- 1995- 2000 2001 2002 2003c1994b 1999b
Chile 1 207 5 401 4 860 4 200 1 888 2 982
MERCOSUR 4 880 30 188 43 590 25 039 17 496 11 397
Argentina 3 027 10 599 10 418 2 166 775 1 103
Brazil 1 703 19 240 32 779 22 457 16 566 10 144
Paraguay 99 185 119 95 -22 19
Uruguay 51 164 274 320 177 131
Andean Community 2 843 9 945 9 266 9 289 7 096 7 148
Bolivia 85 711 736 706 677 357
Colombia 818 2 796 2 299 2 500 1 974 1 291
Ecuador 303 639 720 1 330 1 275 1 637
Peru 801 2 350 810 1 070 2 391 1 332
Venezuela 836 3 449 4 701 3 683 779 2 531
TOTAL 8 930 45 534 57 716 38 528 26 480 21 527
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance-of-payments statistics
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and data from official sources in the respective countries. Figures for
2003 are estimates based on information provided by central banks. The figures shown in the table differ from those
presented in Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 (ECLAC, 2002a), because
that document records investment in the reporting economy, minus direct investment carried out by residents of that economy
abroad.
a Figures correspond to FDI inflows in the reporting economy, minus capital taken out of the country by the same foreign firms.
b Annual average.
c Estimates, except for Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela.
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The trend of sectoral flows in 1996-2003 shows that
72% of FDI in Brazil was channelled to the services
sector, basically telecommunications and electricity, the
former a result of the privatization of Telecomunicações
Brasileiras (Telebrás), while 24% was absorbed by
manufacturing, largely in the automotive sector (see
appendix table A-I.1). In 2003 the services sector lost
further ground as an FDI target, continuing the trend
that had begun in 2001. Having absorbed 80% of flows
in 1996-2000, the sectoral share had shrunk to 35% by
2003. In contrast, manufacturing industry, which had
accounted for an average of 18% of net FDI inflows
between 1996 and 2000, saw its share expand to 36%
between 2001 and 2003. With regard to FDI-origin
countries, there is greater diversification in Brazil than
in the case of Mexico. The United States is the leading
investor country, accounting for 22% of the total (see
appendix table A-I.1); Spain is ranked second (17%),
followed by the Netherlands (11%). The five leading
investor countries account for 68% of total FDI in
Brazil.
Net FDI inflows to Argentina in 2003 are estimated
at US$ 1.1 billion, representing a 42% rise on the previous
year’s figure, but just 10% of the average amount received
in 1995-1999 (see table I.6). In fact, net inflows in 2002
and 2003 –which slumped to late-1980s levels– are a
long way from the annual average of US$ 7.8 billion
recorded between 1991 and 2000. As mentioned in the
previous report on foreign investment in the region, this
steep decline reflected the crisis the country has been
going through, characterized by restrictions on
withdrawals of bank deposits and foreign-currency
remittances abroad, and then, with the ending of the
convertibility regime in January 2002, by a steep
devaluation of the local currency and a freeze on public-
utility charges.
During 2003 the restrictions on bank deposits have
been gradually lifted, foreign-exchange controls have
been eased, and monetary reunification has begun by
redeeming the quasi-currencies issued by the provinces
during the crisis. In addition, presidential elections were
held, and the new Government signed an agreement with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September.
Despite the initial demands of the Fund, in this
agreement the authorities refused to make any
commitment on public service charges or any
adjustment timetable. The sharp 10.9% contraction in
the economy in 2002 was followed by a robust recovery
of 8% in 2003, leading to an improvement of the
country’s risk perception.
As mentioned in the previous edition of this report,
although the crisis in Argentina hurt all foreign firms, its
effects were not uniform. Firms that had invested with a
view to the national or regional market, or both, were
the worst hit, by a combination of two factors: currency
devaluation among the countries of the region, in
particular the Argentine peso and the Brazilian real, and
a weakening of domestic demand as a result of the crisis.
Secondly, public-utility firms found themselves trapped
with liabilities in dollars, stemming from the loans with
which they had financed their rapid expansion in the
1990s, and a steep fall in their incomes, resulting from
the freeze on prices, devaluation, and the slump in
demand. Investments linked to the search for natural
resources for export –hydrocarbons and mining–
emerged relatively unscathed from the domestic crisis;
and devaluation has actually favoured certain traditional
exports, such as agriculture. In 2002, therefore, FDI flows
were negative in the services sector and positive in
manufacturing, mining and hydrocarbons. In the latter
case, FDI was maintained at the average levels seen since
1992, except for 1999 when Yacimientos Petrolíferos
Fiscales (YPF) was sold (ECLAC, 2000).
As regards investor countries, Spain is the leader
with a 43% share of total FDI flows in 1996-2002 (see
appendix table I-A.2), as a result of an investment wave
driven by large firms such as Repsol-YPF, Telefónica
de España and others (ECLAC, 2002b). Some way
behind come the United States (12%) and the
Netherlands (10%); the five largest investor countries
accounted for 76% of FDI in this period. In 2002,
however, investment flows from this group of countries
were negative, reflecting the deteriorating FDI climate
(see appendix table I-A.2).
Chile
Net FDI flows to Chile in 2003 posted a vigorous
58% recovery following their 55% slump in 2002.
Although this growth is significant, the level of inflows,
on the order of US$ 3 billion, amounts to no more than
55% of the annual average recorded in 1995-1999 (see
table I.6). Chile has the most stable economy in Latin
America and is the region’s best rated country in terms
of corruption, competitiveness, general business climate
and risk rating.5 Since 2002, Chile has signed three free
5 The authorities of this country consider that the slackening of FDI flows may partly be explained by foreign firms’ seeking funding locally
rather than abroad.
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trade agreements, giving it improved access to several
important markets: the United States, the European Union
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).6 In
2003 it also signed double taxation conventions with
Spain and the United Kingdom; in early 2004 it approved
a free trade agreement with the Republic of Korea; and
negotiations are ongoing for a trilateral trade treaty with
Singapore and New Zealand. Estimates for 2003 are even
more encouraging. A significant proportion of FDI
inflows has taken the form of mergers and acquisitions;
and the authorities hope that the signing of free trade
agreements will provide an additional incentive for
foreign investors to choose Chile as a service platform
(ECLAC, 2002b, p. 34).
There have been two major poles of attraction for
FDI in Chile: the primary sector, of interest to TNCs
seeking natural resources; and the services sector, which
attracts firms pursuing a strategy of local and regional
market penetration (ECLAC, 2000). In the first half of
the 1990s, the mining sector accounted for the bulk of
FDI. In the second five years, however, the services
sector, basically energy, telecommunications and
banking, took over as the main destination (see appendix
table I-A.1). It is worth noting that Chilean assets are
relatively expensive when measured in dollar terms, so
TNCs face high entry costs, for example in the retail trade
sector where local players have a strong presence. The
United States and Spain have been the predominant
investor countries, accounting for 25% and 24% of total
flows in 1996-2003, respectively (see appendix table I-
A.2). In that period, the five leading investor countries
generated 78% of total FDI flows.
Andean Community
FDI inflows to Andean Community countries totalled
an estimated US$ 7.148 billion in 2003, which represents
growth of just 1% compared to the previous year’s figure,
but a reduction of 28% with respect to the average for
1995-1999 (see table I.6). The increase in FDI occurred
despite major political crises in two member countries,
which had serious repercussions on their economic
performance. The trends in investment flows have been
varied, expanding in Venezuela and Ecuador, but
declining in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru (ECLAC, 2003a,
chapter II).
Net FDI flows to Bolivia in 2003 are estimated at
US$ 357 million –47% less than the 2002 figure and
50% below the 1995-1999 average. This retreat is
mainly explained by the low level of investment in the
hydrocarbons sector, which between 1996 and 2002
captured just under 50% of all FDI inflows. This
negative trend is associated with political problems and
uncertainty surrounding the natural gas sector (see
box I.5). The United States is the leading investor
country, providing 34% of flows in 1996-2002; next
comes Argentina –basically as a result of operations
carried out by Repsol-YPF; and then Brazil, Italy and
Spain, each with shares of around 10% (see appendix
table I-A.2).
In Colombia, net FDI inflows shrank by 35% in
2003, to a level far below the average recorded in 1995-
1999 (see table I.6). The services sector was the leading
FDI destination in the second half of the 1990s; but since
2001 that sector has lost much of its attractiveness, and
primary activities (hydrocarbons and mining) have
become the main recipients, in a trend that consolidated
further in the first quarter of 2003 (see appendix table
I-A.1). In origin terms, investments come mainly from
Spain (25%) and the United States (9%) (see appendix
table I-A.2).7
In Ecuador, the net FDI inflow in 2003 amounted to
US$ 1.637 billion, which represented a 28% increase,
thereby confirming the rising trend displayed since the
early 1990s (see table I.6). Investments by transnational
petroleum companies largely explain the FDI channelled
to this country. In 1996-2002, the primary sector,
dominated by oil activities, has absorbed 85% of total
FDI (see appendix table I-A.1). The United States is the
leading investor country, with a 34% share in 1996-2002,
followed by Canada, with 24%. The five leading investor
countries accounted for 75% of total FDI in the period
(see appendix table I-A.2).
In Peru, net FDI flows in 2003 totalled US$ 1.332
billion, equivalent to 43% of the average amount entering
the country in 1995-1999, but down by 44% compared
to the 2002 figure. This steep fall in FDI flows does not
reflect the profusion of FDI projects in natural resources
(hydrocarbons and mining) observed in 2003. During
the past year, Peru signed a free trade agreement with
MERCOSUR, which admitted it as an associate member
of the bloc on the same basis as Bolivia and Chile. In the
6 Consisting of Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.
7 Excluding oil investments, Spain and the United States have shares of 18% and 17%, respectively.
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investment area the agreement seeks to encourage the
signing of reciprocal investment promotion and
protection conventions, in addition to a double taxation
agreement. The aim here is to encourage investment
between the countries of the bloc, in order to facilitate
trade and technology flows.
The Venezuelan economy registered an
unprecedented contraction in 2003, on the order of
9.5%, as result of the strike called by opposition political
parties and business entities, which lasted from
December 2002 until February 2003. In addition, the
imposition of stringent price and foreign-exchange
controls have caused difficulties for firms that have to
carry out their transactions in foreign currency. Despite
this climate of economic and political instability, FDI
flows to Venezuela grew more than threefold to reach
US$ 2.531 billion in 2003, which marks a return to
levels near those achieved in 1995-1999, following the
steep fall that occurred in 2002 (see table I.6).
Nonetheless, about 30% of that amount corresponds to
investments by Compañía Anónima Nacional Teléfonos
de Venezuela (CANTV), owned by Verizon
Communications of the United States, that were actually
made in 1996 but only registered in June 2003.8 In
sectoral terms, the hydrocarbons area has been the
strongest pole of attraction for foreign investors. Since
partially opening up to foreign investment in the early
1990s, which was boosted in 1995 by the possibility of
entering strategic partnerships with Petróleos de
Venezuela (PDVSA), this sector has become the
country’s leading FDI recipient. In fact, 49% of FDI
flows have targeted the primary sector, mainly in
relation to hydrocarbons exploitation (see appendix
table I-A.1). In terms of investor countries, 25% of flows
between 1996 and 2002 were sourced from the United
States, followed by Spain which provided 9% of the
total.
To summarize, although statistical data on FDI in
Latin America still suffer from a number of shortcomings,
they nonetheless make a major contribution to
understanding the phenomenon. Based on various
statistical sources and weighing up the regional
experience as a whole, it can be stated that FDI in 2003
continued on the same downward trend that had begun
in 1999. The steepest fall occurred in the MERCOSUR
countries and in the services sector, both of which were
major destinations during the FDI boom of the 1990s.
MERCOSUR countries had mainly absorbed market-
seeking FDI channelled into the services sector, and to
lesser extent manufacturing. There were also reductions,
although less accentuated, in Mexico, Central America
and the Caribbean, which have absorbed efficiency-
seeking FDI targeting the export assembly industries. In
Chile, although the natural-resource-seeking strategy was
very important during the first half of the 1990s, the
search for services markets began to prevail from 1995
onward. In this country FDI posted a revival in 2003,
although it is still far from the levels attained during 1996-
1999. In the Andean Community, where most FDI
inflows are natural-resource-seeking, flows have
increased despite the major economic and political
instability prevailing in some of these countries in 2003.
This shows that FDI with this aim, which has scant
linkage to local economies and is focused exclusively
on exports, is relatively immune to domestic conditions
in the host countries.
Since the start of current decade, the region seems
to have embarked upon a new stage marking the end of
the FDI boom seen in the 1990s. This is mainly
explained by the exhaustion of the privatization process
and by TNC debt levels, especially among firms
involved in public services, which have forced them to
be more cautious in their investments. In this new phase,
the amounts being invested by foreign firms are
substantially smaller, but levels of repatriation abroad
in respect of returns on earlier investment are equal to,
or comparatively larger than during the preceding
period. This is starting to raise the problem of the impact
of FDI on external accounts, especially in countries
where investment does not generate significant exports,
such as in MERCOSUR. Looking to the future, the
prospects are brighter in the international context,
particularly as regards trends in the United States
economy, which suggests a more encouraging outlook
for FDI flows to the region.
8 CANTV reported a 1996 investment of US$ 879 million in June 2003, in order to comply with regulations established for obtaining
foreign currency, according to a statement made to Dow Jones Newswires by Miriam Aguilera, director of the Foreign Investment
Superintendency (El Universal, 2003).
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C. THE OPERATIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
This section aims to show the breadth and depth of the
ongoing process of asset transnationalization in the
economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, among
goods and services producers,  and in financial
institutions. This process has been particularly intensive
in the public-utility and finance areas, which,, certain
precautions are needed when analysing this type of data
(see box I.3).
Box I.3
ORIGIN AND CONSIDERATION OF TNC STATISTICS
The information used to prepare this
section is drawn from the database
maintained by the magazine América
Economía. This fortnightly publication
prepares an annual list of the 500
largest firms operating in Latin America
and the Caribbean, ranked by net
sales. It also incorporates other
relevant data, such as profits, assets,
exports, ownership and stockmarket
quotation, among others. The study
carried out by América Economía is
the only regional attempt to produce a
map of the largest firms operating in
the region. The publication includes
information not only on firms quoted on
the stock exchange, as is the case with
the database maintained the firm
Economática, but also on closed
companies. As a result, the analysis is
broadened in scope to encompass
public enterprises, most of which are
not quoted on stock markets, together
with other private firms and TNC
subsidiaries which also tend not to be
quoted.
Other publications carry out similar
studies. The magazines Fortune and
Forbes prepare separate lists of the
largest firms in the United States and
worldwide. In Latin America,
Expansión of Mexico, Exame of
Brazil and Mercado of Argentina,
among others, also publish data on
the leading firms, but only covering
enterprises operating in their
respective countries. Accordingly, the
effort made by América Economía is
unique at the regional level, and has
become the main input source for
this section.
Nonetheless, for several reasons
the data need to handled with care.
Firstly, sometimes a firm is assigned
all the sales of its subsidiaries, even
if other investing partners are
involved. Problems of double
counting also occur in enterprise
sales when the parent or holding
company and its subsidiaries are
considered at the same time. An
example of this is the Mexican
subsidiary of the autoparts enterprise
Delphi Corp., which appears in the
list along with its subsidiaries Delphi
Packard Electrics Systems and Delphi
Delco Electronics. A similar situation
obtains in the case of several
subsidiaries of foreign companies and, to
a lesser extent, of local firms and their
subsidiaries, which results in the data
published by América Economía tending
to over-represent the presence of foreign
subsidiaries in the region. Throughout
the period covered by the América
Economía databases, the Unit on
Investment and Corporate Strategies
decided to correct the situation only in
the case of Petróleos Mexicanos
(PEMEX), since this has the largest
sales volume of a parent firm and its
subsidiaries. It was decided to keep
PEMEX alone on the list and to eliminate
its subsidiaries.
Despite problems in certain specific
situations, the information provided by
América Economía nonetheless makes a
valuable contribution to elucidating the
trends that have prevailed among the
region’s largest firms.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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1. Transnational corporations
Ever since the 1990s, the arrival of large volumes of FDI
in the region’s countries has resulted in a major process
of asset transnationalization among the economies of
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2001). This
process is revealed in the importance acquired by TNCs
both in goods-producing activities and in service
provision, as indicated by sales data for the 500 largest
enterprises operating in the region. Whereas in 1990
TNCs accounted for 25% of total sales, by 1999 their
share had peaked at 43% (see figure I.5), just at the time
when FDI also reached its highest level. Starting in that
year, the foreign share began to decline, coinciding with
the sharp drop in FDI inflows to the region. Nonetheless,
this retreat does not mean that transnational firms have
lost importance – they still account for 36% of the sales
of the 500 largest companies.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the Special
Studies and Projects Department of the magazine América Economía.
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Transnational corporations have gained a forceful
presence both in the manufacturing sector and in services.
In the first case, many medium and high-technology
industries (automotive, autoparts, electronics) are largely
dominated by TNCs, which have concentrated their
operations in assembly plants located in Mexico to supply
the North American market –and, to a lesser extent, in
Brazil and Argentina, although in this case with a more
marked orientation towards the domestic market and
MERCOSUR (see chapter III). Along with medium and
high-technology industries, a wide range of low-tech
manufacturing industries such as clothing, also operate
under the assembly-plant system, and are located both
in Mexico and in the Caribbean Basin countries (see
chapter II for the cases of Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Honduras and Jamaica).
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The services sector also reveals a broad-based
TNC presence, which has been growing steadily since
economic reforms were implemented to privatize,
deregulate and liberalize public utilities in most of the
region’s countries. This was the sector that received
the largest FDI inflow in the second half of the 1990s.
The new regulatory context for public-utility provision
allowed TNCs to gain ground steadily by purchasing
State-owned assets –and sometimes businesses owned
by local private capital– mainly in the energy,
telecoms, finance and infrastructure areas. This
process explains the growing preponderance of
service-providing TNCs, while the importance of
State-owned firms has waned (see figure I.5). It also
explains the largest firms’ declining participation in
the primary and manufacturing sectors, although the
latter still displays the largest overall presence (see
figure I.6).
Figure I.6
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the Special
Studies and Projects Department of the magazine América Economía.
The relative decline in the TNC presence since 1999
has enabled locally owned private firms to expand in a
number of service areas, specifically those where foreign
firms previously held a large share. The economic crises
suffered by several countries in the region generated
disappointing results for several firms in this sector,
especially those providing non-tradable services. In crisis
periods, where demand slumped across the board, the
inability to redirect production towards other markets was
decisive in the results of these firms, even causing some
of them to withdraw altogether from the countries in
which they had operations. This occurred most
intensively in Argentina, where the economic crisis,
compounded by social and political instability, forced a
number of TNCs established in the country to refocus
their strategies, and several of them closed down their
operations, thereby opening up opportunities for local
enterprises to take on more active roles (see section D of
this chapter). In this way, whereas in 1998-2002 only
about 30% of mergers and acquisitions in the region were
of an intra-border nature –investors from one country
buying assets in the same country– in 2003 about half of
such operations were of this type (see appendix table
I-A.3). This phenomenon, in which local agents take
advantage of investment opportunities such as the
purchase of foreign-held assets, probably indicates that
in situations of regional uncertainty local agents are better
informed and more willing to take risks. Alongside these
factors, the repositioning process was facilitated by the
fact that several local groups were in situations of high
liquidity, as a result of the previous merger and
acquisitions process in which foreign firms had acquired
local assets on a massive scale (see box I.4).
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Box I.4
LOCAL PLAYERS GAIN GROUND IN THE SERVICES SECTOR
In South America the opening up of
the services sector to foreign
investment in the early 1990s
triggered an unprecedented inflow of
foreign capital into this sector,
making it the main target of market-
seeking FDI in the subregion. During
this period foreign firms expanded
vigorously as service providers in
South America, to the detriment of
local enterprises, both private and
State-owned. Since 2002, this trend
has been changing however, with
foreign service providers withdrawing
and those owned by local capital
expanding by buying the devalued
assets put up for sale by the former
group. This is occurring both in the
public utilities sector, especially
telecoms, and in the financial and
retail trade sectors.
Telecommunications: Advance of the
Mexican enterprise América Móvil
In the telecoms area, Teléfonos
de México S.A. (TELMEX) launched
a new expansion strategy for its
mobile telephony businesses in Latin
America in late 2000. In order to
prevent the firm’s finances being
affected by the investments and
results of new businesses abroad,
which require large volumes of
funds, it decided to spin off its Telcel
subsidiary into an independent
enterprise engaging exclusively in
mobile telephony. The new enterprise
began trading under the name of
América Móvil. The firm implemented
an aggressive expansion strategy in
Latin America, based on numerous
acquisitions, boosted by the decision
by several of its foreign competitors
to quit the region. Against this
backdrop, in 2002 it acquired the
shares of its foreign partners in the
Telecom Américas conglomerate,
SBC of the United States, and Bell
Canada, taking control of the latter
which, in turn, owned four mobile
phone operators in Brazil. In 2003 it
invested over US$ 1 billion in the
acquisition of mobile phone
enterprises in several South
American countries, purchasing the
Brazilian firms BSE Sistemas
Eletrônicos Ltda. and BCP
Telecomunicações de São Paulo
from BellSouth for US$ 171 million
and US$ 625 million, respectively. It
gained total control of Consorcio
Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones
(Conecel) by acquiring the remaining
20% of this firm that it did not
already own; it paid US$ 90 million
for an option to buy a controlling
stake in the Argentine operator CTI
Móvil, a subsidiary of Verizon
Communications (United States);
and it announced the purchase of
51% of Compañía de
Telecomunicaciones de El Salvador
(CTE) from France Telecom for
US$ 417 million. With these latest
acquisitions, América Móvil now has
a subscriber base of over 40 million,
distributed across Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia,
Ecuador, El Salvador and
Guatemala. In addition, TELMEX
purchased the assets of AT&T Latin
America in 2003. This list of
countries could be joined by Spain, if
the intention of América Móvil to
purchase the Spanish telecom
operator Auna Telecomunicaciones
comes to fruition. Its current market
presence and potential acquisitions
make América Móvil the leading
competitor of Telefónica de España
in Latin America. In March 2004, in
reaction to the aggressive expansion
of América Móvil, Telefónica reached
an agreement with the United States
operator BellSouth to take over its
interests in Latin America.
Banking: Local institutions are
leading consolidation of this sector in
Brazil
In clear contrast to the rest of the
region, the consolidation of banking
activity in Brazil has been led by
local banks, thereby reversing the
trend observed since 1997, when
foreign operators were vigorously
penetrating the Brazilian market. As
mentioned in the previous edition of
this report, two locally owned banks
–Bradesco and Itaú– have expanded
significantly in the local market over
the last two years, as a result of
active participation in the
privatization of public institutions and
the takeover of several other private
enterprises, both local and foreign. In
2003, Bradesco pressed ahead with its
aggressive acquisition policy by taking
over two foreign operators: the local
subsidiary of the Spanish bank, Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, for US$ 700
million, and the asset management
subsidiary of JPMorgan for US$ 1.8
billion. Itaú, for its part, announced the
purchase of the life insurance and
retirement pension operations of
Assurances Générales de France
(AGF) in October 2003, for which it
paid US$ 84.4 million. Foreign banks,
in contrast, which had been very
dynamic in this area five years earlier,
in this decade so far have been
virtually absent from this type of
offensive, and have even lost ground to
local banks by divesting assets. The
exceptions are ABN Amro of the
Netherlands and the British-based
Hong-Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp.
(HSBC), which, for the first time since
the crisis, displayed a desire to grow
and consolidate their position in the
Brazilian market. ABN Amro paid
US$ 760 million to Banca Intesa (Italy)
for Sudameris, while HSBC, which has
been present in Brazil since 1997, paid
US$ 815 million for all the operations
and assets of the British bank, Lloyds
TSB, which had been operating in the
country for 140 years.
Retail trade: Foreigners exit the
Chilean market, while Chileans expand
their regional presence
Chilean retail trade enterprises
have engaged in intensive activity in
recent years, gaining dominant
positions in the local market and
forcing large foreign players in this
subsector to abandon their operations
in the country. Their strategy has
focused on expanding activities in their
core business or through horizontal
integration into additional areas,
together with the conquest of new
foreign markets. The Falabella
department store has spearheaded the
Chilean expansion abroad, in addition
to having completed large-scale
business deals within Chile. Falabella
began to internationalize its activities
in 1993, by opening stores in the
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Argentine cities of Mendoza, Rosario,
Córdoba and San Juan, and then
venturing into the Peruvian market in
1995 with its purchase of Saga. In
1997, it embarked upon a horizontal
diversification process, acquiring
33% of the Chilean subsidiary of the
home improvement store The Home
Depot (United States), which it now
totally controls, in addition to setting
up travel and insurance businesses
through Viajes Falabella and
Corredores de Seguros Falabella,
respectively. In 1998, it made
purchases to further expand the range
of its businesses: the Chilean
subsidiary of ING Bank, which in 1999
gave birth to Banco Falabella; and 20%
of Farmacias Ahumada, which has a
presence in both Mexico and Brazil. In
2002, it entered the hypermarket
business in Lima, through Tottus.
Lastly, in 2003 it merged with Sodimac,
a Chilean home improvement chain,
and this operation makes the new firm
the second largest in this subsector in
(Box I-4 concluded)
Latin America, surpassed only by Wal-
Mart México. With the aim of breaking
into the supermarket segment, in late
2003 it attempted to purchase the Chilean
subsidiary of the French Carrefour chain
which had decided to leave the country
following disappointing results (see table
I-A.5 of the appendix). Nonetheless, it
was Distribución y Servicios S.A. (D&S)
that finally landed Carrefour, so Falabella
is now studying other options in this
area, such as opening outlets in its own
stores.
Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of The Economist Intelligence Unit,
Business Latin America, several editions; América Economía (various editions); the websites of the firms Invertia (http:/
/www.invertia.com) and Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com); El Mercurio, “Por qué Carrefour optó por abandonar
Chile”, Santiago, Chile, 30 December 2003; Estrategia, “D&S realiza aumento de capital por US$ 287 millones y firma
compra de Carrefour Chile”, Santiago, Chile, 8 January 2004.
Despite a relative weakening of TNC sales in the
last few years, the consolidated sales of the 50 largest
firms in Latin America amounted to about US$ 220
billion in 2002 (see appendix table I-A.4); in other words,
29% of the total sales of the 500 largest firms in the
region, which is similar to the percentage recorded in
1999. In the manufacturing sector, where TNCs are
basically concentrated in the automotive and autoparts
industry, they account for 62% of sales of the largest 50
TNCs, thereby confirming the leadership of
manufacturers among the 500 largest enterprises (see
appendix table I-A.4). Established mainly in Mexico and
Brazil, from where they supply the North American and
MERCOSUR markets, respectively, these enterprises are
the leaders in sales-volume terms. Key examples include
General Motors, Volkswagen, DaimlerChrysler, Ford and
Nissan. In addition, enterprises engaged in the autoparts
trade have emerged very strongly, such as Delphi, Lear
Corporation, Visteon Corporation and TRW, Inc. (the
automotive industry is analysed in detail in chapter III).
Firms in the services sector contribute 28% of the
sales of the 50 largest TNCs, with those in the telecoms
sector posting the most vigorous expansion. In fact,
Telefónica de España is currently the largest foreign firm
in the region: between 1999 and 2002, its total sales more
than tripled, raising it from third place in terms of sales
in 1999 to first in 2002 (see table I-A.4 of the appendix).
It has also expanded practically throughout the continent,
with its main operations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Peru, and a presence also in Colombia, Venezuela,
Mexico and a number of Central American countries.
Meanwhile, firms such as Telecom Italia, MCI (formerly
WorldCom) and Verizon, joined the list of the 50 largest
transnationals in the region thanks to their operations
essentially in Brazil and Argentina.
In the primary sector TNCs account for just 10% of
total sales, largely corresponding to hydrocarbons. This
is consistent with what has been stated earlier, namely
that this is a sector dominated essentially by State-owned
enterprises. The large TNCs operating in this activity are
firms that traditionally have had a major presence in the
region, such as Royal Dutch/Shell, ExxonMobil and
ChevronTexaco. Alongside these, Repsol-YPF is the
largest transnational in the sector, and is also the only
large Spanish enterprise operating outside the services
sector.
In terms of origins, TNCs are dominated by those
based in the United States, which account for 45% of
total sales of the 50 largest transnationals (see appendix
table I-A.4). Further behind come the Spanish firms,
whose sales account for about 20% of the total, and
German enterprises with 11%. The countries in which
TNCs have the strongest presence are Mexico and Brazil,
where they generate 53% and 31%, respectively, of the
sales of the 50 largest TNCs operating in Latin America.
Firms in the automotive industry are very important in
both countries, but especially in Mexico. In Brazil,
meanwhile, the services sector has also become
important, with the local subsidiary of Telefónica de
España becoming the largest of the TNC subsidiaries
present in the region. The case of Argentina is also
notable, given the huge reduction in its share of the sales
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of the 50 largest transnationals. As a result of the bad
results obtained by the subsidiaries of these firms, which
in some cases led them to abandon their operations in
the country, just 6% of the sales of the largest TNCs were
generated in Argentina in 2002, compared to 13% in
1999.
Latin American State-owned firms have maintained
a strong position in the primary sector, despite having
lost some ground as a result of privatization processes.
In fact it is largely thanks to State activity in the primary
sector that these firms are still major players among the
largest in the region, since State-owned enterprises had
roughly a 75% share of the sales of the 25 largest firms
in the primary sector throughout 1990-2002. In the last
few years, and as result of strong international oil prices,
the State share has actually increased. Although the State
has shed much of its old role as producer of goods and
services, leaving the space vacated to foreign enterprises,
this did not happen in the hydrocarbons sector, where,
given the strategic nature of this resource, the enterprises
generally remained in State hands.9 The only exceptions
to this pattern are Argentina, Bolivia and Peru, which
privatized their oil companies in the 1990s. Accordingly,
the region’s largest firms are to be found in this sector,
including Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Petróleos de
Venezuela (PDVSA) and Petróleo Brasileiro (Petrobras),
giants which almost without exception have shared the
three first places in the general list of the 500 largest
firms. In 2002, these three corporations between them
accounted for over 15% of the total sales of this list.
The phenomenon of TNC expansion in services can
be seen more clearly by considering the hundred largest
firms in the sector. In this group, TNCs have expanded
vigorously, whereas State-owned enterprises have
generally declined. Until 1994, TNCs accounted for about
10% of total sales (see figure I.7), with a few firms,
mainly in Argentina and Brazil, operating in the retail
sector (Carrefour and Makro) and in telecoms (Telefónica
de España and Telecom Italia). Starting in the second
half of the 1990s, however, the foreign presence in the
services sector became increasingly clear, as other
countries carried out large-scale privatizations. In
addition to increasing in number, their range also
expanded –in terms of subsectors covered (telecoms and
energy, mainly), and the countries in which they were
establishing their operations. Although Argentina and
Brazil continued to be major hosts for these firms, Chile
and Mexico also gained importance.
9 The same phenomenon occurs in a number of firms in the mining subsector, such as the State-owned CODELCO in Chile.
Figure I.7
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the Special
Studies and Projects Department of the magazine América Economía.
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The most significant moves illustrating the
transnationalization of the sector included the so-called
“Operación Verónica” whereby, at the end of the last
decade, Telefónica de España consolidated its regional
system by raising its equity stake in its Brazilian,
Argentine and Peruvian subsidiaries to almost 100%
(ECLAC, 2001). The takeover of the Chilean electric
power enterprise Enersis by Endesa España was also
highly significant in the configuration of the regional map
of the electric power subsector, because this acquisition
led to a series of operations to acquire energy assets in
Argentina, Peru, Brazil, and elsewhere (ECLAC, 2001).
In the retail trade area, the Wal-Mart subsidiary in Mexico
expanded vigorously, taking over various supermarkets
in that country to become a major sectoral player at both
local and regional levels. The entry of Royal Ahold
(Netherlands) and Carrefour (France) in the late 1990s
also contributed to the regional restructuring of the sector.
Nonetheless, from 1999 onwards, sales growth among
TNCs in the services sector began to falter, and, as
mentioned above, several of them abandoned the region
altogether, thereby opening up spaces for local investors
(see box I.4).
The largest manufacturing enterprises have faced a
different situation. This is the sector in which TNCs
display a major and virtually unchanging presence, in
contrast to State participation which has been practically
nil (see figure I.8). Among manufacturing firms, the
leading enterprises have permanently been subsidiaries
of the large automotive firms established in Brazil and
Mexico, such as General Motors, DaimlerChrysler, Ford,
Volkswagen, Nissan and Fiat. Other important subsectors,
although way behind the automotive group, have been
the food industry, with firms such as Nestlé, and computer
and electronics, involving the subsidiaries of Samsung,
Hewlett-Packard, Sony and IBM, among others, located
mainly in Mexico. The largest operations carried out in
the manufacturing sector, involving the entry of new
transnational players, include the purchase of Grupo
Embotellador México (Gemex) by PepsiCo in late 2002.
The panorama in the brewing sector has also altered, with
operations involving regional groups, such as Cisneros
(Venezuela) and Bavaria (Colombia), together with
TNCs, including Heineken (Netherlands) and Budweiser
(United States) (ECLAC, 2003b, chapter I). In March
2004, the merger between the Brazilian brewer AmBev
and Interbrew of Belgium created the world’s largest
brewery, pushing Anheuser-Busch (United States) into
second place.
Figure I.8
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the Special
Studies and Projects Department of the magazine América Economía.
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An analysis of the 200 largest exporting firms in
Latin America and the Caribbean also reveals a process
of transnationalization in the economies concerned. In
the five years 1990-1994, 25% of all exports were
generated by TNCs, whereas 10 years later their share
amounted to 42% (see figure I.9). The most dynamic
sector, and the one in which TNC presence is greatest, is
manufacturing, which is explained largely by automotive
and electronics activities in Mexico, and clothing and
electronics in Central America and the Caribbean, based
on an efficiency-seeking strategy. Manufacturing exports
virtually quadrupled between the first five years of the
1990s and the first three years of the new decade, to top
US$ 113 billion. With such explosive growth, this sector’s
share in the total exports of the largest exporting firms
grew from 42% in the early 1990s to 56% in the first few
years of the new millennium. This increase has also
resulted in a relative loss of share for firms in the primary
sector, whose exports, although slightly more than
doubling, have accounted for a declining share of the
total, shrinking from nearly 50% at the start of the 1990s
to 36% in the first few years of the new century.
The primary export sector, which plays a key role in
the economies of several South American countries, also
displays a heavy presence of TNCs engaged in
hydrocarbons extraction, including ChevronTexaco,
Royal Dutch/Shell and ExxonMobil; and in mining,
where subsidiaries of BHP Billiton and Anglo American
among others are operating. Although the exports of this
sector grew by 115% over the period 1990-2002, its
relative share among the 200 largest exporting firms has
declined, given the remarkable expansion of the
manufacturing share.
Figure I.9
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2. Transnational banks
Banking activity has also been subject to a vigorous
transnationalization process, especially in the last few
years of the 1990s. Until 1995, foreign operators had a
negligible share in the total assets of the 100 largest banks
in Latin America, compared to their local and State-
owned counterparts (see figure I.10). In the second half
of the decade, however, several of the region’s countries
embarked upon financial reform, aimed at strengthening
and restructuring the system, to be better able to withstand
the crises that may buffet it in the future. The aim was to
enhance systemic solvency by selling local banks to large
international financial groups; but the results showed that
far from helping overcome crisis situations, such as that
suffered in South America, in some cases international
banks chose to abandon their host economies (ECLAC,
2003b, chapter III). By 2000, the banking map in Latin
America had changed radically, and although foreign
banks were still behind their local and State-owned
counterparts in asset terms, the former group was in a
boom situation while the second group was in clear
retreat. Nonetheless, the explosive expansion of foreign
banks has been reversed over the last few years, mainly
as a result of the crises in Brazil and Argentina, which
forced several of them to close down their operations.
Spanish banks, particularly Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria (BBVA) and Banco Santander Central
Hispano (BSCH), were the key players in the purchase
of domestic assets in the second half of the 1990s, and
this has made them the largest transnational banks
operating in Latin America, with operations in several
countries (see table I.7). At a time when Spanish banks
needed to grow, BBVA and BSCH chose to expand their
businesses towards Latin America, as a way of defending
themselves from the progress of their European
competitors (given the problems Spanish banks faced in
achieving expansion in Europe), and also to take
advantage of the new policy of financial-sector openness
implemented by the region’s Governments. For this
reason Latin American subsidiaries are a fundamental
pillar of the Spanish banks’ global businesses –unlike
other large foreign banks, such as Citibank of the United
States or ABN Amro of the Netherlands, for which Latin
American operations represent only a minor part of their
worldwide activity (ECLAC, 2003b, chapter II).
Figure I.10
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the Special
Studies and Projects Department of the magazine América Economía.
a Figures correspond to data for the first half of 2003.
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Table I.7
LATIN AMERICA: LARGEST FOREIGN BANKS BY CONSOLIDATED ASSETS,
FIRST HALF OF 2003
(Millions of dollars)
Rank in Rank in Bank Country of origin Assets Main subsidiaries ina
  2003  1999
1   1 Banco Santander Central Spain 62 894 Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
Hispano (BSCH) Argentina, Venezuela
2   3 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain 61 019 Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Peru,
Argentaria (BBVA) Venezuela, Colombia, Panama,
Uruguay
3   2 Citibank United States 59 463 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela,
Uruguay, Paraguay
4   5 ABN Amro Bank Netherlands 16 174 Brazil, Chile; Argentina,
Colombia, Paraguay
5   4 FleetBoston Financial Corp. United States 13 754 Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay,
Mexico, Panama, Peru
6   6 HSBC Holdings United Kingdom 12 203 Brazil, Argentina, Panama, Chile
7 10 Scotiabank Canada 11 455 Mexico, Chile, Panamá, El
Salvador, Dominican Republic
8 11 Sudameris France 5 337 Peru, Argentina, Panama,
Colombia
9    b J.P. Morgan Chase United States 4 476 Brazil, Mexico, Chile
10   7 Lloyds TSB Group United Kingdom 3 761 Brazil, Argentina, Colombia
Total 250 537
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data provided by the Special Studies
and Projects Department of the magazine América Economía.
a Figures include subsidiaries with assets in excess of US$ 250 million. The countries are ordered according to the assets of their
respective subsidiaries.
b In 1999, JPMorgan and Chase Manhattan had not yet merged, so it is impossible to compare the position of the joint enterprise in
2003 with the ranking of the two banks when independent. In 1999, JPMorgan was ranked 21st, while Chase Manhattan was in
ninth place.
 The composition of the 10 largest foreign banks
present in Latin America reflects the regional importance
of the Spanish banks. By the end of the first half of 2003,
the two leading Spanish operators accounted for 49% of
the total assets of the top ten (see table I.7). In
comparison, the three United States banks accounted for
31%. Citibank has become the most important of the
three, following its 2001 purchase of Banamex in
Mexico. With total assets in the region of US$ 60 billion,
of which its Mexican subsidiary accounts for two thirds,
Citibank is now third among the 10 largest foreign banks.
These figures confirm the importance of the United States
and Spain in FDI inflows to Latin America, in this case
targeting the banking sector, following a service market-
seeking strategy. Other countries with a regional banking
presence include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Canada and France, although their shares are all well
below 10%.
In the banking sector generally, 35 of the region’s
100 largest banks were foreign at the end of the first half
of 2003, accounting for 34% of total assets. There are
also 48 local private banks which jointly account for 40%
of assets, while the 17 State-owned banks hold 26%.
To summarize, foreign investment inflows to Latin
America explain the vigorous process of asset
transnationalization experienced by the region’s
economies. This is revealed through the changing
structure of the largest firms operating in Latin America,
with TNC presence growing at the expense of State and
local participation. The change was particularly forceful
in the public utility and financial services areas, where
the State had traditionally played a leading role, but
which it steadily gave up in the wake of the reforms
implemented in the 1990s. Services joined
manufacturing, where the transnational presence is longer
established, as the main targets of TNC activity. Exports
by TNCs have also expanded vigorously, especially in
manufacturing, favoured by preferential conditions for
entry into the North American markets. The largest TNCs
come predominantly from the United States (largely
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manufacturing) and Spain. It is important to highlight the
tremendous growth achieved by Spanish firms, which at the
present time are key players in the telecom and energy areas,
and also in banking –in a process that has generated very
substantial improvements in the quality and coverage of basic
utilities previously delivered by the State.
The position achieved by TNCs has been undermined
somewhat by the economic crisis. The space vacated by
firms that decided to close down their operations in the
region, given bad results and economic uncertainty, has
gradually been occupied by various local actors,
which saw the crisis as an opportunity to gain new
positions, particularly in the services markets. The
next section makes a more detailed analysis of the
strategies that guided the behaviour of TNCs over
the last year, making it possible to conceptualize
and better understand recent changes in the trends
prevailing in the transnational segment of individual
economies.
D. STRATEGIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
This section of the ECLAC foreign investment report
traditionally analyses the three major types of strategy under
which transnational enterprises operate in Latin America
and the Caribbean. In this edition, however, chapters II and
III are devoted to the corporate strategy of efficiency-
seeking, through detailed case studies of a number of
Caribbean Basin countries and the automotive industry,
respectively. This section will therefore address the
other two strategies in greater detail, namely the
search for natural resources and the search for
services markets, thereby offering a more balanced
overview of the three strategies followed by TNCs
operating in the region.
1. Transnational corporations in search of natural resources
Transnational enterprises continue to show interest in
investing in the region’s raw materials sector, despite the
crises that have affected several Latin American countries,
which discouraged new investments in other productive
sectors and, in some cases, called into question the key
role of TNCs in the extraction of natural resources, mainly
hydrocarbons and minerals. As has been traditional in the
region, FDI in the primary sector is basically concentrated
in the South American countries, since they offer abundant
natural resources and favourable regulatory frameworks.
Such conditions have largely defined the primary-exporting
characteristics of the productive structure of several
countries in the subregion. With the expectation that FDI
in this sector would be positive for the host countries in
terms of foreign-currency generation, high local content
and job creation in non-urban zones, Governments
implemented policies to attract foreign firms, and the latter
established themselves in the subregion through
partnerships with large State-owned enterprises, or through
the concession of areas for natural resource exploitation,
especially in hydrocarbons.
In 2003, various investments were made in the
mining, oil and natural gas subsectors. The crises in
several of the region’s countries had little effect on
TNC investment decisions in those subsectors since
this type of FDI is largely disconnected from local
economic activity. Nonetheless, these firms have been
confronted by a crisis of another type in which their
role in the host country has been called into question,
firstly because they do not provide sufficient
resources to the State, and secondly because their
operations cause substantial environmental harm.
In the mining industry major investments are
currently being carried out in Argentina, Peru and
Chile –countries that have high-quality reserves and
offer attractive tax breaks to the subsector. During
the current decade, a large part of mining FDI has
been aimed at the exploitation of gold deposits,
although other minerals and metals, such as copper,
have not lost importance. In addition to institutional
factors offering long-term stability, the development
of mining projects has been driven by an increase in
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the demand for metals which, in turn, partly explains the
high international prices attained by these commodities.
The gold price has been rising since the second half of
the 1990s, and in late 2003 it topped US$ 400 per ounce.
In addition, thanks to the increased demand for copper,
especially in China, and the control over world reserves
established in Chile by the State-owned CODELCO, the
price of copper rose strongly to reach US$ 1.40 per pound
in March 2004, having been very depressed in recent
years.
In Argentina and Peru there has been significant
activity by the Canadian enterprise Barrick Gold (the
world’s second-largest gold producer), whose
development plan for 2003-2008 includes investments
totalling US$ 2 billion in three deposits: Alto Chicama
in Peru, Veladero in Argentina and Pascua-Lama on the
border between Argentina and Chile. The latter contains
proven and probable reserves of 26 million ounces of
gold, making it one of the largest in the world. A key
factor for exploitation of the Pascua-Lama mine was the
late-2002 signing of a mining treaty between Argentina
and Chile, through which a legal framework was created
to regulate the activity when this spreads across both sides
of the border. In addition, the Canadian operator Meridian
Gold is developing another project for exploitation of a
gold deposit with reserves of 3 million ounces.10 Copper
mining, meanwhile, is led by Chile, where Minera
Escondida, owned by BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto,
inaugurated phase 4 of its expansion project, requiring
an investment of around US$ 1.045 billion. This raises
the productive capacity of Escondida by 50%, to 1.2
million tons of copper per year (Portal Minero, 2003).
Plans to expand Escondida are moving ahead, and in June
2003, a US$ 400 million investment was announced in
the Escondida Norte project, which is set to come
onstream in 2005. This will make it possible to maximize
the synergies of the different operations, in order to
achieve the firm’s goal of maintaining its production
around 1.2 million tons per year.
In the hydrocarbons subsector, the various political
upheavals –unlike the economic crises– that affected
resource-rich Venezuela and Bolivia undermined TNC
investment plans in this area. The same situation occurred
in Brazil, where investments have slowed down in the
wake of the decision by the Government to review its
policy of opening up hydrocarbons activity to private
enterprise. The situation in Argentina and Peru has been
different, however, with major investment plans being
announced in the subsector. Nonetheless, investment in
natural gas in Argentina, which is mainly used in the
domestic market, has been undermined firstly by a price
freeze –not only for natural gas but also for electricity,
which uses gas as a fuel in thermoelectric power plants–
and secondly by of a lack of clear regulations regarding
public utilities.
Oil activity in Venezuela was brought to a virtual
standstill by the strike that occurred in the country
between December 2002 and January 2003. Production
slumped to just 200,000 barrels per day –a negligible
volume compared to the daily rate of almost 3 million
barrels before the strike. Against this backdrop, the
investment of over US$ 600 million in the two
development phases of the Yucal Placer gasfield, operated
by the Franco-Belgian TotalFinaElf,11 originally
scheduled for the first half of 2003, had to be postponed
to early 2004. The State-owned PDVSA is also looking
for partners to carry out a natural gas project on the
Deltana platform, located on the maritime border with
Trinidad and Tobago, involving an investment of nearly
US$ 6 billion. In late 2002, Statoil (Norway) and
ChevronTexaco (United States) were chosen as partners
for PDVSA in areas 2 and 4, but it is not yet clear who
will carry out the exploration work in areas 1, 3 and 5. In
addition there is the Mariscal Sucre project, whose main
activity will be a gas liquefaction plant for export to the
United States. With an investment of US$ 2.7 billion,
this project involves PDVSA in partnership with the
Anglo-Dutch firm Royal Dutch/Shell and the Japanese
Mitsubishi (ECLAC, 2003b, chapter II).
In Argentina, the Spanish enterprise Repsol-YPF is
planning to invest US$ 5.5 billion between 2003 and
2007, while the Brazilian State-owned Petrobras, which
expanded its presence in Argentina by purchasing Pérez
Companc in 2002, has a US$ 2 billion investment planned
for the same period, aimed at increasing its oil production
in the country by 66%. In the case of natural gas, the
Cruz del Sur Consortium completed construction of a
gas pipeline through which 4.5% of Argentine gas
production will be exported to Uruguay (Oil & Gas
Journal, 2003). Nonetheless, as mentioned above,
investment in the subsector is currently at a halt, pending
definitions regarding contracts with privatized firms,
since a large part of the gas is consumed in the local
market.
10 There is also interest in exploiting deposits in the Argentine Patagonian area, where AngloGold of South Africa is already working the
Cerro Vanguardia mine.
11 TotalFinaElf is the lead operator with a 69.5% stake. Other participants include Repsol-YPF (15%), and the Venezuelan firms Inepetrol
(10.2%) and Otepi (5.3%).
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In Ecuador the heavy crude oil pipeline, construction
of which by several transnational oil companies12 began
in June 2001, has now come on stream. This will facilitate
a major increase in the country’s crude oil exports, by
adding transport capacity for 400,000 barrels per day
(ECLAC, 2003b, chapter II).
In Peru, investment has tended to be concentrated
in the Camisea natural gas field, a project currently over
85% complete, and which has committed investments of
about US$ 1.2 billion. One of the consortium partners,
Hunt Oil of the United States,13 signed an agreement with
Tractebel (Belgium) to sell it 2.7 million tons of liquefied
natural gas to generate electric power in Mexico. This
export project, which involves investments totalling
US$ 1.8 billion, will turn Peru into a net exporter of
petroleum products. In addition to this agreement, the
Camisea project received loans for US$ 135 million and
US$ 75 million from the Interamerican Development
Bank (IDB) and the Andean Development Corporation
(ADC), respectively, to finance the processing and
distribution (downstream) phases of the project. The
granting of these credits aroused opposition from
environmentalist and indigenous groups opposed to the
Camisea project; and these groups succeeded in forcing
the United States Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) to
reject disbursement of a US$ 214 million credit for
Camisea.
The opposition that this project has met with is not
an isolated phenomenon in the activity of natural-
resource-seeking TNCs in Latin America. The previous
edition of this report mentioned that FDI aimed at natural
resource exploitation was the category least affected by
the economic crisis in South America. This was because
extractive activity carried out by TNCs is mainly aimed
at export, is highly capital intensive, mainly uses imported
inputs and generates little value-added, with the result
that it is poorly integrated into local productive structures
(except in the case of natural gas), and gives rise to very
few productive linkages. As a result, local economic
conditions have little effect on investment decisions.
Although these characteristics enable the activity to
remain relatively immune to economic crises, they also
raise serious doubts as to the real contribution made by
this type of FDI in the host countries.
Opposition to TNC activity has been two-pronged.
Firstly attention is drawn to the environmental harm that
extractive operations usually cause to the surrounding
area, the aftermath of which is hard to mitigate in the
short or medium term, compounded by its effects on
neighbouring populations. The lawsuit against Texaco
which is ongoing in Ecuador, and the forced
postponement of the Alumysa project in southern Chile
as result of protests by the local community, are two
examples that highlight the real or potential consequences
of extractive activity in the absence of appropriate
environmental regulations (see box I.5). The second
prong questions the contribution made by TNCs to fiscal
revenues in the host country, through tax payments and
royalties. It has been suggested that firms should have to
pay for the right to extract nonrenewable natural
resources, bearing in mind that the countries of the region
generally have abundant resources and good physical
conditions for their extraction, which lowers the firm’s
costs. From different domains and with different
consequences, the payments made by firms for natural
resource extraction have been called into question in both
Bolivia and Chile. One of the main causes of the serious
crisis in Bolivia was the requirement that natural gas
should not leave the country without firstly making sure
it would generate major gains for the nation. Similarly,
in Chile the possibility of reviewing the taxation of copper
mining is emerging as an issue once again, and the idea
of charging a royalty for this activity has been suggested
(see box I.6).
12 Members of the consortium are mostly firms that currently produce oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon: Alberta Energy Ltd. (Canada, 31.4%),
Repsol-YPF (Spain, 25.69%), Petrobras (Brazil, 15%), Occidental Petroleum (United States, 12.26%), Agip (Italy, 7.51%), Kerr-McGee
Corp. (United States, 4.02%) and Techint (Argentina, 4.12%).
13 Hunt Oil has a 40% stake in Camisea. The other partners are the Argentine Pluspetrol (40%) and SK Corporation (Korea) with 20%.
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FDI aimed at natural resource
exploitation generates positive
impacts in the host countries basically
through the payment of taxes and
local expenditure by the firm (wages
and input purchases). It also has
negative impacts, however, stemming
from the environmental damage
caused by extractive activities and
consequent disruption of traditional
ways of life among neighbouring
communities. For this reason, firms
have been facing growing opposition
from the inhabitants of the regions in
which they operate, as a result of
greater awareness of the
environmental issue –initially
promoted in the 1970s in developed
countries– which frequently
transcends national borders. As a
result, both firms and Governments
have been forced to take the demands
of affected sectors into account. The
lawsuit filed against Texaco in
Ecuador, and the postponement of the
Alumysa project in Chile, are
illustrative of the way local
communities have forced firms to
account for the damage they cause, in
the case of Texaco, and delayed a
project because of potential to cause
environmental damage, in the case of
Alumysa.
“Case of the century” against Texaco
in Ecuador
Indigenous communities in
Ecuador are currently in litigation
against the United States
transnational petroleum company
Texaco (now known as
ChevronTexaco), which they accuse of
having withdrawn from Ecuador in
1990 following 23 years of extractive
activity, leaving in its wake
considerable economic damage in the
country’s Amazon jungle caused by
the dumping of tons of waste and
crude oil in the area. The first lawsuit
against the petroleum company had
been filed in 1993 before the New York
Federal Appeals Court, which in 2002
ruled that the case should be heard in
the Ecuadorian courts, and ordered
the firm to submit to its jurisdiction.
The case began on 21 October 2003,
in the small chamber of the Court of
Lago Agrio, a jungle town in the
northeast of Ecuador. The plaintiffs
are demanding the following from
Texaco: economic compensation of
US$ 1 billion; the cleanup of some
600 oil wells and toxic and hazardous
waste dumps that were abandoned in
the zone; decontamination of polluted
rivers, streams and lakes; installation
of a potable water network in all the
villages of the region; medical care
for inhabitants of the zone who are
suffering chronic diseases as a result
of environmental pollution; and help
for affected indigenous communities
to enable them to regain the way of
life they enjoyed before the start of oil
activities in the region.
ChevronTexaco does not deny the
environmental damage caused by the
toxic materials, but it invokes
Ecuadorian law at that time, to which
the relevant industrial standards
adhered. Moreover, it denies
responsibility for decisions taken by a
foreign subsidiary which participated
in a consortium with Gulf Oil and the
State-owned PetroEcuador (which
eventually held a majority share when
Gulf Oil sold its stake), even though
Texaco was the consortium operator.
Lastly, it argues that ChevronTexaco
cannot be held accountable for the
actions of Texaco, which was taken
over in 2001 by Chevron, and bear
the costs of “supposed acts imputed
to a firm of which it is not the
successor” (Clarín, 2003). The lawsuit
has been dubbed the “Case of the
century”, given its complexity and the
scale of the damage caused, which
makes it the worst ever ecological
disaster in the western hemisphere.
The quantity of toxic wastes
discharged into the environment is
three times as large as the Exxon
Valdéz oil spill off the coast of Alaska
in 1989, which required an enormous
investment to clean up.
Opposition to the Alumysa project in
Chile
In Chile, the Alumysa project,
involving an investment of US$ 2.75
billion, was suspended by the
Canadian operator Noranda, following
the decision by the Regional
Environment Corporation (Corema) to
reject the environmental impact
assessment presented by the firm.
The project, which has been in the
development stage for over a decade,
entails construction of an aluminium
production plant, three mega-
hydroelectric plants, and a port at
Chacabuco Bay in the Aysen region in
the southern part of the country. The
plant would import over a million tons
of minerals per year (aluminium,
calcined coke, tar, cryolite, fluoride
salts and others) from Jamaica, Brazil
and Australia, for the purpose of
producing 440,000 tons of aluminium
ingots, destined mainly for the
external market. The project has
aroused fierce opposition from local
inhabitants, environmentalist groups
and the salmon and tourism
industries, since the industrial process
for aluminium production is well
known to be one of the most polluting
in the world, and the Aysén region is
one of the areas of greatest
environmental value in Chile.
Opponents of the project accuse the
Canadian firm of choosing Chile as
the location for its project in order to
avoid the costs of complying with the
strict environmental laws in force in its
home country. Given that Chile does
not have its own bauxite, which is the
raw material used in aluminium
production, nor great industrial
demand for aluminium products, they
argue that industrial waste would be
the only thing left in the country; and
they fear this would set a precedent
for other highly polluting projects to
choose Chile as the destination for
their investment. According to
estimates made by Fundación Terram,
of the US$ 467 million in value added
Box I.5
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
50 ECLAC
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that Alumsya would generate per year,
only 15% would remain in the country.
Of this, 3% (US$ 13.5 million) would
directly benefit the Aysén region
through wages paid to local workers.
According to the project’s opponents,
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Gary Hughes, “Canadian industrial
giant prepares invasion of Patagonia”, Native Forest Network, 2002; Global Reporter, “Texaco Era, el precio del oro
negro”, 2003 (http://www.global-reporter.net/spanish/index.html); Arnaldo Pérez, “¿Se retira Alumysa?”, La insignia,
Madrid, 2003; Glenn Switkes, “Folket i Ecuador mot Texaco”, Tidskriften Kommentar, 1994; Fundación Terram Megaproject
“Alumysa: de reserva de vida a basurero industrial”, Análisis de políticas públicas, serie APP, 2002; Judith Kimerling,
“Impacto ambiental y acciones legales”, 2002 (http://www.accionecologica.org); Amazon Watch, “Timeline. The case
against Chevron Texaco”. (http:// www.amazonwatch.org/amazon/EC/toxico/index.php?page_number=5).
the project would mean selling the
country’s environment and water to a
foreign firm on the cheap; and having
developed comparative advantages as
an exporter of natural resources, the
country would move into selling its
ecosystems and serving as an
industrial rubbish bin. The firm, which is
seeking financial partners, decided to
halt the project in August 2003, in order
to exert pressure in response to the
delay in authorization.
Natural gas export project suspended
in Bolivia
In Bolivia, a project to export natural
gas to the United States and Mexico
triggered a major political crisis which
in October 2003 led to the resignation
of the President of the Republic
elected only the previous year. This
project involves a total investment of
US$ 6 billion, of which one third would
be carried out in Bolivia and in the
country chosen as the location for the
export port (Peru or Chile), while the
rest would be invested in the
destination country (Mexico or the
United States). The project is being
carried out by the Pacific LNG
consortium – operated by Repsol-YPF
of Spain and British Petroleum (BP) to
exploit the Margarita deposits in the
Department of Tarija in southern
Bolivia. The protests were triggered by
the Bolivian Government’s choice of
Chile rather than Peru as the location
for the Pacific coastal port through
which the gas would be exported.
Nonetheless, the project’s opponents
soon moved to a stance of outright
rejection, regardless of the port
chosen, and now are even calling into
question the 1996 Hydrocarbons Act
which allows private firms to exploit,
extract, transport and market the
production obtained, subject only to
the requirement to pay royalties, but
exempt from the obligation to share
their profits. The project’s opponents
claim that Bolivia would obtain a
negligible share of the overall
business. According to Centro de
Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y
Agrario (CEDLA), the current price at
which natural gas is being sold to
Brazil is US$ 1.77 per thousand cubic
feet (MPC). The gas exported to the
United States would be sold for just
US$0.70 per MPC, of which the
Treasury would receive 18%, in other
words about US$ 0.13 per MPC. The
project’s opponents insist that the
hydrocarbons shortfall on the
domestic market should firstly be
covered, which raises the paradox
that, despite having the second
largest gas reserves in Latin America
after Venezuela, Bolivia has the lowest
coefficient of natural gas consumption
per capita in the continent, and its
inhabitants are forced to make use of
other more expensive energy sources,
such as electricity or liquefied gas
(which is also more dangerous), or
simply use firewood or other fuels.
They also insist on the need to add
greater value to the gas through
industrial processing within Bolivia. In
his inaugural address, the new
President of Bolivia promised to hold a
binding referendum to decide whether
or not to export the gas, and whether
the Hydrocarbons Act should be
amended. In response, Repsol-YPF,
the operator of the Pacific LNG
Consortium, has suspended its
investment plans and decided to
exploit natural gas in Indonesia for
export to the Mexican and United
States markets.
The debate over royalty payments in
copper mining in Chile
Chile is a country with great
geological-mining potential; and it has
the world’s largest copper reserves
located in high-quality deposits close
to ports, which allows production costs
to be kept low. In addition, FDI in the
mining sector operates under a
favourable institutional framework, and
in a context of economic and political
stability, all of which makes the mining
sector attractive for FDI. Large-scale
mining in Chile is subject to the
general tax regime, except that
Box I.6
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D.L.600 offers the possibility of tax
invariability. Certain special
characteristics of large-scale mining
enable it to take better advantage of a
number of general incentives. One of
these is accelerated depreciation,
which allows for rapid recovery of the
investment and acts as a major
stimulus to a capital-intensive activity.
Under the legal status of “Contract
mining company”, these firms have to
pay income tax (first category) and a
tax on dividend payments at 35%.
Nonetheless, the law contains
mechanisms that make it possible to
evade payment, for example by
making remittances abroad without
paying dividend tax, provided these
are not reported as profits. Moreover,
as interest payments are taxed at a
rate of just 4%, firms record part of
their contributions to subsidiaries as
intra-enterprise loans, in order to
avoid paying the 35% tax on
dividends.
This tax regime has enabled
transnational mining firms to keep
their costs down after payment of
taxes and still earn a good return, but
their contributions to fiscal revenues
have been slight, especially in
comparison to those made by the
State-owned CODELCO. The tax
regime for mining became a major
issue in 2002, following the sale of
the Disputada de Las Condes mine
by Exxon Mobil for US$ 1.3 billion.
The problem arose because
throughout its 20 years of operation of
the country, the firm had always
declared losses, thereby avoiding
payment of income tax.
As a way of improving the tax
system, debate has begun on the
possibility of requiring a royalty
payment from private firms engaging
in large-scale mining activities. This
would take the form of a duty (rather
than a tax), which firms usually have to
pay for the extraction of a
nonrenewable natural resource. The
opponents of this proposal claim that it
would discriminate against the
country’s leading economic activity; its
promoters counter that non-payment of
royalties for the extraction and use of
the mineral creates positive
discrimination, since mining is the only
activity that obtains its raw materials
free of charge. Generally speaking,
firms interpret tax amendment bills as
a change in the rules of the game, and
threaten to scale back their projects if
the changes are implemented.
Nonetheless, the geological and
institutional conditions prevailing in
Chile would still enable it to offer highly
favourable advantages even if the
royalty were applied.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Carlos Arze, “El problema del
gas: desarrollo económico versus intereses de las transnacionales”, Informe de coyuntura, Nº 1, 2003; Miguel Lora,
“Es cuestión de tiempo, Chile dependerá del gas boliviano”, 2003 (http:// www.pulsobolivia.com).
These disputes highlight the need to consider the
way the region’s countries have acted to attract foreign
investment. The main problem that needs to be resolved
is how to strengthen the links between TNCs and the
countries that accommodate them, in order to break the
enclave status that the firms adopt. In addition, fiscal
policies (regulatory and tax laws mainly) need to be
consistent with the objectives of reducing adverse impacts
and increasing positive ones. The first of these includes
avoiding major harm to the environment, or to the terms
of trade –given the negative effect on international prices–
in addition to improving integration with local economic
activity. The second includes the search for better
exploitation of technologies brought into the country by
the investing firms, and increased use of local resources,
which means input suppliers and technical and
professional staff, along with other local services.
In conclusion, transnational enterprises remain
interested in pursuing their activities in Latin America,
despite the fact that several projects have run into
problems that have led to their suspension. Unlike what
will be seen in the following section, these obstacles have
not resulted in a significant decline in natural resource-
based projects, since they do not stem from economic
crises being faced in the host countries, but instead involve
institutional disputes. These new conditions have forced
countries to rethink the way they set entry conditions for
foreign investors. In the primary sector, although the State
presence has traditionally been very important, private
enterprises have managed to establish their businesses,
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either independently or else through partnerships with
State-owned firms. Public policies towards natural
resources need to consider the sustainable development
of the sector and include ways of overcoming the
problems that have arisen from TNC activities in this
area. Thus, it is necessary to ensure the revenues to be
received by the State in return for exploitation of non-
renewable natural resources. In addition, policies are
needed to integrate foreign business activity with the local
economy, in order to strengthen productive linkages and
generate greater value-added in production. In this way,
countries with natural resource abundance could expand
their productive structure, by moving from simple
extraction and export, to a stage in which there are also
initial (upstream) processes and secondary (downstream)
processing of the resource in question.
2. Transnational firms in search of local markets for services
The search for services markets has been the most
important strategy pursued in Latin America in the second
half of the 1990s. Implemented by TNCs, the strategy
has been applied in a wide range of activities, such as
energy, telecommunications, banking and retail trade. The
largest investments have been concentrated in the member
countries of MERCOSUR and Chile, although Mexico
and a number of Central American and Caribbean
countries have also attracted investors to the financial
and retail trade sectors, and to a lesser extent public
utilities (ECLAC, 2000, 2001 and 2002b). Thus, South
American countries received major FDI inflows
channelled to the tertiary sector, which, although
traditionally controlled by State-owned firms, resulted
in a growing presence of foreign enterprises. From the
second half of the 1990s onward, TNCs became
increasingly important players among the region’s major
service providers, as discussed above.
Although characterized more by the transfer of
existing assets than by new investments, the dynamic
private investment process seen in the initial years of the
reforms gave the sector an injection of resources for
modernization of facilities, which led to significant
improvements in both coverage and service quality,
thereby increasing the systemic competitiveness of the
economies in question.
As mentioned in the previous edition of the foreign
investment report, foreign firms that made investments
in order to enter local markets are those that suffered
most, both from the impact of the crises suffered by
several South American countries since the start of this
decade, and as a result of the slide on world stock markets
that began in late 2000. In the countries of this subregion,
the contraction of domestic demand in the wake of
adjustment policies and devaluations seriously impaired
the revenues of public-utility firms in dollar terms. This
situation highlights a significant difference with respect
to enterprises seeking natural resources and efficiency
for their exports, which could better protect themselves
from such upheavals by sending most of their production
to the external market. The consequences of the crises
meant that firms in the services sector had serious
difficulties in meeting their high foreign-currency
liabilities contracted during the expansion phase in the
1990s. This situation, compounded by a poorly defined
regulatory framework, generated conflicts between the
regulatory authorities and firms, which tried to raise their
charges at a time when consumer incomes were
shrinking.
At the world level, the crisis that shook large
corporations mainly in the public utilities sector, between
2000 and 2002, revealed the fragility of enterprises
which, in the midst of merger and acquisition fever, had
expanded their businesses in the 1990s on the back of
heavy borrowing. Unlike what happened in the last
decade, they are now finding it much harder to obtain
the funding needed for their activities, which makes them
reluctant to contribute to their subsidiaries when these
encounter problems. As a consequence, many of the
subsidiaries not only have failed to meet their investment
commitments, but have actually declared a suspension
of payments on their liabilities. In addition, as result of
the problems that have arisen, several firms have decided
to withdraw from the region, the counterpart of which
has meant progress for locally owned firms in the services
sector (see box I.4).
The crisis raised new challenges relating to the
regulatory frameworks under which the firms operate.
Often, such regulations were established after the
privately owned firms have been set up, so the regulatory
framework design was adapted to the pre-existing
industry structure, which was generally monopolistic or
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otherwise uncompetitive.14 In addition, the regulatory
framework was frequently defined under pressure both
from the fiscal area and from multilateral agencies that
were urging countries to speed up the reform process.
As a result, the regulatory framework could not prevent
concentration or monopoly conduct leading to higher
charges and worker layoffs; nor did it provide the tools
needed to solve the regulatory disputes that quickly began
to appear. In this new context, the definition of new rules
was not problem-free, as competent regulatory bodies in
many cases were not available for this task. The examples
of Argentina and Brazil clearly illustrate how the
authorities have had to rethink their relationship with
privatized firms, which has meant questioning previous
agreements, redefining rate structures in the case of
Argentina, and using public funds to bail out the
subsidiaries of large TNCs in financial difficulties, as
has happened in the electric-power subsector in Brazil
(see boxes I.7 and I.8).
14 See ILO (1999), Campodónico (2000), Cárdenas (2003), Paliza (1999), Fisher, Gutiérrez and Serra (2000), Fernández and Birhuet (2002).
Box I.7
RENEGOTIATION OF UTILITY RATES IN ARGENTINA
In Argentina, as a result of the steep
devaluation of the local currency, the
Public Emergency and Exchange-
Rate Regime Reform Act was passed
in January 2002, which froze public
utility rates and expressed them in
pesos, and appointed the Ministry of
Economic Affairs to renegotiate
concession contracts with privatized
firms. Fierce social and political
resistance has succeeded in keeping
utility rates frozen, despite
tremendous pressure exerted by the
firms themselves and by the IMF for
them to be raised. In 2002 the
Government tried to adjust charges
on three occasions, but these
initiatives were suspended as result
of judicial rulings in each case. In
July 2003, the new Government
created the Ministry of Federal
Planning, Public Investment and
Services, from which a special
commission was given the task of
reviewing and renegotiating all
contracts with privatized enterprises
(telecommunications, electric power,
gas, water, railways, highway
concessions, postal services and
airports, among other areas). It was
also announced that the
renegotiation period would be
extended until late 2004. Firstly, each
of the contracts will be individually
reviewed to determine whether there
has been non-compliance by the
firms. Then, the firm, the Government,
the corresponding regulatory body
and various NGOs will renegotiate a
new contract, which will finally be sent
to Congress for approval and
implementation (Latin America
Energy Report, 2003).
The most conflictive situation has
arisen in the electricity subsector,
where power outages have occurred.
Mutual recriminations between the
Government and the firms,
concerning the causes of the power
cuts, have generated a climate of
tension between the two parties. The
firms, which have reduced their levels
of investment to the minimum, state
that the outages were due to a lack of
funds to invest in system expansion
and maintenance, precisely because
charges have been frozen. The
Government, for its part, claims that
the power cuts are a deliberate
attempt to force a rise in rates. The
privatized firms also complain that
they have liabilities in foreign currency
but receive their revenues in the
devalued local currency and at frozen
rates. In fact, several of them have
ceased payment on their debts, and
are negotiating loan restructuring with
their creditors. They also complain about
the delay in renegotiating contracts and
establishing clear regulatory rules. They
warn that with the current charges and
uncertainty generated by the lack of
definition in the rules, they can neither
undertake new investments nor carry out
those needed to maintain the system.
The authorities’ response is that the
firms cannot exempt themselves from the
crisis in the country, nor ignore the
inability of the consumer to pay higher
rates. They add that it is the firms, rather
than consumers that must assume
responsibility for having borrowed in
dollars, just as they must bear the
inherent risks of business activity. There
are currently 25 lawsuits in process
against State of Argentina in the
Arbitration Court of the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), filed by privatized firms
seeking support from investment
protection treaties. The lawsuits,
amounting to about US$ 12.55 billion,
together with a further US$ 2.5 billion in
claims filed before other courts, are
founded on the firms’ not having been
authorized to tie their rates to the dollar,
as stipulated in the contracts, a point that
has been a key issue throughout the
public-utility rates problem in Argentina
(Clarín, 2003).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Latin America Energy Report, 11
July 2003; Clarín, Buenos Aires, 2 November 2003.
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Box I.8
THE BRAZILIAN STATE BAILS OUT TRANSNATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER FIRMS
One of the main objectives of
privatization and reform of the electric
power industry was to solve the
chronic problem of investment
financing that arose in the 1980s, as a
result of the external debt crisis. Not
only was this goal not fulfilled, but
privatization was followed by an
abrupt reduction of investment in the
sector (see figure below). In addition,
and to avoid systemic collapse, the
State of Brazil, acting through the
National Bank for Economic and Social
Development (BNDES), had to provide
a financial bailout for the subsidiaries of
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Source: Hermes de Araujo, Investment in the Brazilian ESI. What went wrong? What should be done?, Instituto de Economia
da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2001, quoted in Hugo Altomonte, Políticas públicas para el desarrollo
sustentable del sector energético, Fifth Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Mining and Energy (Santiago, Chile, 18-20
July 2001).
The underlying causes of this
situation are regulatory failings and
the design of the reforms,
compounded by bad financial
management on the part of the parent
companies and their subsidiaries.
The problem stems from the fact
that the private sector was given
responsibility for investment, but
without sufficient incentives in terms
of competitive markets and knowledge
of how the wholesale power market
operates (Altomonte, 2001). For
example, prices for the power plants
operating in the system were set in
1997 to last till 2002, without defining
what would happen thereafter. The
previous system was reformed to
provide centrally guaranteed fuels
(coal and residual oil or “óleo
combustível”), in order to partly
compensate for variations in rainfall.
Nonetheless, the alternative system
proposed by the Government had still
not been approved by late 2003. Lack
of definition in the new model
generated a climate of uncertainty for
the firms, which made them reluctant
to invest.
In addition, the globalization of
electric power companies, which is
still a very recent phenomenon, was
financed with a high level of debt,
which caused major financial
imbalances in the parent companies
when the stock market bubble burst
in late 2000. In addition, subsidiaries
in Latin America assumed a high
degree of exchange-rate risk, by
maintaining heavy liabilities in foreign
currency while their revenues are in
local currencies. On this latter point,
the regulatory authorities are also
culpable for failing to raise the alarm
concerning the risk involved in this
situation.
In 2003, BNDES offered a bailout
package for distributor firms, subject
to certain conditions. Firstly it
reached an agreement with AES
Corp. of the United States, which had
suspended payments in early 2003
on expiry of a US$ 1.2 billion debt
with BNDES itself. The loan had been
granted to AES Corp. guaranteed by
its stake in Eletropaulo
Metropolitana, a firm that would have
returned to State ownership if it failed
to pay its debt. Based on this
agreement, Novacom was created as
a new enterprise jointly owned by
AES Corp. (50.1%) and BNDES
(49.9%). Half of the debt owed by
AES Corp. will be capitalized in the
new firm, while US$ 515 million will
be paid back over a 10 to 12-year
period; AES Corp. will have to put up
US$ 85 million of its own funds. The
agreement means that AES Corp.
retains control of the firm, its most
important asset in the country, while
offloading half of its debt with the
Brazilian Government.
For the other distributor firms,
BNDES offered a bailout package
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worth US$ 3 billion. Under this plan,
BNDES would purchase 10-year
equity-convertible bonds from the
firms, on condition that an agreement
is reached with creditors to
restructure 30% of their short-term
debt. The restructured debt must have
a repayment term of at least three
years, with the first installment not
falling due until at least 12 months
have elapsed from the signing of the
financing agreement with BNDES.
The amount to be lent by BNDES
(through the bond purchase), will be
equal to the amount of the debt that
the firm succeeds in restructuring, up
to a maximum of 50% of its total
short-term debt. In addition, the firms
must join the “Novo Mercado” –a new
stock market with stricter rules– to
force them to adopt better patterns of
corporate management. A final
condition is that the debts owed by
Brazilian subsidiaries to their parent
companies must be fully capitalized in
those subsidiaries. This condition is
dampening enthusiasm among a
number of firms, whose parent
companies are not willing to make
capital contributions. Nonetheless,
Light Serviços de Electricidade,
controlled by Electricité de France,
which has the highest debt with its
parent company (US$ 410 million),
does seem willing to accept the plan.
(Box I.8 concluded)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Latin America Energy Report,
11 and 25 September 2003; Hermes de Araujo, Investment in the Brazilian ESI. What went wrong? What should be
done?, Instituto de Economia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2001; Hugo Altomonte, Políticas públicas
para el desarrollo sustentable del sector energético, document presented at the Fifth Inter-Parliamentary Conference
on Mining and Energy, (Santiago, Chile, 18-20 July 2001).
3. Investments and asset purchases in the services sector
In the telecoms area, where revenues declined sharply
in 2002 following a lengthy growth period, a number
of foreign firms, mostly from the United States, are
withdrawing from the region, while two others,
Telefónica de España and the Mexican operator América
Móvil, are advancing vigorously (ECLAC, 2001,
chapter IV). These two firms are competing for control
of the mobile telephony market in Latin America, taking
advantage of sharply lower asset prices (see table I.8).
Interest in expanding market share is being driven by
upbeat projections made by analysts for this subsector.
For example, Pyramid Research, a United States
consultant in the telecoms area, is projecting 6% annual
average revenue growth in this industry for 2003-2008,
twice that estimated for Europe and the United States,
although less than in the emerging countries of Eastern
Europe and Asia. These healthy prospects, together with
a significant drop in the valuation of corporate assets
as a result of the crisis in the region and the difficulties
that many firms are encountering in divesting assets,
have offered attractive business opportunities for
buyers. For example, in the telecom boom years,
investors paid over US$ 2,000 per subscriber to buy
mobile telephony firms, whereas in mid-2003 this value
in some cases dropped as low as US$ 400-US$ 500
(EIU, 2003b).
In the 2002-2003 biennium, América Móvil and
Telefónica de España accelerated their asset purchases
in the region –essentially in Brazil, where the struggle
for regional leadership is being waged most intensively,
but also in Argentina, in the case of América Móvil
(see box I.4 and table I.6), and in the mobile segment
in Mexico, in the case of Telefónica. Another of the
major players is Telecom Italia, operating through its
TIM subsidiary. Consequently, the market is in the
hands of just a few firms, and the four largest mobile
telephony operators in Latin America control 82% of
all subscribers. América Móvil, Telefónica and TIM
now account for 73% of mobile phone customers,
compared to 64.4% in 2001. In Europe and Asia, by
comparison, the four largest firms control less than half
of the market (EIU, 2003b).
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Table I.8
TELEFÓNICA DE ESPAÑA AND AMÉRICA MÓVIL: NUMBER OF MOBILE
 TELEPHONE CUSTOMERS, 2003
 Telefónicaa América Móvil
Argentina 3 311 1 411
Brazil 20 656 9 521
Chile 3 571 …
Colombia 1 915 3 674
Ecuador 816 1 537
El Salvador 248 216
Guatemala 409 870
Nicaragua 229 100
Mexico 3 454 23 444
Panama 420 …
Peru 2 149 …
Puerto Rico 175 …
Uruguay 146 …
Venezuela 3 307 …
Total 40 806 40 773
Source: El Mercurio, 7 March 2004.
a
 Includes subscribers to BellSouth, after Telefónica had acquired its Latin American assets in March 2004.
15 France Telecom retains 2% of Nortel for regulatory reasons, since the rules of privatization stipulated that the majority owner of the Nortel
controller group must be foreign. Telecom Italia owns the other half of Nortel.
16 This figure is reduced to US$ 2.7 billion when money held in cash to meet liabilities when necessary is deducted. Nonetheless, the debt is
now in the process of renegotiation and when this concludes the real amount will likely be considerably lower, bearing in mind that similar
renegotiations in the telecoms subsector resulted in haircuts of over 60% (Clarín, 2003c).
Latin America remains the key pillar of growth for
Telefónica de España, and, despite suffering the effects
of economic instability over the last few years, the firm
has deepened its involvement in the region during this
period, as shown by the fact that the vast majority of its
subscribers are in Latin America. In Mexico, Telefónica
has increased its presence through two operations: in
2001, purchase of the four local operators owned by
Motorola, and in 2002, the acquisition of Pegaso PCS,
which made it the second largest mobile telephony
operator in Mexico. In Brazil, in 2002 it acquired 14.7%
of Telesp Celular Participações (TCP), a subsidiary of
Portugal Telecom, in the framework of an agreement with
the latter to merge under BrasilCel all the mobile phone
companies owned by the two enterprises in Brazil. In
2003, BrasilCel announced the acquisition of Tele Centro
Oeste Celular Participações (TCO), whose 3 million
subscribers raised the firm’s total number of customers
to 17 million. Currently it is implementing a project worth
roughly US$ 1.5 billion to construct a national GSM
(Global System for Mobile Communications) and GPRS
(General Packet Radio Service) network in Brazil. In
March 2004 it reached an agreement with BellSouth
(United States) to purchase its Latin American interests
for US$ 5.85 billion. With this latest operation, Telefónica
de España has consolidated its position as the region’s
leading telecoms enterprise, equalling the number of
subscribers to América Móvil in the mobile phone
segment (see table I.8).
Another foreign telecoms firm that has consolidated
its presence in the region is Telecom Italia. Already the
owner of 50% of Nortel, which in turn held a controlling
54.7% stake in Telecom Argentina, the Italian operator
paid US$ 60 million for an option to purchase a further
48%, which would give it total control of the consortium.
Its former partner in Nortel, France Telecom, with which
it had an equal share of the equity, sold 48% to a local
group belonging to the Werthein family.15 The buyer paid
US$ 125 million in cash and absorbed a prorata share of
Telecom Argentina’s defaulted debt, which, at US$ 3.3
billion, was the largest amount ever accumulated by a
local private group.16 The share purchase option would
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17 In Brazil and Venezuela, retail trade sales fell by 2% and 16%, respectively, between January and August 2003, compared to the same
period a year earlier. In Mexico, supermarket sales grew by 5.6% during the first half of 2003, while economic recovery has had a positive
effect on retail trade in Argentina (EIU, 2003c).
allow Telecom Italia to take full control of the Argentine
company at any time between early 2009 and late 2013,
and enable Werthein today to become the owner of half
of the country’s second-largest phone company, with a
real outlay of between US$ 60 and US$ 70 million
(Clarín, 2003c).
In contrast to the firms described above, others are
scaling back their presence in the region: Verizon (United
States) and Vodafone (United Kingdom) sold their stakes
in Iusacell in Mexico; Verizon also sold its Argentine
subsidiary, CTI Móvil, to América Móvil; AT&T sold its
Latin American assets to the Mexican operator Telmex;
MCI, formerly WorldCom, has put its stakes in Avantel
and Embratel in Mexico and Brazil, respectively, up for
sale; BellSouth sold BSE and BCP to América Móvil in
Brazil, and then the remainder of its Latin American
interests to Telefónica de España. Lastly, Sprint is looking
for a buyer for its stake in Intelig, partly owned by France
Telecom, which is also currently withdrawing from the
region.
In the electric power subsector, the problems that
have faced public-utility firms in general, as described
at the start of this section, were compounded by others
relating to organization and regulation. These
situations have provoked a number of disputes between
the firms and regulators, which on occasions have
delayed implementation of the company’s business
plans.
One of the largest investments is that announced by
Endesa España, which is planning to invest US$ 2.853
billion over the period 2004-2008 (US$ 484 million to
be used in 2004) in new power plants in Latin America,
thereby increasing its installed capacity in the region by
1,056 MW (La Tercera, 2004).
In Argentina, few investments are being carried out
owing to the tension that exists between the Government
and electric power enterprises as a result of pricing
problems. The most important of those that are going
ahead include two projects to export electricity to Chile.
In October 2003 AES Corp. announced investments
totalling US$ 50 million in an electric-power distribution
line to interconnect the networks of its subsidiaries in
the south of Argentina and Chile. Petrobras Energía is
also studying an electric-power interconnection project
similar to that of AES Corp., to be implemented through
Transener, an enterprise owned by the Brazilian firm in
partnership with the British National Grid. The Transener
project involves an investment of US$ 135 million to
build a 500 kV power line between the hydroelectric dam
complex in the south of Argentina and Chile, which could
be inaugurated between 2006 and 2007 (El Cronista
Comercial, 2003).
Since early 2002 firms in the subsector in Chile have
been awaiting developments in the “Ley Corta” electric
power bill, which aims to solve the causes of
underinvestment in the sector, especially in the
transmission segment. The most conflictive point has
been lack of agreement on who should pay electric power
transmission tolls, an issue that generated major friction
between the National Energy Commission (CNE), the
subsector regulator, and the Ministry of Economic
Affairs, resulting in the resignation of the CNE executive
secretary. Some analysts believe that investments by
electric power firms have been frozen until a new
regulation is in place. In January 2004, the “Ley Corta”
bill was finally passed, and the authorities now expect
major progress in improving and modernizing the sector,
with increased investments in the transmission segment,
particularly in the southern zone of the country. This new
regulatory framework is expected to elicit investments
in new projects totalling about US$ 3 billion (Estrategia,
2003).
The retail trade segment has gone through hard
times over the last two years, as a result of the steep
reduction in purchasing power in Latin America, which
was even worse in foreign-currency terms. Nonetheless,
the declining sales trend levelled out in 2003, and an
increase of 2.6% is forecast in the consumption of food,
beverages and tobacco for 2004 (EIU, 2003c). In 2003,
the performance in this subsector has varied across
countries: retail sales retreated in Brazil and Venezuela,
while Argentina and Mexico posted recoveries
compared to the previous periods.17 Faced with this
situation, some chains have decided to leave the region,
or to offload some of their assets. The Dutch enterprise
Royal Ahold, for example, having made two
acquisitions in 2002 in Argentina and Brazil, changed
course and in early 2003 announced its intention to
divest its assets in the region. In that year it sold its
interests in Chile, Paraguay and Peru, and in March
2004 reached an agreement to sell most of its Brazilian
assets to Wal-Mart. Meanwhile, JC Penney sold six of
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18 JC Penney had already withdrawn from Chile in 1999, having sold its assets to the local group that owns the Almacenes París department
store chain.
its stores in Mexico to the Sanborns group, which forms
part of the Mexican conglomerate Grupo Carso.18
Among the chains that remain, the strategies observed
to cope with the decline in purchasing power involve
selling own-brand products, which enables the firms
to offer significant discounts, in conjunction with the
purchase of other chains, or partnerships with them,
to increase both their scale and their bargaining power
with suppliers, and the horizontal diversification of
their activities. The merger and acquisitions movement
is intensifying the level of concentration in the area.
The Chilean groups have performed outstandingly,
having consolidated in the local retail market and
expanded to several other Latin American countries
(see box I.4).
The financial subsector has also been affected by
the crisis in South America, the repercussions of which
have caused the exit of a number of foreign financial
institutions, mainly from the Argentine and Brazilian
markets. In the latter country, the largest in the region
and where foreign banks have penetrated least, these have
also faced harsh competition from large local banks,
whose strengthened competitiveness prevented foreign
competitors from gaining dominant market positions.
Those that have entered the country in the last five years,
such as HSBC, BBVA and ABN Amro, have found it
hard to compete and forge an identity in the market, for
which reason several of them decided to divest their
Brazilian assets. In contrast, locally owned banks,
particularly Bradesco and Itaú, have expanded
considerably over the last two years, leading the
consolidation movement that has occurred in the banking
system by purchasing assets put on sale by the State, and
others that were privately owned both locally and by
foreigners (see box I.4). National banks continued to
progress in 2003, as a number of foreign competitors
withdrew, but the novelty was that other foreign banks
also made acquisitions, thereby signalling a desire to
grow and consolidate in the Brazilian market. Currently,
high rates of interest, combined with heavy government
reliance on borrowing, are providing banks with a chance
to acquire assets of lower risk and higher yield, such as
government bonds. Some analysts believe that if a
reduction in the public deficit is achieved and inflationary
pressures are eased, in the medium-term the banks will
start to look for business opportunities with the private
sector, mainly in the consumer credit market. Foreign
banks such as Citigroup (United States) and HSBC
(United Kingdom) have already begun to focus their
strategy in that direction (EIU, 2003d, 2003a).
In conclusion, the services sector, which was where
TNCs penetrated most in the 1990s, suffered a reverse,
or a slowdown in progress, during the first few years of
the current decade. The economic crisis, with attendant
weakening of domestic demand, left firms in this sector
in an uncomfortable position, since they cannot redirect
their production towards markets where demand
conditions are more favourable. On the other hand, the
crisis revealed regulatory conflicts that served to further
complicate the situation for these firms. As a result,
several of them redefined their strategy and decided to
offload their operations in the region. This enabled local
enterprises to increase their presence in the sector by
buying up assets put on sale, as was clearly seen in the
banking subsector in Brazil and in retail trade in Chile.
At the same time, other companies that decided to remain,
especially European telecom operators, managed to
consolidate their positions. The telecoms area in
particular has displayed great dynamism over the last
few years, with major operations carried out by both
European and Latin American companies in the largest
regional markets.
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E. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that the
FDI phenomenon is generally somewhat more complex
than normally assumed, and the different standpoints
from which it is usually studied only provide a partial
view. Accordingly, a combination of the various
perspectives, using different statistical sources, is needed
to build a conceptual framework that affords a more
thorough and deeper understanding of the nature and
fundamentals of both FDI and the activities of
transnational corporations. ECLAC is therefore
proposing a reference framework for interpreting the
phenomenon in Latin America and the Caribbean, in
which TNC strategies are fundamental.
This chapter points out that FDI flows have
continued to decline, and this has caused additional
concerns especially in terms of external financing. In
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, the
preferential destination for firms pursuing an
efficiency-seeking strategy, FDI retreated less than in
South America, where natural resources- and market-
seeking strategies have predominated. Despite this, the
presence of TNCs in both goods- and service-
producing activities remains strong. In addition, the
review of situations facing the natural resources- and
regional market-seeking strategies confirms that FDI
seems to have entered a stage of smaller volumes,
which in turn has generated macroeconomic
instability. Moreover, the gap between expectations
and reality in terms of FDI flows has widened. The
research carried out suggests that this gap is different
in each of the corporate strategies that determine FDI
destinations and amounts (see table I.9).
When a few examples are examined, it can be seen
that in designing policies FDI-recipient countries
generally expect natural-resource-seeking FDI to
generate exports based on natural resources with high
local content, in order to generate employment in non-
urban zones, along with increased fiscal revenues through
taxes, among other benefits. Recent experience in the
region, however, suggests that a number of problems have
arisen from the fact that TNC activities adopt an enclave
modality without integrating into the local economy; they
generate little value-added, and the level of local
processing is low; in addition, revenue from taxes levied
on nonrenewable resources is very small, and this is
compounded by complications resulting from the
instability of international commodity prices and
environmental pollution.
With regard to FDI associated with a local-market-
seeking strategy (goods and services), the main
expectations held by the Governments of recipient
countries focus on the creation of new productive
activities, improvements to the economy’s systemic
competitiveness, increased local content, promotion of
new productive linkages, greater local business
development and improvements in the coverage, cost and
quality of local services, among other things. Here again,
recent experience shows that this category of FDI in Latin
America has been accompanied by problems of various
kinds. Higher costs and lower quality among these
products or services, compared to international norms,
tends to limit their competitiveness; and there have also
been regulatory and standards-related problems
especially in countries facing macroeconomic difficulties.
As a result, there is a considerable mismatch in the region
between the expected benefits and those that have
effectively been materialized in the case of FDI driven
by natural-resource-seeking strategies, and an even larger
one in the case of FDI motivated by the search for local
markets. The situation with respect to the strategy that
seeks efficiency to conquer external markets will be
addressed in depth in chapters II and III.
The conclusions of this analysis ultimately suggest
that it would be advisable for national policymakers to
take a more broad-based view both of the FDI
phenomenon and of TNC activities, even if only to ensure
external resource flows. Clearly there are causal
relationships between the economic determinants, host
countries’ expectations, and the problems that have arisen
following several years of the transnationalization process
in local economies –relations that can best be understood
from a perspective that takes account of the strategies of
TNCs operating in the region. It would therefore seem
prudent to have a contingency plan in place to cope with
the various types of problem that are starting to emerge
in relation to FDI. Host countries should define what they
expect from FDI, and the role it will play in the context
of their national productive development strategy, in order
to prioritize the corporate strategies seen as most
important in this context.
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Table I.9
IMPACT OF BUSINESS STRATEGIES ON RECIPIENT ECONOMIES
FDI strategy Potential benefits Possible difficulties
Natural-resource- Increased natural-resource exports Enclave activities not integrated into local
seeking Improved international economy
competitiveness of natural resources Little local processing of resources
High local content of exports Cyclical international prices
Employment in non-urban areas Low tax revenues from non-renewable
Tax revenues and royalty income resources
Environmental pollution
Local-market- New local economic activities Production of goods and services not
seeking Increased local content internationally competitive (not world class)
(national or regional) New/deepened production linkages Weak position in terms of international
Local enterprise development competitiveness
Improved services (quality, coverage Regulatory and competition problems
and price) and improved systemic Disputes in relation to international investment
competitiveness obligations
Crowding out of local companies
Efficiency-seeking Increased exports of manufactures Becoming stuck in the low-value-added trap
(to capture export Improved international Focus on static rather than dynamic advantages
markets) competitiveness of manufactures Truncated production linkages: dependence of
Transfer/assimilation of technology assembly operations on imported components
Training of human resources Crowding out of local companies
New/deepened production linkages  ”Race to the bottom” in production costs
Local enterprise development (salaries, social benefits, exchange rate)
Evolving from an export platform into  “Race to the top” in incentives (tax,
a manufacturing centre infrastructure)
Limited cluster creation
Technological-asset- Technology transfer Low propensity to invest in technology
seeking Improved science and technology Stagnation of production
infrastructure Unfocused national policy
Specialized logistics development
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Table I-A.1
LATIN AMERICA: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF FDI, 1996-2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Cumu- Share1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003a lative (%)total
Mexico b
Primary 116 140 71 210 282 38 209 25 1 090 1
Manufacturing 4 719 7 306 5 123 8 985 9 309 5 854 5 435 4 532 51 262 48
Services 2 887 4 715 3 048 3 971 6 858 20 677 7 615 4 875 54 646 51
Brazil 
Primary 111 457 143 846 1 299 1 494 637 1 482 6 469 4
Manufacturing 1 740 2 036 2 767 7 003 5 088 7 000 7 620 4 480 37 734 24
Services 5 814 12 817 20 362 20 140 24 139 12 547 10 499 6 940 113 258 72
Argentina
Primary 1 728 177 1 324 17 845 2 736 898 1 225 ... 25 934 43
Manufacturing 2 776 3 308 1 147 1 950 1 487 49 596 ... 11 314 19
Services 2 096 4 888 3 648 3 153 4 749 1 261 -1 036 ... 18 759 31
Other 350 788 1 173 1 038 1 445 -42 -9 ... 4 743 8
Chile c
Primary 1 090 1 758 2 523 1 388 363 975 2 002 ... 10 098 28
Manufacturing 917 627 530 828 240 754 209 ... 4 105 11
Services 2 829 2 833 2 981 6 983 2 419 3 053 1 166 ... 22 264 61
Colombia
Primary 866 696 110 -73 27 1 020 837 483 3 966 19
Manufacturing 731 514 785 505 514 236 285 140 3 710 18
Services 1 515 4 354 1 934 1 019 1 758 1 244 851 312 12 987 63
Ecuador
Primary 307 562 769 605 681 1 139 1 078 ... 5 141 85
Manufacturing 24 45 30 8 10 59 56 ... 232 4
Services 169 117 70 36 28 132 141 ... 693 11
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Ministry of Economic Affairs of
Mexico, Directorate General of Foreign Investment; Central Bank of Brazil; Ministry of Economic Affairs of Argentina; Foreign
Investment Committee of Chile; Banco de la República de Colombia; and Central Bank of Ecuador.
a In the cases of Mexico and Brazil, the figures for 2003 cover the whole year. In the case of Colombia, they refer to the period
January-June.
b The global total of FDI flows broken down by destination sector differs from the total reported in the balance of payments, because
the former only includes amounts notified to the National Foreign Investment Register (RNIE), in addition to imports of fixed assets
by maquila enterprises. RNIE notifications tend to be made with a significant lag compared to the date on which the investments
are actually made. This means that the amount of FDI reported to RNIE in any given month largely corresponds to investments
carried out several months earlier. Similarly, the figure reported as FDI materialized during a given period is not definitive, because
the amount subsequently increases as RNIE receives notification of the remainder of investments carried out in that period.
c The differences between figures obtained from the Foreign Investment Committee and the balance of payments (Central Bank)
(see table I.8) arise from the types of record used by each institution. The Committee only considers investment carried out under
the auspices of D.L.600, which covers over 85% of the total investment entering the country. Moreover, while the Central Bank
records investment flows received under all mechanisms, it does not classify as FDI long-term credits granted to foreign firms,
which are very significant in the case of large-scale mining projects. Another source of discrepancy relates to the deadlines under
which flows are registered. The Central Bank does this when the money actually enters or is withdrawn, while the Investment
Committee records flows at the date on which the investment contract establishes their entry.
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 Table I-A.2
LATIN AMERICA: LEADING INVESTOR COUNTRIES, 1996-2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Cumu- Share1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003a lative (%)total
Mexico
United States 5 187 7 455 5 340 7 067 11 841 20 362 8 227 5 101 70 579 66
Netherlands 493 359 1 070 1 000 2 583 2 563 1 155 470 9 693 9
Spain 74 329 345 997 1 908 743 293 1 381 6 068 6
United Kingdom 83 1 830 184 -193 265 87 1 144 853 4 252 4
Canada 516 240 208 623 665 984 208 160 3 605 3
Other 1 367 1 948 1 095 3 672 -813 1 830 2 233 1 467 12 800 12
Brazil 
United States 1 975 4 382 4 692 8 088 5 399 4 465 2 614 2 383 33 998 22
Spain 587 546 5 120 5 702 9 593 2 767 587 710 25 612 17
Netherlands 526 1 487 3 365 2 042 2 228 1 892 3 348 1 444 16 332 11
Cayman Islands 655 3 382 1 807 2 115 2 035 1 755 1 555 1 909 15 213 10
France 970 1 235 1 805 1 982 1 910 1 913 1 815 825 12 455 8
Other 2 783 4 008 5 777 6 843 7 648 8 250 8 834 5 632 49 775 32
Argentina
Spain 146 1 792 908 16 830 6 750 494 -900 ... 26 020 43
United States 2 021 2 017 920 1 307 947 533 -193 ... 7 552 12
Netherlands 1 079 1 757 1 073 424 378 1 302 -87 ... 5 926 10
France 418 168 1 310 1 536 656 521 -175 ... 4 434 7
Italy 109 284 339 655 910 -60 -118 ... 2 119 3
Other 3 180 3 140 2 742 3 233 778 -624 2 251 ... 14 700 24
Chile
United States 2 285 904 1 402 1 395 778 1 776 594 480 9 613 25
Spain 488 1 508 896 4 580 678 351 248 122 8 871 24
Canada 585 1 058 988 458 1 165 207 506 187 5 155 14
United Kingdom 298 542 704 370 183 390 1 510 130 4 126 11
Italy 325 19 6 51 96 920 30 7 1 453 4
Other 856 1 187 2 039 2 345 122 1 137 489 351 8 525 22
Bolivia
United States 131 257 357 339 368 351 289 ... 2 092 34
Argentina 7 95 221 106 81 100 31 ... 641 11
Italy 138 149 110 65 52 63 27 ... 604 10
Brazil 38 68 35 139 40 72 182 ... 574 10
Spain 14 83 46 10 46 59 268 ... 526 9
Other 98 202 259 351 244 231 202 ... 1 587 26
Colombia
Spain 360 84 1 652 -85 -145 869 147 ... 2 882 25
United States 366 587 87 819 158 629 -54 ... 2 592 9
Netherlands 51 33 145 876 177 184 32 ... 1 498 6
Cayman Islands 165 929 561 660 119 -432 -101 ... 1 901 4
Virgin Islands 115 357 69 411 -64 571 3 ... 1 463 4
Other 829 970 1 657 1 414 31 521 510 ... 5 932 52
Ecuador
United States 217 287 360 230 235 317 392 ... 2 038 34
Canada 13 110 207 133 171 430 352 ... 1 416 24
Italy 1 10 84 64 67 87 109 ... 422 7
Argentina 14 31 28 88 25 64 58 ... 308 5
Spain 18 26 1 0 86 85 87 ... 303 5
Other 225 224 150 132 137 340 264 ... 1 472 25
Venezuela
United States 567 1 116 810 975 924 1 332 507 ... 6 231 25
Spain 58 1 016 305 123 487 113 116 ... 2 218 9
France 67 262 136 174 260 383 143 ... 1 425 6
United Kingdom 84 560 171 207 21 55 -37 ... 1 061 4
Argentina 136 303 228 213 25 64 -37 ... 932 4
Other 1 271 2 279 2 842 1 598 2 747 1 501 676 ... 12 914 52
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Ministry of Economic Affairs of
Mexico; Central Bank of Brazil; Ministry of Economic Affairs of Argentina; Foreign Investment Committee of Chile; Central
Bank of Bolivia; Banco de la República de Colombia; and Central Bank of Venezuela.
a Figures for Mexico correspond to the period January-September; for Brazil they cover January-October.
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Table I-A.3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES
FOR AMOUNTS EXCEEDING US$ 100 MILLION, 2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Enterprise sold Country Ownershipa Buyer Country Percentage Amount
 paid
1. Primary sector 3 303
Valepar S.A. Brazil L Mitsui & Co. Ltd. Japan 15 830
Valepar S.A. Brazil L National Bank for Economic  Brazil 8.5 520
and Social Development
(BNDES)
Caemi Mineração e Metalurgia Brazil L Cia. Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) Brazil 43.4 426
Valepar S.A. Brazil L Litel Participações Brazil 5.5 287
Valepar S.A. Brazil L Bradespar Brazil 4.6 239
Minera Alumbrera Ltd. Argentina F Wheaton River Minerals Ltd. Canada 25.0 210
Oil fields Mexico F Apache Corp. United States 100 200
Minera Alumbrera Ltd. Argentina F Wheaton River Minerals Ltd. Canada 25.0 182
Yacimiento Boquerón (60%) and DZO (100%) Venezuela F Perenco United Kingdom ... 160
Vintage Oil Ecuador Ecuador F Encana Corp. Canada 100 137
Klabin Bacell S.A. Brazil L RGM International Singapore 81.7 112
2. Manufacturing sector 2 228
Seminis Mexico L Fox Paine & Company LLC United States 100 650
Riocell S.A. Brazil L Aracruz Celulose Brazil 100 611
Alcoa América Latina b L Alcoa Inc. United States 40.9 397
Latasa Brazil F Rexam plc United Kingdom 88.6 324
Sonae Produtos Derivados Brazil L Sonae SGPS Portugal 50 144
Cia. Siderurgica Tubarão Brazil L Arcelor Luxembourg 8.8 102
3. Services sector:  Electricity and water 10 282
Río Maipo Chile F Compañía General de Chile 98.7 203
Electricidad (CGE)
Aguas Andinas Chile F Aguas de Barcelona Spain 9.6 189
Central Hidroeléctrica de Canutillar Chile F Hidroeléctrica Guardia Vieja Chile 100 174
Central Costanera Argentina F Endesa S.A. Spain 27.4 139
Ecoeléctrica Puerto Rico F Natural gas Spain 50 130
Termopernambuco Brazil L Iberdrola S.A. Spain 72.6 117
Líneas de Transmisión Chile F Hydro Quebec Canada 100 110
     Telecoms
Oi Brazil L Telemar Norte Leste Brazil 100 1 577
Grupo Iusacell Mexico F Movil Access Mexico 73.9 811
BCP S.A. Brazil L América Móvil Mexico 100 625
Tele Centro Oeste Celular c Brazil L BrasilCel Portugal/ Spain 61.1 430
Compañía de Teléfonos de El Salvador (CTE) El Salvador F América Móvil Mexico 51 417
BSE Sistemas Eletrônicos Ltda. Brazil F América Móvil Mexico 95 171
     Finance
Banco BBA Creditanstalt S.A. Brazil F Banco Itaú Brazil 95.8 936
Lloyds TSB Brazil F HSBC United Kingdom 100 815
BBV Banco Brasil Brazil F Banco Bradesco Brazil 100 796
Banco Sudameris Brasil Brazil F ABN Amro Netherlands 94.6 769
Grupo Financiero Inverlat Mexico F Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 36 323
Banco Fiat Brazil F Banco Itaú Brazil 100 244
Grupo Nacional Provincial S.A. Mexico F GNP Pensiones Mexico 40 200
Orígenes AFJP Argentina F Banco Santander Spain 20 150
Central Hispano
     Other
Sodimac S.A. Chile L S.A.C.I. Falabella Chile 100 569
Infraestructura 2000 Chile F Obrascón Huarte y Laín (OHL) Spain 60 273
TMM Puertos y Terminales Mexico L SSA Mexico Inc. United States 51 114
Total 15 813
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information published in Bloomberg
and in specialized magazines.
a L = prior to the sale, the firm was under local ownership. F = prior to the sale, the firm was foreign-owned.
b Alcoa (United States) paid US$ 397 million to Grupo Camargo (Brazil), for a 40.9% stake in the firm’s South American operations
(including a presence in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela).
c Tele Centro Oeste Celular (TCO) was acquired by BrasilCel through its subsidiary Telesp Celular Participações. BrasilCel is a joint
venture formed in equal parts by Portugal Telecom (Portugal) and Telefónica (Spain), which controls a large proportion of the fixed
and mobile telephone market in Brazil. Mobile telephony operates under the brand name “Vivo”, and TCO became part of this enterprise.
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Table I-A.4
LATIN AMERICA: 50 LARGEST TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES BY CONSOLIDATED SALES, 2002
(Millions of dollars)
Position Position Firm Country of origin Sector Sales Main subsidiaries a
in 2002 in 1999
1 3 Telefónica de España S.A. Spain Telecommunications 34 230 Brazil, Chile, Peru,
Argentina, Mexico
2 2 General Motors Corporation United States Automotive 14 862 Mexico, Brazil,
Colombia
3 20 Delphi Automotive Systems Corp. United States Autoparts 13 267 Mexico
4 9 Wal-Mart Storesb United States Commerce 10 676 Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina
5 1 Volkswagen A.G. Germany Automotive 10 293 Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina
6 4 DaimlerChrysler A.G. Germany Automotive 9 908 Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina
7 6 Ford Motor Companyb United States Automotive 6 742 Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, Venezuela
8 8 Repsol-YPF Spain Oil/gas 5 781 Argentina
9 - Samsung Corporation Korea Electronics 5 050 Mexico
10 26 Nissan Motor Japan Automotive 4 996 Mexico
11 13 Pepsico United States Beverages/beer 4 666 Mexico, Argentina
12 - Sony Corporation Japan Electronics 4 652 Mexico
13 12 Royal Dutch/Shell Group Netherlands/ Oil/gas 4 420 Brazil, Argentina, Chile
United Kingdom
14 - Telecom Italia Spa. Italy Telecommunications 4 293 Brazil, Argentina, Chile
15 14 Nestléb Switzerland Food 4 246 Mexico, Brazil,
Colombia, Argentina
16 34 Koninklijke Philips Netherlands/ Electronics 4 189 Mexico
Electronic N.V. United Kingdom
17 28 Hewlett-Packard (HP)b United States Computers 4 110 Mexico, Brazil
18 17 ExxonMobil Corporationb United States Oil/gas 4 028 Brazil, Colombia,
Chile, Argentina
19 11 International Business United States Computers 3 992 Mexico, Brazil,
Machines (IBM)b Argentina
20 7 The Coca-Cola Companyb United States Beverages/beer 3 931 Mexico, Brazil,
Venezuela, Argentina
21 19 General Electric United States Electronics 3 830 Mexico
22 10 Carrefour Groupb France Commerce 3 785 Brazil, Mexico,
Colombia, Argentina
23 27 Siemens A.G. Germany Electrical appliances 3 776 Mexico, Brazil
24 - Lear Corporation United States Autoparts 3 551 Mexico
25 5 Endesa Spain Electric power 3 450 Chile
26 25 ChevronTexacob United States Oil/gas 3 153 Brazil, Colombia,
Argentina
27 - Matsushita Electric Industrial Japan Electronics 3 065 Mexico
(Panasonic)
28 - AES Corporationb United States Oil/gas 2 987 Brazil, Venezuela,
Chile, Argentina
29 31 British American United Kingdom Tobacco 2 522 Mexico, Brazil,
Tobacco Plc. (BAT) Venezuela, Chile,
Argentina
30 - Visteon Corporation United States Autoparts 2 380 Mexico
31 - TRW, Inc. United States Autoparts 2 300 Mexico
32 24 Cargill, Inc.b United States Agribusiness 2 296 Brazil, Argentina
33 - Flextronics International Ltd. United States Electronics 2 097 Mexico
34 - MCI (ex WorldCom) United States Telecommunications 2 012 Brazil 
35 - Verizon Communications United States Telecommunications 1 909 Venezuela
36 40 Procter & Gamble United States Hygiene/cleaning 1 718 Mexico
37 22 Fiat Autob Italy Automotive 1 688 Brazil, Argentina
38 16 Koninklijke Ahold N.V.b Netherlands Commerce 1 614 Brazil, Chile, Argentina
39 - LG Electronics Inc. Republic of Korea Electronics 1 609 Mexico
40 29 Kimberly-Clark Corporation United Kingdom Pulp/paper 1 551 Mexico
41 23 Unileverb United Kingdom Hygiene/food 1 457 Mexico, Argentina,
Colombia, Brazil
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(Table I-A.4 concluded)
Position Position Firm Country of origin Sector Sales Main subsidiaries a
in 2002 in 1999
42 36 BASF A.G. Germany Chemicals 1 407 Brazil, Mexico
43 18 Philips Morris Companies Inc.b United States Tobacco 1 400 Mexico, Argentina
44 43 Eastman Kodak Company United States Photography 1 379 Mexico
45 - BP Amoco Plc. United Kingdom Petroleum 1 306 Argentina, Colombia
46 - MIM Holdings Australia Mining 1 254 Argentina
47 37 Renault France Automotive 1 123 Brazil, Colombia,
Mexico, Argentina
48 32 E.I. Du Pont de Nemoursb United States Chemicals 1 088 Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina
49 - Avon Inc. United States Hygiene/cleaning 1 070 Mexico, Brazil
50 - Electricité de France France Electric power 1 033 Brazil 
Total 222 142
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the Special
Studies and Projects Department of the magazine América Economía.
a Includes subsidiaries with sales in excess of US$ 100 million. Countries are ordered according to the sales of their respective
subsidiaries.
b For these enterprises, the countries in which they are known to operate are indicated in italics, but as they did not publish their
results in 2002, América Economía could not include them in its listing. For the same reason, firms that usually appear among the
largest transnationals in terms of sales volume, this year are not included. Some of the leading absentees are Motorola, BellSouth,
Ericsson, Intel, Nokia, Toyota, Nortel and 3M.
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Table I-A.5
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ACQUISITIONS IN THE RETAIL TRADE SUBSECTOR, 2000-2004
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Date Firm Country Seller Buyer Percentage Amount paid
2004 Bompreço Brazil Royal Ahold Wal-Mart 100 300
(Netherlands) (United States)
2004 Carrefour Chile Carrefour (France) D&S (Chile) 100 124
2004 Las Brisas Chile Jürgen Paulmann Cencosud (Chile) 100 30
(Chile)
2003 Santa Isabel Chile Royal Ahold Cencosud (Chile) 100 95
(Netherlands)
2003 Supermercados Disco Argentina Royal Ahold Cencosud (Chile) 100 ...
(Netherlands)
2003 JC Penney Mexico JC Penney Grupo Sanborns 100 ...
(United States) (Mexico)
2003 Santa Isabel Peru Royal Ahold Grupo Interbank 100 ...
(Netherlands) (Peru)/Grupo Nexus
(Peru)
2003 Sodimac Chile ... Falabella (Chile) a 100 569
2003 Supermercados Stock Paraguay Royal Ahold Grupo A.J. Vierci 100 5
(Netherlands) (Paraguay)
2002 Farmacias Benavides Mexico Farmacias Benavides Farmacias Ahumada 67 45
(Far-Ben) (Far-Ben México) FASA (Chile)
2002 Disco Argentina Velox Retail Holdings Royal Ahold 50 508
(Argentina) (Netherlands) b
2002 G Barbosa Brazil n.a. Royal Ahold 100 ...
(Netherlands)
2001 The Home Depot Chile The Home Depot Falabella (Chile) 67 54
(United States)
2001 Boticas Fasa Peru Local private Farmacias Ahumada 15 2
investors FASA (Chile) c
2001 The Home Depot Argentina The Home Depot Cencosud (Chile) 100 87
(United States)
2000 Drogamed Brazil n.a. Farmacias Ahumada 77 25
FASA (Chile)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a Corresponds to a merger in which, through a capital increase equivalent to the total value of its assets (US$ 525 million), Sodimac
became part-owner of Falabella. According to its capital contribution, its stake will be 21%.
b As a result of this acquisition, Royal Ahold controls 100% of Supermercados Disco.
c FASA entered the Peruvian market in partnership with Santa Isabel, and then through successive purchases gained control of
100% of Boticas Fasa.
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Transnational corporations (TNCs) have come to play a
central role in manufactures exports (UNCTAD, 2002).
Efficiency-seeking companies set up international
systems of integrated production (ISIP) based on business
strategies aimed at optimizing the configuration of their
production processes by moving production to locations
that offer significant advantages in terms of costs and
access to export markets (Lall, Albaladejo and Zhang,
2004). The subdivision of the global value chain and the
multiplication of supplier networks have opened up new
opportunities for developing countries to take part in ISIP.
Labour-intensive activities are moved to places where a
low-cost but efficient workforce is available. The
segmentation of the value chain has also generated new
opportunities to export services for countries that are able
to provide them competitively.
In terms of advantages for host countries, efficiency-
seeking TNCs have the potential to increase the recipient
economies’ competitiveness, either by introducing value-
added activities in industries in which such companies
had not invested previously or by making changes in
established industries to move from labour-intensive,
low-productivity, low-technology activities to
knowledge-based, high-productivity, high-technology
activities. In order for this industrial and technological
upgrading of exports to occur, firms must make
production more efficient and undertake a restructuring
process geared to switching from static comparative
advantages to dynamic ones in the host countries.
Moreover, the TNC subsidiaries established in the host
countries can forge linkages with local firms. When such
linkages are in place, the resulting exports will be
sustainable and beneficial for the recipient economies,
will have higher domestic value added and will help
strengthen the country’s business sector (UNCTAD,
2001).
Labour-intensive exports are economically
beneficial as long as domestic value added is positive at
international prices, even if it does not grow as fast as
the exports themselves. Countries are inclined to steer
II. EFFICIENCY SEEKING STRATEGIES TO CAPTURE
     EXPORT MARKETS: TRANSNATIONAL
     CORPORATIONS IN COSTA RICA, HONDURAS,
     JAMAICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
A. INTRODUCTION
70 ECLAC
their excess labour supply towards export-oriented
production when they have little chance of employing it
in better-paid or more economically desirable activities.
This suggests, in line with any theory of comparative
advantages, that such countries will specialize in labour-
intensive processes as they begin their export drive. The
challenge is to make exports sustainable through industrial
and technological upgrading (Lall, Albaladejo and Zhang,
2004). To this end, local suppliers must provide innovation
capacity, as well as the skills to carry out a wide range of
value-added functions associated with the manufacturing
process, including product and component design,
sourcing and testing, inventory management, packaging
and delivery logistics. These growing demands on key
suppliers represent an additional market access barrier
for smaller, newer suppliers in developing countries, even
in low-technology industries.
The successful national industrialization strategies
carried out by some economies (primarily Asian ones),
which combined local capacity-building with efforts to
attract export-oriented TNCs, serve as a model for other
countries wishing to promote export-oriented foreign
direct investment (FDI) and to make it an integral part
of their national development strategies from which they
will ultimately benefit (Lall, 2002; Loewendahl, 2002).
The spread of ISIP and the upgrading of the activities
of TNC subsidiaries in specific locations along the value
chain depend not only on the strategies of the firms
involved, but also on the host countries’ policies. These
policies can play a major role in determining the
configuration of ISIP if the governments concerned have
a clear understanding of how they fit in with the
corporate strategies that determine the nature and
location of these systems (Mortimore, Vergara and Katz,
2001). Host-country authorities thus face a twofold
challenge: they must try to join the ISIP of expanding
TNCs, on the one hand, and make sure that the
relationship is beneficial for them, on the other
(Mortimore and Vergara, 2004).
Meeting this twofold challenge may be harder than
it looks. Two major problems have been identified in this
regard. The first is that some developing countries have
found that their policies to attract efficiency-seeking FDI
are not sustainable over the long term, owing to factors
such as increases in local wages, limitations on the
industrial and technological upgrading of the assembly
operations imposed by export market access
mechanisms, the rollback of the benefits provided under
preferential trade agreements as a result of further global
trade liberalization and the fiscal and financial burdens
created by the incentives used to attract FDI (Oman,
2000; Mortimore and Peres, 1997). The second problem
consists of the difficulties that form what could be called
the “low-value-added trap” (UNCTAD, 2002). These
difficulties are associated with the attraction of low-
quality FDI, typically from firms that are relatively
uninterested in forming linkages with the local economy,
have little potential to generate spillovers and operate
with a short-term time horizon. Such firms, which invest
very little in productivity and skills development, are
most commonly found in labour-intensive industries,
which basically compete on price (more than on quality,
timely delivery or fashion) and often see workers more
as a cost to be contained than as a resource to be
developed. Given the slightest downturn in the host
country’s competitive position (exchange-rate
appreciation, wage hikes, social security cost increases,
etc.), these so-called “fly-by-night” firms will quickly
pull up stakes in pursuit of a better place to locate their
cost centres.
In practice, this suggests that there is a broad
spectrum of TNCs differentiated by their behaviour. At
one end are those that can be caricatured as “fly-by-
night”, which often cause the host country to fall into
the “low-value-added trap”. At the other end are TNCs
that are industry leaders, such as Intel in semiconductors
or Toyota in automobiles, which, instead of seeking
temporary advantages, aim to locate parts of their ISIP
in countries that will become their partners. As the case
of Toyota is considered in some detail in chapter III of
this report, the experience of Intel will be analysed in
more depth here to give a clearer idea of the nature of
this class of TNCs that seek efficiency through direct
investment in ISIP (see box II.1).
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Box II.1
INTEL’S INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION STRATEGY
Intel has consolidated its position as
the world’s leading semiconductor firm
by deploying a global investment
strategy to reorient its ISIP. This is
reflected in the fact that its average
annual investment rose from less than
US$ 500 million in the 1980s to some
US$ 1.7 billion in the early 1990s, and
later reached nearly US$ 4.6 billion in
the period 1996-2002. Intel’s ISIP
reflects its manifest technological
leadership, expressed in its slogan
“Intel Inside”, which refers to the
ubiquity of its products in electronic
equipment.
Intel’s international expansion was
primarily shaped by three basic factors:
security, logistics and cost reduction.
The first is reflected by the firm’s
limited global expansion, which is
designed to prevent any leakage of its
main competitive advantage –its
technology– to competitors. This is why
over two thirds of Intel’s employees
work in its home country, the United
States, even after the firm’s recent
international expansion. Security
concerns also explain why Intel’s ISIP
consists entirely of wholly-owned
subsidiaries. This shows that the firm
treads very carefully in taking
decisions to expand internationally. The
second factor, logistics, encompasses
speed-to-market and market-access
issues. Intel estimates that each new
generation of microprocessors has, at
most, a six-month lead over its
competitors. Accordingly, its production
sites must enable it to minimize the
time needed to reach the market so it
can keep its competitors at bay. Other
logistical factors, such as transport
costs, are less important because of
the extremely high value of
semiconductors in relation to their size
and weight. The third factor, cost
reduction, is taking on more
importance as Intel’s competitors
continue to expand internationally to
take advantage of lower-cost
production sites. The combination of
these three factors defines the
particular characteristics of Intel’s ISIP:
a few large-scale operations in a small
number of countries outside the
United States. As a result, the firm
has become the leading exporter in
countries such as Ireland, the
Philippines and Costa Rica.
Intel’s ISIP includes two kinds of
plants: (i) those for manufacturing
wafers and etching integrated circuits
onto them, and (ii) those for assembly
and testing, where the wafers are
thinned to reduce internal stress and
are then cut into 300 to 500 individual
chips or microprocessors. These chips
are mounted onto a lead frame and
attached to thin gold wires that will
eventually connect them to the other
elements of the computer. Afterward
they are encapsulated, inspected and
tested. Intel’s ISIP includes 18 wafer
manufacturing plants, located in the
United States (14), Ireland (2) and
Israel (2), and 12 assembly and
testing plants, located in the United
States (1), Malaysia (4), the
Philippines (3), Costa Rica (2) and
China (2) (see table).
INTEL: FEATURES OF THE MAIN MANUFACTURING, ASSEMBLY AND TESTING PLANTS
Country/Region/ Process Wafer
Year initiated Functions and products technology size Employees(microns)  (mm)
United States 44 164
Oregon 15 000
1978 Manufacture of motherboards n.a. n.d.
1992 Manufacture of logic and
flash memory 0,25  0,35 200
1996 Manufacture of logic 0,13 200
1999 Manufacture of logic 0,13 300
2003 Manufacture of logic (development) n.a. 300
Arizona 10 000
1996 Manufacture of logic 0,18 200
1999 Assembly and testing n.a.
2001 Manufacture of logic 0,13 200
California, 1988 Manufacture of logic and  0,13  0,18 200 8 500
flash memory
New México 5 500
1980 Manufacture of flash memory 0,35 150
1993 Manufacturas of logic and
flash memory 0,18  0,25 200
2002 Manufacture of logic 0,13 300
Massachusetts, 1994 Manufacture of logic 0,28  0,35  0,50 200 2 700
Washington, 1996 Manufacture of production systems n.a. n.a. 1 400
Colorado, 2001 Manufacture of flash memory 0,18 200 1 064
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Country/Region/ Process Wafer
Year initiated Functions and products technology size Employees(microns)  (mm)
   (Box II.1 concluded)
Security concerns account for the fact
that most of the wafer plants
–especially the most modern ones
using the most advanced technology,
such as 0.13-micron process
technology– are located in the United
States, where there is relatively less
risk of war, terrorism or technology
leakage. Nonetheless, even though a
new wafer plant today can cost over
US$ 1 billion, and thus requires a huge
financial outlay, in 1985 Intel decided to
build its first wafer plant outside the
United States in Israel, and added
another new plant in 1999. The other
foreign site for wafer manufacture is
Ireland, where the firm established and
upgraded a plant between 1993 and
1998 and is now building a more
modern one (for 300-mm wafers).
Access to the European market
played a major role in that site
selection. Today, about 30% of Intel’s
wafer manufacturing capacity is
located outside the United States.
This shows that other factors have
gradually taken precedence over the
security concerns that originally
prevailed in the selection of sites for
the expensive wafer manufacturing
plants.
While cost reduction is a priority, it
is far from being the only factor that
determines the siting of assembly
and testing plants, which carry out
labour-intensive tasks. In 1979 Intel
began its expansion in this regard by
building a plant in Manila, Philippines.
Later, new plants were added in
Penang, Malaysia (1988); outside San
José, Costa Rica (1997); and in
Shanghai, China (1997). Intel has
deepened its presence at each of
these sites by building new assembly
and testing plants to complement the
original ones. In other words, one of
the principal characteristics of the
Intel ISIP is that it tends to grow in a
handful of existing locations and that
expansion to new ones is quite
uncommon. Siting decisions are
usually based on whether qualified
technicians are available,
construction costs, infrastructure
quality, logistics, supplier capabilities
and production costs. Thus, there are
major differences between the siting
of wafer manufacture and fabrication
plants and that of assembly and
testing plants.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Intel
(www.intel.com); Michael Mortimore and Sebastián Vergara, “Targeting Winners: Can FDI policy help developing countries
industrialize?”, European Journal of Development Research, in press, 2004; United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness
(UNCTAD/WIR/2002), New York/Geneva, 2002. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.II.D.4.
Israel 2 300
Jerusalen, 1985 Manufacture of logic and 0,35  0,50  0,70 150
flash memory 1,0
Qiryat Gat, 1999 Manufacture of logic 0,18 200
Ireland 3 400
Leixlip, 1993-1998 Manufacture of logic 0,18  0,25 200
Leixlip, 2004 Manufacture of logic n.a. 300
Philippines 5 984
Manila, 1979-1995 Assembly and testing Flash memory 50-200
Cavite, 1997 Assembly and testing Logic 200
Cavite, 1998 Assembly and testing Flash memory 200
Malaysia 7 790
Penang, 1988 Assembly and testing Logic, computer 150-200
products
Penang, 1994 Assembly and testing Logics, computer 150-200
products
Kulim, 1996-1997 Assembly and testing, manufacture Logic, computer 200
of motherboards boards
Penang, 1997 Assembly and testing - 200
Costa Rica 1 845
San José, 1997 Assembly and testing Logic 200
San José, 1999 Assembly and testing Logic 200
China 1 227
Shanghai, 1997 Assembly and testing Flash memory 150-200
Shanghai, 2001 Assembly and testing Logic 150-200
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Lastly, it should be borne in mind that small
developing economies face additional challenges in
attracting FDI. By definition, they are unlikely to catch
the attention of market-seeking TNCs. Their domestic
markets are not big enough to enable them to reach the
levels of productive efficiency demanded by the kinds
of operations that can give them a foothold in the global
market and make them major competitors. They often
start their industrialization processes with simple, labour-
intensive activities such as apparel manufacture, and seek
to conclude trade agreements or to join integration
arrangements to expand their markets, with the aim of
strengthening their industrialization processes and
enabling leading domestic firms to evolve into global
players.
It is important to note that in today’s world, small
countries are gradually becoming the norm. Worldwide,
87 countries have fewer than 5 million inhabitants, 58
have fewer than 2.5 million and 35 have fewer than half
a million. To put it another way, half the world’s countries
have populations smaller than that of the state of
Massachusetts in the United States. Some small countries
have been very successful in attracting ISIP nodes of
efficiency-seeking TNCs and in upgrading the activities
carried out by those nodes. The best-known cases are
those of Ireland (see box II.2) and Singapore (Lall, 2000).
In Latin America small countries account for more than
half the total, especially in the Caribbean Basin, yet none
of them has even remotely approached the success of
Ireland or Singapore.
Box II.2
IRELAND’S EXPERIENCE IN ATTRACTING EFFICIENCY-SEEKING FDI
Since the 1980s Ireland has been
implementing an industrialization
strategy based on efficiency-seeking
FDI to promote the manufacture of fast-
growing export products, especially in
the information technology industries
(electronics, computers and
telecommunications). The entity
responsible for putting this strategy into
practice is the country’s vibrant, well-
organized Investment and
Development Agency (IDA). To meet its
objectives, IDA was given a generous
budget, which in 2000 amounted to 164
million euros for the provision of
financing and 27 million euros for
promotional and administrative activities.
Ireland, as a member of the European
Union, has full access to the vast
European market. This makes it a
particularly interesting site for the
establishment of production centres
belonging to non-European (especially
United States) investors.
IRELAND: SHARE OF WORLD IMPORTS AND EXPORT STRUCTURE, 1985-2001
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 1999 2001
I. Market share 0.57 0.70 0.84 1.24 1.37
II. Export structure a 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources 19.1 13.8 9.7 5.4 4.3
Natural-resource-based manufactures 25.7 27.5 29.8 38.6 41.4
Non-resource-based manufactures 53.1 56.8 58.4 53.4 52.0
- Low technology 15.1 15.6 13.5 8.7 7.6
- Mid-level technology 15.2 15.8 13.4 10.0 9.6
- High technology 22.8 25.5 31.5 34.6 34.9
Other 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.2
III. 10 principal exports, by contribution b c 29.0 36.6 49.6 67.4 71.6
514 Nitrogen-function compounds * + 0.7 2.9 5.9 16.5 20.0
752 Automatic data processing machines * + 9.6 9.9 12.1 12.9 12.2
515 Organo-inorganic and heterocyclic compounds * + 5.0 4.7 7.4 11.3 12.0
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products * + 2.8 4.2 6.8 7.6 9.3
759 Parts and accessories for use with machines in
       groups 751 or 752 * + 4.4 5.6 3.3 5.9 5.1
898 Musical instruments and parts and accessories thereof + 1.7 4.0 5.6 4.2 3.3
764 Telecommunications equipment and parts * + 0.9 1.5 2.0 2.7 3.0
776 Electronic cathode lamps, tubes and valves * + 1.7 1.1 3.8 2.8 2.8
872 Medical instruments and appliances * + 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.0
551 Essential oils, perfume and flavour materials + 0.8 1.2 0.9 1.6 1.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the TradeCAN software, 2002
edition.
a For more details on the export structure, see table II.1.
b (*) Groups of products that were among the 50 fastest-growing in world imports, 1985-2001.
c (+)/(-) Groups in which Ireland gained/lost market share in world imports, 1985-2001.
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     (Box II.2 concluded)
Ireland’s success is unmistakable
(see table). Its share of global
merchandise trade rose from 0.57% to
1.37% between 1985 and 2001, while
the structure of its non-resource-based
manufactures exports shifted
considerably towards high-technology
products. Ireland gained market share
for each of its 10 principal export
products, many of which were linked to
the new focus of domestic policy.
Between 1985 and 2001 the
contribution of some of the country’s
priority exports –automatic data
processing machines (SITC group
752), parts thereof (group 759) and
telecommunications equipment (group
764)– to total export value rose from
less than 15% to over 20%. Since
1988, 8 out of the 10 leading foreign
exporters in Ireland have been in the
electronics and computer industry
(Intel, Dell, Microsoft, Gateway, Apple,
EMC, 3Com and Motorola). Together,
these firms account for more than a
third of total merchandise exports by
foreign companies and for over a fifth
of total exports.
In 1990 Intel decided to open the
first of its two manufacturing plants in
Leixlip to serve the European market.
The site selection was based on the
large pool of qualified workers,
including engineers and technicians;
the low tax rate (10%); the abundant
supply of freshwater and electric
power; and the existence of business-
friendly government policies. That
decision gave a strong boost to the
IDA objective of attracting efficiency-
seeking FDI in the electronics industry.
In 2003 Ireland’s FDI intake
reached a record high of US$ 24.4
billion –more than double the amount
received in 2002– and made that
country one of the world’s 10 leading
FDI recipients. The FDI stock swelled
from US$ 32 billion to US$ 157 billion
between 1980 and 2002. This
investment is highly concentrated in
terms of origin: two thirds comes from
the Netherlands, the United States and
the United Kingdom, and is channelled
mainly into the electrical, electronic,
chemical and publishing industries,
which are markedly export-oriented.
Foreign firms have accounted for the
bulk of the country’s exports (nearly
90% in 1999). In fact, two thirds of
Ireland’s leading export firms are
foreign (E-Brief UNCTAD, UNCTAD/
PRESS/EB/2004/006, 19 February
2004).
Ireland is continuing to consolidate
its strategy of knowledge-based
development, with emphasis on the
further industrial and technological
upgrading of skills and research
capacities as key factors of
competitiveness. To complement their
success in attracting the above-
described manufacturing activities, the
authorities are trying hard to attract
services, especially those related to
information technology and the
business world. The results speak for
themselves: Intel’s decision to
establish its European Operations
Centre in Ireland attests to the
country’s proven competitiveness in
delivering customer support services
–shared services and call centres–, as
well as its leadership in Europe in
attracting new FDI (greenfield
investment) for software production,
engineering and medical and financial
services. It is expected that FDI will
continue to play a major role in this
strategy, which seeks to embed foreign
firms more deeply in the local
economy and to promote the
internationalization of their suppliers.
Business parks providing world-class
services have been built in various
parts of the country, while IDA acts as
an intermediary between academic
institutions and foreign companies in
meeting the needs of high-technology
industries.
The following sections review the experiences of
four of the small Caribbean Basin economies –Costa
Rica, Honduras, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic–
to see how they have taken advantage of the new
opportunities opened up for developing countries as a
result of the decisions taken by TNCs seeking to enhance
their efficiency through FDI to establish or extend their
ISIP in the subregion.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Investment
and Development Agency (IDA) (http://www.idaireland.com).
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B.  EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS IN COSTA RICA, HONDURAS, JAMAICA AND THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The establishment of ISIP nodes in the Caribbean Basin
has had an impact on each of the four countries selected
for this analysis, whose participation in ISIP varies from
one country to another, as do the impacts generated. One
of the most striking effects is on the international
competitiveness of the host economies.
Between 1985 and 2001 Costa Rica’s share of the world
import market rose considerably, from 0.07% to 0.12%,
with a peak of 0.13% in 1999 (see table II.1). Over that
period its export structure changed: after having been
heavily tilted towards natural resources in 1985 (67.5%),
it was dominated by non-resource-based manufactures in
2001 (56.5%). High-technology manufactures in Costa
Rica showed an interesting pattern of brisk growth and
progressively replaced low-technology manufactures,
which had accounted for most of the export basket up
until the mid-1990s. As a result of the opening of the Intel
microprocessor plant, high-technology exports soared
from 3.3% of total sales in 1995 to 28.1% in 2001 (having
reached 29.5% in 1999). In 2001 the 10 principal products
represented 67.4% of total exports, with the most
sophisticated electronics manufactures (SITC groups 759
and 776) accounting for 24.4% (25.8% in 1999), while
the share of apparel, as an example of low-technology
manufactures, amounted to 7.7%. Thanks to this
performance, Costa Rica gained market share for all of
its 10 leading exports, not to mention the fact that 6 of
these products were among the fastest-growing in world
trade. Without a doubt, the country has become a shining
example of how economies can progress towards better
Table II.1
COSTA RICA: SHARE OF WORLD IMPORTS AND EXPORT
STRUCTURE, 1985-2001
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 1999 2001
I. Market share 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.12
II. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources a 67.5 57.5 49.8 32.9 31.7
Natural-resource-based manufactures b 7.6 6.5 9.8 8.5 9.1
Non-resource-based manufactures c 24.1 34.9 38.9 55.9 56.5
- Low technology d 14.5 25.4 27.0 18.3 18.4
- Mid-level technology e 6.3 6.0 8.0 8.1 10.0
- High technology f 3.3 3.5 4.0 29.5 28.1
Other g 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.5 2.5
III. 10 principal exports, by contribution h i 62.6 62.2 60.4 68.7 67.4
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried + 30.2 31.9 28.6 20.5 20.5
759 Parts, n.e.s., for use with machines in groups 751 or 752 * + 0.1 0.0 0.1 20.8 13.6
776 Electronic cathode lamps, tubes and valves * + 0.1 0.1 0.1 5.0 10.8
846 Undergarments, knitted or crocheted * + 2.8 5.4 6.8 4.9 4.6
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes + 23.9 13.2 10.6 5.5 4.2
872 Medical instruments and appliances * + 0.0 0.3 1.1 1.7 3.6
842 Outer garments, men’s and boys’, of textile fabrics * + 2.0 5.3 6.0 3.5 3.1
292 Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s. + 2.5 4.0 4.1 2.5 2.5
058 Fruit, preserved, and fruit preparations + 0.5 1.3 2.0 2.1 2.3
931 Special transactions and commodities not classified
        according to kind * + 0.5 0.7 1.0 2.2 2.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the TradeCAN software, 2002 edition.
Product groups are based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Rev. 2.
a Includes 45 simply processed commodities; includes concentrates.
b Includes 65 groups: 35 groups of agricultural/forestry products and 30 groups of other products (primarily metals –except steel–,
petroleum products, cement, glass, other).
c Includes 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Includes 44 groups: 20 in the textiles and apparel category and 24 others (paper products, glass and steel, jewellery).
e Includes 58 groups: 5 in the automotive industry, 22 in the processing industry and 31 in the engineering industry.
f Includes 18 groups: 11 in the electronics category and 7 others (pharmaceuticals, turbines, aircraft, instruments).
g Includes 9 groups not classified according to kind (mostly in section 9).
h (*) Groups of products that were among the 50 fastest-growing in world imports, 1985-2001.
i
 (+)/(-)Groups in which Costa Rica gained/lost market share in world imports, 1985-2001.
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conditions in the framework of assembly operations, since
it upgraded these activities in two major steps: from natural
resources to apparel and from apparel to electronics.
The Dominican Republic saw its share of the world
import market increase from 0.08% to 0.09% between
1985 and 2001 (see table II.2). In 1985 its export structure
was dominated by natural resources (24.6%) and natural-
resource-based manufactures (23.1%). By 2001 this
situation had changed so radically that non-resource-
based manufactures had come to represent the bulk of
the country’s exports (82.9%). The fastest-growing
exports were low-technology manufactures, whose share
expanded from 28.2% to 61.6%. In 2001 the country’s 10
leading exports accounted for 72.2% of its total exports.
Of these, apparel (SITC groups 842, 846, 843 and 845)
and other manufactures (SITC groups 872, 772 and 897)
represented 56.6% of the total. The country has gained
market share for 8 of its 10 leading exports, 6 of which
are among the fastest-growing in world trade. The
Dominican Republic, which was once a minor natural
resource exporter, has become a major apparel exporter.
Honduras’s international competitiveness improved
appreciably between 1985 and 2001, during which time
its share of the world import market rose from 0.05% to
0.07% (see table II.3). Its export structure underwent a
major shift, moving from a strong dependence on natural
resources (74%) and natural-resource-based manufactures
(18%) in 1985 to a heavy concentration in non-resource-
based manufactures (70%) in 2001. The fastest-growing of
these manufactures were low-technology products, which
jumped from 5.2% to 65.2% of total exports over the period
under consideration. In 2001 the country’s 10 leading
exports represented 81.7% of its total external sales, with
most of that share accounted for by apparel (SITC groups
846, 845, 842, 843 and 844) and electrical equipment
(SITC group 773), which together represented 62.6% of
the total, while natural resources (SITC groups 057, 071
and 036) continued to lose ground. As a result of this
change, Honduras has gained market share for 8 of its 10
leading exports, 5 of which are among the fastest-growing
in world trade. Of all the new exporters of apparel in the
Caribbean Basin, Honduras boasts the best performance.
Table II.2
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: SHARE OF WORLD IMPORTS AND EXPORT STRUCTURE, 1985-2001
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 1999 2001
I. Market share 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09
II. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources a 24.6 13.5 9.1 6.0 5.4
Natural-resource-based manufactures b 23.1 10.4 10.1 9.2 8.8
Non-resource-based manufactures c 39.2 69.7 77.1 81.9 82.9
- Low technology d 28.2 49.6 58.5 62.0 61.6
- Mid-level technology e 9.9 18.5 16.2 16.8 17.3
- High technology f 1.1 1.6 2.4 3.1 4.0
Other g 12.9 6.2 3.6 2.9 2.9
III. 10 principal exports, by contribution h i 31.2 59.5 65.1 72.7 72.2
842 Outer garments, men’s and boys’, of textile fabrics * + 4.6 11.6 14.4 16.4 17.5
846 Undergarments, knitted or crocheted * + 4.7 7.0 11.1 13.7 12.7
843 Outer garments, women’s, girls’ and infants’, of textile fabrics * + 4.8 8.8 9.3 8.6 8.6
872 Medical instruments and appliances + 0.0 3.7 6.3 7.0 7.5
845 Outer garments and other articles, knitted or crocheted * + 0.8 4.1 5.1 6.8 7.0
122 Tobacco, manufactured + 1.6 1.2 1.9 4.6 4.5
671 Pig iron, spiegeleisen and sponge iron - 7.7 10.1 5.0 3.8 4.4
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical
       circuits * + 1.1 3.4 3.6 5.0 4.3
897 Jewellery, goldsmiths’ and silversmiths’ wares and other
       articles * + 3.1 4.1 3.1 3.3 3.3
612 Manufactures of leather or of composition leather - 2.8 5.5 5.3 3.5 2.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the TradeCAN software, 2002 edition.
Product groups are based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Rev. 2.
a Includes 45 simply processed commodities; includes concentrates.
b Includes 65 groups: 35 groups of agricultural/forestry products and 30 groups of other products (primarily metals –except steel–,
petroleum products, cement, glass, other).
c Includes 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Includes 44 groups: 20 in the textiles and apparel category and 24 others (paper products, glass and steel, jewellery).
e Includes 58 groups: 5 in the automotive industry, 22 in the processing industry and 31 in the engineering industry.
f Includes 18 groups: 11 in the electronics category and 7 others (pharmaceuticals, turbines, aircraft, instruments).
g
 Includes 9 groups not classified according to kind (mostly in section 9).
h (*)Groups of products that were among the 50 fastest-growing in world imports, 1985-2001.
i (+)/(-) Groups in which the Dominican Republic gained/lost market share in world imports, 1985-2001.
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Table II.3
HONDURAS: SHARE OF WORLD IMPORTS AND EXPORT STRUCTURE,
1985-2001
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 1999 2001
I. Market share 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07
II. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources a 74.0 67.3 39.7 23.6 20.0
Natural-resource-based manufactures b 18.0 12.0 8.1 7.3 7.6
Non-resource-based manufactures c 7.5 19.5 51.2 67.4 70.0
- Low technology d 5.2 16.1 46.7 62.6 65.2
- Mid-level technology e 1.7 2.7 3.7 3.7 4.0
- High technology f 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.2 0.8
Other g 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.4 2.2
III. 10 principal exports, by contribution h i 70.5 70.6 76.4 80.6 81.7
846 Undergarments, knitted or crocheted * + 0.9 4.9 15.8 29.8 29.8
845 Outer garments and other articles, knitted or crocheted * + 0.0 0.9 9.4 13.3 17.1
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried - 36.7 33.5 13.3 6.7 7.0
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes + 24.5 15.7 13.6 9.3 6.7
842 Outer garments, men’s and boys’, of textile fabrics * + 0.2 3.1 6.0 5.4 5.2
843 Outer garments, women’s, girls’ and infants’, of
       textile fabrics * + 0.1 1.8 5.0 4.7 4.7
844 Undergarments of textile fabrics (other than knitted or
       crocheted goods) + 0.9 2.3 6.0 5.1 4.3
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, whether in shell or not - 6.2 7.4 5.6 3.4 3.4
122 Tobacco, manufactured + 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.0
773 Equipment for distributing electricity * + 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.1 1.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the TradeCAN software, 2002 edition.
Product groups are based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Rev. 2.
a Includes 45 simply processed commodities; includes concentrates.
b Includes 65 groups: 35 groups of agricultural/forestry products and 30 groups of other products (primarily metals –except steel–,
petroleum products, cement, glass, other).
c Includes 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Includes 44 groups: 20 in the textiles and apparel category and 24 others (paper products, glass and steel, jewellery).
e Includes 58 groups: 5 in the automotive industry, 22 in the processing industry and 31 in the engineering industry.
f Includes 18 groups: 11 in the electronics category and 7 others (pharmaceuticals, turbines, aircraft, instruments).
g
 Includes 9 groups not classified according to kind (mostly in section 9).
h (*) Groups of products that were among the 50 fastest-growing in world imports, 1985-2001.
i (+)/(-) Groups in which Honduras gained/lost market share in world imports, 1985-2001.
Lastly, Jamaica’s international competitiveness has
tended to falter. Between 1985 and 2001 its share of the
world import market slipped from 0.04% to 0.03% (see
table II.4). Between 1985 and 1995 its export structure
changed somewhat, moving from a concentration in
natural-resource-based manufactures (71.9%) at the
beginning of the period to a growing emphasis on non-
resource-based manufactures, which by 1995 had come
to represent 36.7% of the total. Subsequently, however,
between 1995 and 2001, natural-resource-based
manufactures regained much of the ground they had lost
(reaching 65.4%), while non-resource-based manufactures
retreated (to 24.6%). In 2001 the country’s 10 principal
products represented 84.3% of its total exports. Natural
resources and manufactures based on these resources
accounted for 64.6%, while apparel (SITC groups 846
and 845) represented 18.1%. The weakness of Jamaica’s
performance is highlighted by the fact that only 5 of its
10 leading exports have gained market share, while only
4 of them are among the fastest-growing in world trade.
Thus, in terms of international competitiveness,
Jamaica’s results were very different from those of the
countries considered above and, in its case, the apparel
industry played a much more minor role.
In the 1980s the economies of Costa Rica, Honduras,
Jamaica and the Dominican Republic –like those of many
Caribbean Basin countries– were essentially producers
and exporters of natural resources. For this group of
countries, changes in the structure of their external sales
were even more important than increases in their export
capacity. Natural resources –and manufactures based on
them– became less and less important in relation to other
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exports (temporarily, in Jamaica’s case). The sluggishness
of traditional exports from Costa Rica (bananas and coffee),
Honduras (bananas, coffee and shrimp), the Dominican
Republic (ferronickel, sugar, tobacco and coffee) and
Jamaica (bauxite, alumina and sugar) triggered efforts to
promote the production and export of manufactures,
generally under an export processing zone (EPZ)
arrangement. These manufactures were usually produced
by foreign companies seeking to improve the productive
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of their ISIP. In most
cases, this resulted in the proliferation of labour-intensive
activities such as the apparel industry, which enabled
foreign firms to take advantage of the low level of local
wages (compared to United States wages). Nonetheless,
some countries made efforts to diversify the activities
carried out in EPZs; clear examples of such countries
are Costa Rica (electronics) and, to a lesser extent, the
Dominican Republic (the Cyberpark initiative).
Table II.4
JAMAICA: SHARE OF WORLD IMPORTS AND EXPORT STRUCTURE,
1985-2001
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 1999 2001
I. Market share 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
II. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources a 8.6 8.5 9.5 8.5 8.2
Natural-resource-based manufactures b 71.9 63.3 51.6 59.0 65.4
Non-resource-based manufactures c 17.8 26.7 36.7 30.1 24.6
- Low technology d 11.7 22.5 32.0 26.4 20.8
- Mid-level technology e 5.3 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.4
- High technology f 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.4
Other g 1.6 1.4 2.0 2.3 1.8
III. 10 principal exports, by contribution h i 73.8 79.9 79.7 83.2 84.3
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals, n.e.s. - 50.2 48.3 37.6 37.3 45.4
846 Undergarments, knitted or crocheted * + 2.6 7.5 19.5 16.2 12.1
845 Outer garments and other articles, knitted or crocheted * + 1.3 6.6 4.7 5.8 6.0
662 Clay construction materials and refractory materials + 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4 5.4
061 Sugar and honey - 8.1 6.0 5.7 5.4 4.8
112 Alcoholic beverages * - 5.4 4.0 3.4 3.5 3.8
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried + 2.1 4.0 4.3 3.3 2.6
512 Alcohols, phenols, phenol-alcohols and their derivatives - 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.4
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes + 1.2 0.8 1.5 1.6 2.1
931 Special transactions and commodities not classified
       according to kind * - 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.1 1.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the TradeCAN software, 2002 edition.
Product groups are based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Rev. 2.
a Includes 45 simply processed commodities; includes concentrates.
b Includes 65 groups: 35 groups of agricultural/forestry products and 30 groups of other products (primarily metals –except steel–,
petroleum products, cement, glass, other).
c Includes 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Includes 44 groups: 20 in the textiles and apparel category and 24 others (paper products, glass and steel, jewellery).
e Includes 58 groups: 5 in the automotive industry, 22 in the processing industry and 31 in the engineering industry.
f Includes 18 groups: 11 in the electronics category and 7 others (pharmaceuticals, turbines, aircraft, instruments).
g Includes 9 groups not classified according to kind (mostly in section 9).
h (*)Groups of products that were among the 50 fastest-growing in world imports, 1985-2001.
i (+)/(-) Groups in which Jamaica gained/lost market share in world imports, 1985-2001.
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In the 1980s macroeconomic imbalances and large
external deficits prompted the authorities of the
subregion’s countries to devalue local currencies on
successive occasions. At the same time they began to
introduce reforms aimed at opening up and liberalizing
their economies. Against this backdrop, and armed
with significant competitiveness gains attributable to
the devaluations, government authorities sought to
boost the role of exports as an engine of economic
growth. To that end, they undertook to expand and
diversify the supply of export products, mainly by
creating incentives in the form of EPZs, complemented
by the special market access conditions offered by the
United States, particularly under the production
sharing mechanism and the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) (see box II.3).
Since the mid-1980s Costa Rica,
Honduras, Jamaica and the Dominican
Republic have benefited from a variety
of trade agreements and programmes
giving them special access to the
United States market and, to a lesser
extent, the European Union market.a
Mechanisms affording special access
to the United States market
 –production sharing and the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI)– have been the
most important, especially because of
their transformative effect on the
production structure of the Central
American and Caribbean economies.
The United States established the
production sharing mechanism
(currently known as HTS 9802) in its
customs regulations to promote the use
of the incentive arrangements
implemented in the Caribbean Basin
countries and to enhance the
competitiveness of goods produced by
United States companies. Under this
mechanism, products assembled
abroad using United States inputs are
subject to tax only on the value added
outside the United States (mostly
wages).
The CBI established unilateral
preferential conditions for the entry of a
wide range of Central American and
Caribbean products into the United
States market. However, it excluded
products such as clothing, footwear,
petroleum and petroleum products.
These and other benefits were granted
under the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act, which entered into force
on 1 January 1984 and was amended
in 1990. The benefits envisaged in the
CBI could be granted in addition to
those provided under the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP).b
With the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in the 1990s, the Caribbean
Basin countries’ conditions of access
to the United States market
deteriorated in relation to the terms
enjoyed by Mexico. Those countries
accordingly raised the possibility, with
Canada and the United States, of
establishing parity with Mexico in the
treatment of their products. In May
2000 the CBI legislation was enhanced
through the passage of the United
States-Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act (CBTPA). The new
agreement extended trade benefits to
textile and apparel articles and to other
products that had originally been
excluded, eliminated tariffs on value
added and extended the term of the
arrangement up to September 2008.
Nonetheless, while the enhanced CBI
helped to redress the imbalance vis-à-
vis Mexico, the treatment it provided
was not nearly equivalent to NAFTA
treatment. Specifically, the CBTPA
provides for equal tariff treatment but
does not establish parity with respect
to rules of origin (regional content).
In September 2001 the Central
American and United States
authorities agreed to embark on an
exploratory phase with a view to
preparing for the official opening of
negotiations for a United States-Central
American free trade agreement, to be
known as CAFTA. These negotiations
began in early 2003 –after the United
States Congress had voted to give the
President trade promotion (or “fast-
track”) authority, which empowers him
to negotiate trade agreements– and
were substantially completed by
December 2003. In general, CAFTA
provides tariff- and quota-free access
to the United States for all Central
American manufactures, maintains the
CBTPAc and GSP preferences and
guarantees that EPZ operations and
tariff drawbacks will continue for as
long as allowed by the World Trade
Organization (WTO).  With respect to
textile and apparel articles, CAFTA
provides immediate duty-free access
for any apparel item produced in a
Central American country with
regionally sourced fabric and thread or
with flat-weave fabrics from Mexico or
Canada –in addition to those from the
United States and Central America–,
although the latter are subject to an
initial limit of 100 million square metres
equivalent (SME) of fabric.d In January
2004 negotiations with Costa Rica
continued with respect to a number of
outstanding bilateral issues:
telecommunications, insurance,
services, representatives of foreign
firms, textiles and agriculture.
On 15 March 2004 the Dominican
Republic and the United States
concluded their negotiations on a free
trade agreement by deciding that the
Box II.3
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MECHANISMS AFFORDING SPECIAL ACCESS TO
THE UNITED STATES MARKET
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     (Box II.3 concluded)
former should become a party to
CAFTA with the same obligations and
commitments as Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua. As in the case of the
Central American countries, individual
market-access schedules were
negotiated for goods, agriculture,
services, investment and government
procurement (Trade Facts, Office of the
United States Trade Representative, 15
March 2004, http://www.ustr.gov).
In summary, the Caribbean Basin
countries first obtained special access
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a
 Jamaica and the Dominican Republic first obtained preferential access to the European market under the Lomé Convention,
concluded in 1975 and updated regularly thereafter. In 2000 the Lomé Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement
between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union. This agreement offers unilateral
preferences for entry into the European Union market, primarily for agricultural products, clothing and electronic components.
In response to pressure from WTO, the parties concluded the new agreement with a view to abiding by WTO rules and
eventually forming a reciprocal free trade area. WTO decided to allow the current system of preferences to remain in place
until 2008, after which the parties will move gradually towards full liberalization, scheduled for 2020.
b
 Launched in 1974, the GSP is a programme of preferences granted by developed countries to developing ones. Under this
arrangement, import duties are unilaterally reduced for a wide range of products, provided that at least 35% of each product’s
value added is generated in the beneficiary country.
c
 The enhancement of preferences under the CBTPA means that products such as canned tuna, textile and apparel articles,
footwear and jewellery, among others, will no longer be subject to import duties.
d This limit may be extended by an additional 100 million SME of fabric in 2004 as a result of a credit obtained in view of
increased purchases of United States fabric and thread. Subsequently, it could increase by 200 million SME a year, without
limits.
In most of the Caribbean Basin countries export
promotion mechanisms have had similar features.
Starting in the mid-1980s the four countries considered
here established legal frameworks for EPZs that gave
generous temporary tax breaks to companies operating
in those zones. To complement the EPZs they established
temporary admission regimes that allowed the duty-free
entry of inputs and machinery used in producing goods
for export. These instruments dovetailed perfectly with
the production sharing mechanism introduced by the
United States (see table II.5).
At the same time, these countries established
regulatory frameworks to encourage and facilitate the
entry of foreign firms. In this way, they gradually began
to strengthen the institutional framework for promoting
investment and boosting exports. Specialized agencies
were set up for this purpose, including the Costa Rican
Investment Board (CINDE) and the Foreign Trade
Corporation (PROCOMER) in Costa Rica, the
Foundation for Investment and Development of Exports
(FIDE) in Honduras, the Investment Promotion Office
(OPI) in the Dominican Republic and the Jamaica
Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO) in Jamaica. CINDE
has been particularly successful, since it has played an
active role in seeking out investors to jump-start certain
strategic sectors of the Costa Rican economy. In fact, it
was instrumental in bringing electronics firms, most
notably Intel, to Costa Rica (see box II.4).
to the United States market through
the production sharing mechanism;
then, under the CBTPA, tariff
treatment equal to that provided
under NAFTA; and finally NAFTA
parity with respect to rules of origin
as a result of the signing of CAFTA.
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In 1982 the efforts of prominent Costa
Rican business people led to the
establishment of the Costa Rican
Investment Board (CINDE), with
support from the government and
financing from the United States
Agency for International Development
(USAID). The prime objective of this
private, not-for-profit organization was
to foster local economic development.
To that end, it has worked to raise
Costa Rica’s profile abroad and has
been very active in seeking out foreign
investors and in providing advice and
assistance to foreign firms setting up
operations in the country. Moreover,
thanks to its non-governmental status,
CINDE has been able to carry out a
long-term strategy without being
constrained by domestic political
changes.
The organization initially sought to
attract FDI to sectors that made
intensive use of unskilled labour. In the
early 1990s, however, those activities
were beginning to lose competitiveness
in the country, just as USAID funding
was about to be discontinued. Given
those circumstances, CINDE decided
to shift its focus towards attracting
foreign companies to industries that
demanded skilled labour. In 1993
CINDE chose three key subsectors: the
electrical, electronics and
telecommunications industries. That
strategy proved to be particularly
sound, since it led to significant
improvements in the country’s
technological infrastructure and
sweeping changes in its production
structure. Thanks to the efforts of
CINDE, a number of leading firms in
these subsectors set up production in
Costa Rica. One of them, and clearly
the one with the biggest impact, was
the United States chipmaker Intel.
Over its 20 years of experience
CINDE has been quick to adapt its
objectives. In the late 1990s the stalled
United States economy and the
difficulty of attracting new investment in
higher technology segments posed
new challenges for CINDE. Today the
organization is working to support the
formation of production clusters as a
means of creating new high-skill jobs
and boosting the country’s
development. In fact, one of the main
competitive advantages on which it
bases its promotional strategy is Costa
Rica’s human capital. Recently CINDE
has concentrated on high-technology
industries: microelectronics, medical
equipment and services, including call
centres and software development. A
fourth group comprises so-called
special projects, including tourism,
apparel and textiles. The agency has
researchers who identify new
investment opportunities in each of
these areas. This kind of work is
complemented by the efforts of the
CINDE offices in New York and
California, which proactively seek to
expand the activities of foreign firms
with operations in Costa Rica and to
promote new endeavours in priority
areas. In this connection, CINDE, with
financial support from the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), is
working with small local companies to
prepare them to become suppliers for
foreign firms with a presence in Costa
Rica, in order to strengthen production
linkages, technology transfer and
business development.
Clearly, CINDE, working with
modest resources and a great deal of
creativity, has assimilated successful
experiences in other parts of the world
and, by so doing, has made a very
positive contribution to Costa Rica’s
modernization and development.
Table II.5
PRINCIPAL INCENTIVES OFFERED IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES (EPZs) IN COSTA RICA, THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC, HONDURAS AND JAMAICA
Costa Rica Dominican Honduras Jamaica
Republic
Exemption from import duties on Yes Yes, for 15 years Yes Yes
raw materials, machinery and
equipment used in the production
process
Exemption from export taxes Yes Yes, for 15 years Yes Yes
Exemption from profit taxes Yes, for 8 years for Yes, for 15 years Yes Yes
new investments;
75% for reinvestment
Exemption from local excise taxes Yes Yes
Exemption from capital taxes Yes, for 10 years
Exemption from profit remittance taxes Yes
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Box II.4
THE COSTA RICAN INVESTMENT BOARD (CINDE): THE KEY INSTITUTION BEHIND
THE COUNTRY’S SUCCESS
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Costa
Rican Investment Board (CINDE) (www.cinde.or.cr); Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, “Costa Rica’s development strategy
based on human capital and technology: how it got there, the impact of Intel, and lessons for other countries”, Human
Development Report 2001, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2001.
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Thus, TNCs (primarily United States ones) invested
in setting up new ISIP nodes to take advantage of the tax
incentives granted by local authorities, special access to
the United States market, low-cost labour1 and proximity
to the North American market.2 Consequently, a growing
share of exports began to be effected under special EPZ
regimes, so that apparel, electrical and electronic products
and other labour-intensive manufactures quickly became
some of the leading exports, bound mostly for the United
States market (see table II.6).
1 The impact of low wages is relative. In 1998, according to data from Werner International, Inc., hourly garment-industry wages were
highest in Costa Rica (US$ 2.52), lowest in Honduras (US$ 0.91) and between the two extremes in the Dominican Republic (US$ 1.48).
Among the 25 countries in the world for which this information is available, Costa Rica ranked 13th, the Dominican Republic ranked 18th
and Honduras ranked 25th. The United States was in fifth place, with an hourly wage of US$ 10.12 in this industry (Mortimore, 2003).
2 Firms can also take advantage of these benefits by outsourcing assembly operations to specialized firms (foreign or domestic) located in
EPZs. The most sophisticated option in this regard is the so-called “full-package” model, which enables firms without an ISIP of their own
–such as large retail chains– to order the finished merchandise directly from a supplier that produces it according to the design or instructions
of the buyer. These services are not limited to the assembly of imported inputs, but also include other stages of production such as design,
input selection and distribution of the finished product. This phenomenon is most common in East Asia and is starting to appear in Mexico,
but there have been no cases of this type of activity in the Caribbean Basin (ECLAC, 2000; Gereffi, 2000; Gereffi, Bair and Spener, 2002;
Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003; Gereffi and Bair, 2002; and Mortimore, 2002).
3 The real inflow of foreign investment to EPZs is hard to quantify, especially in comparative terms, owing to differences in the rules for
recording such inflows and to the fact that machinery and equipment –like imported inputs– are deemed to be only temporarily present in
EPZs.
Although the phenomenon is not fully reflected in
statistics, the development of the export sector in a
number of small Caribbean Basin economies has to a
large extent mirrored FDI inflows.3 The characteristics
of this development in recent years imply that a large
proportion of FDI has been channelled into
manufacturing activities, particularly those associated
with efficiency-seeking TNCs. Moreover, the share of
United States capital is biggest in countries that have
increased their capacity to export manufactured or
assembled products. This pattern shows that there is a
strong synergy between trade and investment, as
complementary elements in catering to specific
markets.
This causal relationship is most evident, in
quantitative terms, in the case of Costa Rica. Between
1997 and 2003 65% of total FDI inflows were
concentrated in manufacturing activities –including
categories such as electronic components and medical
devices–, all under EPZ arrangements (BCCR, 2003).
In Honduras and the Dominican Republic, foreign firms
have been the dominant stakeholders in EPZs. As of late
Table II.6
COSTA RICA, HONDURAS, JAMAICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: GEOGRAPHICAL
DESTINATION OF TOTAL EXPORTS, 1985-2002
(Percentages)
Costa Rica Honduras Jamaica Dominican Republic
1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002 1990 1997 2002
United States 45.7 40.1 49.6 52.8 48.4 69.5 28.3 44.8 28.2 66.8 83.3 85.0
European Union 29.5 30.7 25.8 21.8 22.3 5.8 31.8 24.1 32.3 19.6 6.0 7.5
Latin America 16.5 21.2 18.2 6.4 19.3 13.9 8.4 5.6 7.0 3.8 3.1 3.4
Asia (incl. Japan) 2.3 3.3 5.3 5.1 3.2 1.2 0.9 4.2 5.7 6.7 2.0 1.7
Other 6.0 4.6 1.0 13.9 6.9 9.6 30.6 21.2 26.8 3.2 5.6 2.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from International Monetary
Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2002, Washington, 2002.
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2002 73% of all EPZ investments in the Dominican
Republic (US$ 1.214 billion) had been made by foreign
companies, 80% of which were based in the United
States. These investments were highly concentrated in
just a few economic activities: apparel (37%), electronics
(14%), medical equipment and instruments (12%) and
tobacco and tobacco products (11%) (CNZFE, 2003).
Similarly, 73% of the firms operating in Honduras’s EPZs
are foreign; 38% are based in the United States and nearly
30% are based in Asia (Hong Kong, Taiwan Province of
China, China and the Republic of Korea). Most of these
firms (61.5%) are in the garment industry (BCH, 2003).4
Thus, the bulk of United States investment in Costa Rica,
Honduras and the Dominican Republic is export-oriented
and is aimed principally at supplying the United States
4 The Multi-Fibre Arrangement of the 1970s allowed countries that were major garment importers to set quotas for their supplier countries
to keep their own clothing makers from being displaced. Asian exporters were among the most active in setting up operations in different
EPZs to take advantage of the local economies’ quotas in major markets.
market. Lastly, investment in Jamaica’s manufacturing
sector –more specifically in the textile and apparel articles
subsector–, after having been the fastest-growing FDI
segment since the mid-1980s, began to decline sharply
and steadily in response to the country’s fragile economic
situation.
In summary, mounting international competition
and the response of TNCs, which opted to establish
and extend international system of integrated
production, have opened up new opportunities for
small economies located near large markets. The
Caribbean Basin countries have tried to seize this
opportunity by taking steps to facilitate inflows of FDI
from efficiency-seeking TNCs, particularly in the
apparel subsector.
C. STRATEGIES OF EFFICIENCY-SEEKING TNCs IN COSTA RICA, HONDURAS,
JAMAICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
In recent years the attractiveness of Costa Rica,
Honduras, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic to
TNCs has changed significantly as a result of a variety
of factors: the policies of host countries (export
incentives), the policies of capital-supplying countries
(special market access) and the new business strategies
of companies seeking to establish ISIP that will enable
them to reach major markets quickly, efficiently and at
the lowest possible cost. Accordingly, TNCs chose some
of these economies as sites for the production or
assembly of manufactured goods in the framework of
their ISIP.
United States firms, in particular, have made
increasing use of offshore assembly to cut production
costs as a way of staying competitive against their main
rivals, both foreign and domestic. In so doing, they have
tried to defend their market share in the United States
and enhance their competitiveness by taking advantage
of low-cost assembly operations while maintaining high
levels of production and employment within the country,
which otherwise would not have been possible. The
upshot is that United States TNCs have become key
engines of investment and export growth in many
Caribbean Basin countries. In the case of trade in
manufactures –both finished products and inputs–,
United States involvement is even greater and is
concentrated in a small number of activities: apparel,
electrical and electronic articles, medical equipment
and other manufactures in the footwear and sporting
goods categories, among others. In 2002 this set of
products represented 75% of the Dominican
Republic’s exports to the United States, nearly 80%
of Honduras’s, about 60% of Costa Rica’s and 33% of
Jamaica’s (see table II.7).
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A major determinant of these results has been the
production sharing mechanism. Operations of this type
are part of the global efforts being made by United
States TNCs to cut  manufacturing costs, especially in
North America and the Caribbean Basin. Imports with
United States content can enter the United States either
duty-free or at a reduced tariff under the production
sharing provisions of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
(HTS), chapter 98 (formerly referred to as the 807
programme and now known as HTS 9802). While the
goods covered by these provisions represent only 6%
to 10% of total United States imports, they account for
a very sizeable share of the Caribbean Basin countries’
exports: 30% to 40% of their total exports to the United
States, and a much bigger proportion in the case of
manufactures, particularly apparel (see table II.8).
Indeed, between 85% and 96.5% of the Caribbean Basin
countries’ garment exports to the United States are
effected under the production sharing mechanism (see
table II.9).
Table II.7
UNITED STATES: LEADING MANUFACTURES IMPORTS FROM COSTA RICA, HONDURAS, JAMAICA AND THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, BY TWO-DIGIT SITC CODE, 1990-2002a
(Percentages and millions of dollars)
1990 1995 2000 2002
84:  Articles of apparel and clothing
accessories Costa Rica 38.1 41.0 23.3 23.2
Honduras 23.3 64.8 78.2 76.7
Jamaica 41.7 63.4 42.5 33.2
Dominican Republic 41.9 51.8 55.8 52.2
77:  Electrical machinery, apparatus Costa Rica b 4.2 5.8 34.6 22.7
and appliances and electrical Honduras 0.0 0.5 2.3 2.2
parts thereof Jamaica - - - -
Dominican Republic 5.4 6.1 8.5 7.5
87:  Professional, scientific and Costa Rica 0.6 2.0 5.2 10.9
controlling instruments and Honduras - - - -
apparatus Jamaica - - - -
Dominican Republic 4.6 8.4 8.3 8.7
89:  Miscellaneous manufactured Costa Rica 3.8 4.5 1.7 2.9
articles c Honduras 1.9 1.5 0.9 0.9
Jamaica 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
Dominican Republic 5.3 6.0 4.7 6.6
Subtotal of the leading Costa Rica 46.7 53.3 64.8 59.7
manufactures imports Honduras 25.2 66.8 81.4 79.8
(percentages) Jamaica 42.1 63.8 42.8 33.5
Dominican Republic 57.2 72.3 77.3 75.0
Total United States imports Costa Rica 1 006 1 842 3 555 3 146
(millions of dollars) Honduras 486 1 441 3 091 3 262
Jamaica 564 838 631 373
Dominican Republic 1 725 3 385 4 378 4 167
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC), USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, version 2.6.0, January 2004.
a
 All USITC figures are based on SITC, Rev. 3, unlike the figures generated by the TradeCAN software used previously, which are
based on SITC, Rev. 2.
b Includes office machines and automatic data processing machines (division 75).
c Basically includes jewellery, goldsmiths’ and silversmiths’ wares and other articles of precious or semi-precious materials (group
897); articles of plastics (group 893); and baby carriages, toys, games and sporting goods (group 894).
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Table II.8
COSTA RICA, HONDURAS, JAMAICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: SHARE OF GOODS COVERED BY PRODUCTION
SHARING PROVISIONS OUT OF TOTAL UNITED STATES IMPORTS, 1980-2002
(Percentages)
1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Costa Rica 11.1 18.5 30.8 38.3 30.8 21.0 25.1 30.3 22.1
Honduras … 6.7 … 46.9 63.0 69.4 61.1 49.0 33.3
Jamaica … 21.8 28.4 54.4 52.4 45.6 38.0 39.6 30.3
Dominican Republic 11.8 28.9 40.3 57.8 63.1 65.2 62.3 49.8 37.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC), USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, version 2.6.0, January 2004.
Table II.9
UNITED STATES: APPAREL IMPORTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES-CARIBBEAN BASIN TRADE




                       
CBTPA CBTPA Other Total production
 preferencese   sharing
9820.11.03- Other
9802.00.80.44b 9820.11.18c 9802.00.80d
Honduras 921 579 537 078 533 888 1 499 349 547 2 343 591 85.0
Dominican Republic 944 014 581 844 540 149 8 925 176 713 2 251 645 91.8
El Salvador 559 272 371 813 454 164 3 468 223 012 1 611 729 85.9
Guatemala 137 712 278 681 359 176 3 039 825 370 1 603 978 48.4
Costa Rica 325 583 76 142 320 738 5 101 21 122 748 686 96.5
Nicaragua 42 229 37 661 26 993 24 267 433 374 340 28.6
Haiti 112 663 31 008 61 728 0 10 972 216 371 94.9
Jamaica 107 673 3 177 59 955 0 10 709 181 514 94.1
Other 16 017 2 043 14 376 17 8 525 40 978 79.2
Total 3 166 742 1 919 447 2 371 167 22 073 1 893 403 9 372 832 79.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Ralph Watkins, “Production-sharing
update: developments in 2002”, Industry Trade and Technology Review, Office of Industries, United States International
Trade Commission (USITC), July 2002, on the basis of official statistics from the United States Department of Commerce,
Office of Textiles and Apparel.
a
 The figures include apparel subject to the old Multi-Fibre Arrangement (replaced by the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing),
which accounted for 97% of total United States apparel imports from CBTPA beneficiary countries in 2001.
b
 HTS subheading 9802.00.80.44 accords duty-free treatment to apparel assembled in CBTPA beneficiary countries from fabrics
wholly formed and cut in the United States from yarns wholly formed in the United States.
c
 Includes apparel imported duty-free from CBTPA beneficiary countries under six HTS subheadings.
d
 Includes apparel imported under HTS subheadings 9802.00.80.15 and 9802.00.80.16.
e
 Includes apparel imported duty-free from CBTPA beneficiary countries under three HTS subheadings.
United States imports under the production sharing
mechanism have fallen since 2000 because the Caribbean
Basin countries have begun to receive more advantageous
special treatment under other programmes (Dussel,
2004). After these countries lobbied for NAFTA parity,
the United States began to implement the CBTPA, or
enhanced CBI, in October 2000. The CBTPA
incorporates all the benefits afforded under the CBI,
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including both production sharing and the Special Access
Program. What is newest and most important about this
legislation is its treatment of textiles and clothing, along
with the other segments that had been excluded from the
benefits of the original CBI (Dussel, 2004). While the
CBTPA represents a major improvement over the CBI
in terms of market access, it is still significantly more
restrictive than NAFTA, particularly because it imposes
quotas and high tariffs on flat-weave fabrics.5 The
conclusion of CAFTA should eliminate some of these
problems, especially with respect to regional value added.
Nonetheless, while it is true that these countries’
conditions of access to the United States market have
progressively improved –to the point where tariff
treatment is now equivalent to that enjoyed by Mexico
under NAFTA–, the current situation is not enabling the
local content and value added of the products exported
5 The features that differentiate the CBTPA from NAFTA include the fact that it is temporary, is based on a variety of quotas and does not
provide for a general “yarn forward” structure, meaning that the tariffs actually paid are much higher than the ones in effect under NAFTA.
While NAFTA grants duty-free access to apparel assembled from fabrics formed and cut in the United States, the value added of such
articles is subject to import duty under the CBTPA.
6 The CBTPA allows beneficiary countries to carry out a slightly higher level of processing and to incorporate a somewhat larger proportion
of non-United States components than would normally be permissible for entry under HTS heading 9802. In the case of apparel, these
processes include cutting, stone-washing and other processes, while the allowable inputs now include limited amounts of Mexican and
Canadian fabrics.
to the United States to increase sufficiently to allow for
the industrial upgrading of these activities in the
Caribbean Basin. Under the production sharing
mechanism, the incorporation of local content was
virtually nil and value added was extremely low; the
CBTPA, for its part, did little to change that situation.6
This state of affairs is confirmed by the low utilization
of the GSP, which requires a minimum of 35% local
value added, and by the high United States content of
the products which the United States imports from this
group of countries under the production sharing
mechanism (see table II.10). Consequently,
specialization in a single market, access to which
depended essentially on a single instrument, meant that
the benefits for host countries were fairly limited. The
recent conclusion of CAFTA could partially redress this
situation (see box II.3).
Table II.10
COSTA RICA, HONDURAS, JAMAICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: UNITED STATES CONTENT
 OF TOTAL UNITED STATES IMPORTS UNDER THE PRODUCTION
SHARING MECHANISM, 1980-2002
(Percentages)
1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Costa Rica 66.7 69.0 69.1 66.8 65.3 65.8 64.6 64.5 63.9
Honduras … 69.8 … 71.0 71.2 70.6 68.7 69.0 67.1
Jamaica … 72.5 74.5 80.9 81.0 81.9 80.8 77.3 74.2
Dominican Republic 67.3 71.7 69.4 65.0 62.9 64.2 62.3 62.0 61.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC), USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, version 2.6.0, January 2004.
Below is a more in-depth analysis of some of the
activities behind these international movements of
merchandise and resources: apparel, electronics, medical
equipment and certain services related to efficiency
seeking. This will shed more light on the benefits and
problems related to the ISIP of efficiency-seeking TNCs
in the Caribbean Basin.
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7 For further details on the apparel industry in Latin America and the Caribbean, see chapter IV of Foreign investment in Latin America and
the Caribbean, 1999 (ECLAC, 2000).
1. Textile and apparel articles: a rootless industry7
The manufacture of textile and apparel articles was an
important engine of industrialization in many developed
countries and in some of the best-performing emerging
economies in the last few decades. More recently, as
industrialization processes turned increasingly to more
technologically complex activities, this industry’s
importance gradually diminished in the first group of
countries and increased in some countries of the second
group. Even so, this activity became established as one
of the fastest-growing segments in international trade.
Some countries (mostly Asian ones) made the most of
the opportunities it offered for as long as they had the
necessary comparative advantages (see box II.5). Others
(nearly all of them in Latin America) achieved high export
volumes on the basis of this activity, but found that this
progress did not serve the purposes of industrial and
technological upgrading (Mortimore, 2003b; Gereffi,
Spener and Bair, 2002; Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003).
Box II.5
THREE MODELS OF ADAPTATION TO CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL APPAREL INDUSTRY
The challenges posed by the changes
that have taken place in the apparel
industry have forced countries to
undertake processes of adaptation
whose approaches differ from one
region or country to another. Some
countries have designed and
implemented active policies for the
establishment of an integrated apparel
industry run by local companies.
Others have used trade advantages to
form special relationships with TNCs as
a way of upgrading those firms’
subsidiaries in the host country. Lastly,
some countries have taken a passive
attitude, settling for whatever is offered
from outside.
(a) The East Asian model
The East Asian model is based on
the experiences of highly successful
textile and apparel exporters in Hong
Kong, Taiwan Province of China and
the Republic of Korea. These firms
followed a sequence in which they
evolved from assembly plants to
original equipment manufacturers
(OEM) and finally to original brand
manufacturers (OBM). The newly
industrialized economies of East Asia
developed and refined their OEM
capabilities in the 1960s and 1970s by
establishing close ties with United
States retailers and other stakeholders
and then learning by watching in order
to build their own export capacity.
Confidence in their performance, which
they built through their successful
dealings with United States buyers,
enabled East Asian suppliers to use
their OEM expertise internationally by
introducing triangle manufacturing.
Under this scheme, East Asian
manufacturers became intermediaries
between United States buyers and
apparel factories in Asia and other
developing regions in order to take
advantage of lower labour costs and
favourable quotas. The creation of
these global sourcing networks helped
the East Asian countries to sustain
their international competitiveness
when domestic economic conditions
and quota constraints threatened to
undermine the original bilateral
relationships they had formed as OEM
or full-package suppliers. The East
Asian economies have gone beyond
OEM by switching to higher-value-
added upstream products (such as
exports of textiles and yarn instead of
apparel), moving downstream from
OEM to OBM in apparel and joining
new value chains in which they hope to
replicate their export success in the
apparel segment.
(b) The Mexican model
The emerging Mexican model
involves a transition from assembly
operations to OEM production. The key
factor in this case has been NAFTA,
which, starting in 1994, eliminated the
trade restrictions that had locked
Mexico into an assembly role. The
maquila system required Mexican
suppliers to use United States inputs in
order to gain duty-free access to the
United States market. In the 10 years
since NAFTA came into effect, more
and more of the apparel supply chain
(such as cutting, washing and textile
production) has been relocated to
Mexico as specific tariff restrictions in
each of these phases are eliminated.
The East Asian countries did not make
use of the production sharing
provisions established by the United
States under its HTS 9802 programme
because the distances involved made
the use of United States textile inputs
impractical. Moreover, United States
textile mills had neither the output
capacity nor the desire, because of
their mass-production orientation, to
supply the wide range of fabrics
required for the manufacture of
women’s wear and high-fashion
apparel, which became the speciality of
East Asian exporters. This created an
OEM niche that East Asian apparel
firms were quick to exploit.
However, NAFTA alone cannot
guarantee Mexico’s success. While the
massive peso devaluations of 1994-
1995 made the country attractive to
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The United States apparel industry faced intense
and growing competition from Asian products, which
forced the leading apparel companies to redefine their
business strategies. Starting in the mid-1980s a number
of United States firms launched a process of
internationalizing production, making use of the
comparative advantages offered by developing countries
and absorbing new technologies and organizational
practices that enhanced the efficiency of their global
operations. Accordingly, there was a large-scale transfer
of assembly operations to locations outside the United
States and an increase in the share of imports in the
domestic clothing market. Import penetration in the
United States market, which was high to begin with,
increased from 57% in 1997 to 74.5% in 2002 (AAFA,
2003).8 Endeavours in Asia were initially the most
common, but these operations were subsequently
extended to other locations. As a result, the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan Province of China gradually moved out of
this industry and into other, more technology-intensive
segments.
Between 1990 and 2002 the Caribbean Basin
countries doubled their share of the imported clothing
market in the United States, from 8.5% to 16.3%, while
the Asian countries saw their share slide from 74.3% to
53.2% and Mexico consolidated its position as the
primary export base, with 13% of that market. The
standouts among the Central American and Caribbean
countries are Honduras, the Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica. Apparel accounts
for a very significant share of the external sales of three
of these countries, particularly Honduras and the
Dominican Republic, in which this industry supplies
about 80% and over 50%, respectively, of exports to the
United States (see table II.11).
8 The sharp downturn in employment in this industry reflects sweeping changes in domestic clothing production in the United States.
Between 1975 and 1995 this downturn was relatively gradual (from 1.24 million to 0.9 million jobs), but between 1995 and 2002 the
number of jobs fell off suddenly, from 935,800 to 520,800 (AAFA, 2003).
(Box II.5 concluded)
United States apparel manufacturers
with international subcontracting
operations, Mexico has lacked the
necessary infrastructure for full-
package garment production. From a
value-chain perspective, the solution to
how to complete the transition to full-
package supply and develop new
production and marketing niches is to
forge linkages with lead firms that can
supply the necessary resources and
tutelage. In other words, Mexico needs
to develop new and better networks in
order to compete with East Asian
suppliers for the United States full-
package market.
(c) The Caribbean Basin model
The Caribbean Basin model is
almost exclusively limited to EPZ
assembly under the HTS 9802
programme. The Caribbean Basin
countries did not receive NAFTA parity
until October 2000. They therefore
encountered tighter quota restrictions,
higher tariffs and more limited
possibilities for vertical integration than
Mexico. Nonetheless, they have had
considerable success with export
assembly. They are expanding their
position in the United States market,
primarily through large assembly plants
linked to the production-sharing
operations of United States TNCs.
However, Caribbean Basin exporters are
losing ground to Mexican firms that can
export similar goods to the United States
more quickly and cheaply. They need to
develop new networks with United
States retailers and other stakeholders if
they are to acquire the skills and
resources they need to move into the
more diversified activities associated
with full-package production.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Gary Gereffi and Olga Memedovic,
“The Global Apparel Value Chain: What Prospects for Upgrading by Developing Countries”, Sectoral Studies series,
Vienna, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 2003.
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 Table II.11
UNITED STATES: APPAREL IMPORTS
(SITC, Rev. 3, 841-845), BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1990-2002
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
1990 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 1990 1995 2000 2002
Millions of dollars Percentages
Asia 16 355 21 357 26 009 29 986 29 759 30 087 74.3 59.6 52.6 53.2
China 3 064 4 477 5 416 5 907 6 080 6 646 13.9 12.8 10.4 11.8
Hong Kong 3 813 4 223 4 415 4 454 4 153 3 861 17.3 12.1 7.8 6.8
Indonesia 615 1 172 1 642 2 034 2 178 2 025 2.8 3.4 3.6 3.6
India 570 1 151 1 531 1 787 1 738 1 903 2.6 3.3 3.1 3.4
Rep. of Korea 2 163 1 553 1 763 2 023 1 928 1 792 9.8 4.5 3.5 3.2
Philippines 950 1431 1 686 1 836 1 830 1 768 4.3 4.1 3.2 3.1
Bangladesh 419 996 1 493 1 933 1 923 1 754 1.9 2.9 3.4 3.1
Thailand 424 1 022 1 436 1 803 1 807 1 715 1.9 2.9 3.2 3.0
Taiwan Province
of China 2 079 1 808 1 877 1 813 1 548 1 355 9.5 5.2 3.2 2.4
Viet Nam 0 8 22 41 42 868 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.5
Malaysia 462 667 707 772 753 715 2.1 1.9 1.4 1.3
Other Asian 1 796 2 849 4 021 5 583 5 779 5 685 8.2 6.5 9.7 10
Mexico 636 2 743 6 486 8 329 7 739 7 344 2.9 7.9 14.6 13.0
Caribbean Basin 1 879 5 229 7 994 9 279 9 218 9 192 8.5 14.6 16.3 16.3
Honduras 112 931 1 895 2 399 2 413 2 457 0.5 2.7 4.2 4.3
Dominican Rep. 679 1 688 2 263 2 328 2 190 2 089 3.1 4.8 4.1 3.7
Guatemala 185 676 1 128  1 479 1 608 1 655 0.8 1.9 2.6 2.9
El Salvador 54 568 1 080 1 507 1 544 1 555 0.2 1.6 2.6 2.8
Costa Rica 373 729 794 762 681 637 1.7 2.1 1.3 1.1
Nicaragua 0 74 232 337 380 433 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.8
Jamaica 224 414 333 181 141 121 1.0 1.2 0.3 0.2
Other Caribbean 252 149 269 1 765 261 245 1.2 0.1 0.6 0.5
Other regions 3 130 5 528 7 564 9 427 9 740 9 903 14.3 17.9 16.5 17.5
Total 22 000 34 857 48 053 57 021 56 456 56 526 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC), USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, version 2.6.0, December 2003.
Nonetheless, the very nature of the production
sharing mechanism (HTS 9802) and the characteristics
of the incentives offered, which reflect the keen
competition to attract FDI to the Caribbean Basin
countries, have had the effect of keeping domestic value
added very low (see table II.9). Some 79% of United
States apparel imports from the Caribbean Basin in 2001
entered under the production sharing arrangement,
compared to 50% of those from Mexico and 1% of those
from China (Watkins, 2002). In addition, given the
importance of wages in the finished product, the transfer
of assembly operations to locations with relatively cheap
labour is an essential feature of TNCs’ efficiency-seeking
strategies. In fact, apparel accounts for about 75% of the
total duty savings achieved on United States merchandise
imports under production sharing provisions (Brookhart
and Watkins, 2000). Thus, the garment industry’s
existence in the subregion is basically contingent on wage
levels, and there is little opportunity to make use of local
physical inputs (Buitelaar and Padilla, 2000).
The fact that the sector is forced to use expensive
United States inputs casts doubt on these countries’ real
competitiveness. What is more, the situation will be even
more problematic when the transition period provided
for in the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
expires, owing to the expected massive inflow of inputs
and finished products from Asia, primarily China.
In addition to the changes that have taken place on
the production side, marketing has also been significantly
transformed. Buyer-driven chains have gradually
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replaced producer-driven ones. In the United States
market, large retailers (Sears, Wal-Mart, J.C. Penney,
Kmart) and branded marketers (Nike, Polo, Tommy
Hilfiger) have acquired more influence over the entire
marketing chain (Gereffi, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002). In these
circumstances, Asian suppliers took on a more important
role by switching to full-package production, edging out
United States clothing makers. This change strengthened
domestic Asian firms that were capable of organizing
all phases of apparel production –from inputs to
completed products– and, in the process, boosted the
development of the local production system.
In contrast, the situation of this industry in the small
Caribbean Basin countries is very different. In general,
the manufacturers operating in these economies are
subsidiaries of foreign branded manufacturers (especially
of women’s undergarments) or domestic or foreign firms
that compete for assembly contracts (particularly for
men’s wear) from large United States retailers. This is
why the full-package concept has not flourished in the
Central American and Caribbean countries, since their
competitive advantages are derived strictly from the
characteristics that make them well-suited to final
product assembly: EPZs, preferential access to the United
States and low wages.
There are three kinds of apparel firms in the
Caribbean Basin, each of which approaches its
competitive position differently:
• Large subsidiaries of United States TNCs that have
set up ISIP nodes in the subregion. Examples of
these are firms that manufacture apparel, especially
undergarments, for export to the United States; these
include leading branded manufacturers such as Sara
Lee (Hanes, Bali, Playtex, L’eggs), Fruit of the Loom
(Fruit of the Loom, BVD, Gitano, Munsinger) and
Warnaco (Warner’s, Olga, Lejaby). They usually
have subsidiaries in three or four countries of the
subregion. If the competitive position of their
subsidiaries’ host countries changes, these firms
react by adding or cutting back on assembly lines,
without having to pull out of the site completely
except in extreme circumstances. Accordingly, they
add new assembly lines at sites where competitive
conditions improve and cut back on them where such
conditions worsen;
• Smaller United States manufacturers of other apparel
items, which serve as subcontractors of bigger
companies (either producers or buyers). These are
generally companies that have been forced out of
the United States under strong competitive pressure
from Asian imports and have set up operations in
the Caribbean Basin in a bid to survive. The ones
that operate at a single site tend to look for a better
one when competitive conditions worsen. The “fly-
by-night” firms mentioned earlier are in this
category;
• Small domestic firms that can combine apparel
manufacture for the domestic market with
subcontracting for bigger firms (either producers or
buyers). Since they usually have no subsidiaries in
other countries, any downturn in competitive
conditions tends to force them to engage in other
activities in order to survive.
Of these three categories of apparel firms in the
Caribbean Basin, subsidiaries of large TNCs are the ones
that are best able to adapt to changing competitive
conditions in the subregion’s countries.
In the four countries considered, this industry has
had varying degrees of success in terms of apparel exports
to the United States (see figure II.1). Although the
Dominican Republic was once the strongest performer,
it has been overtaken by Honduras. Costa Rica was in
second place until 1994, when a quota dispute arose with
the United States government. Even though WTO ruled
in favour of Costa Rica in the dispute, the Costa Rican
apparel industry has lost momentum since then. Jamaica
used to be in third place, but problems deriving from
macroeconomic stability, such as the local currency’s
appreciation against the United States dollar, caused the
subsector to lose competitiveness, as reflected by the
decline in apparel exports to the United States since 1996.
Although Honduras ranked fourth in the early 1990s, it
subsequently turned in the best performance because it
offered the lowest wages in the industry. Thus, these four
countries achieved widely diverging results over the
period considered.
In Honduras this industry has become highly
specialized in knitwear, which represents 63.2% of its
apparel exports to the United States and consists mainly
of T-shirts, sweaters and brassieres, in addition to mass-
market clothing. The Dominican Republic specializes in
mass-market men’s wear –pants of all types,
undergarments and T-shirts– and, to a lesser extent,
women’s wear (pants and undergarments). Costa Rica’s
apparel industry has focused primarily on knitted
undergarments for women and girls, particularly
brassieres, panties, nightdresses and pajamas, which
account for more than 40% of the industry’s exports.
Jamaica’s small production base is currently highly
concentrated in T-shirts of knitted fabric, which
represent just under half of its sales to the United States
market.
The apparel industry’s loss of competitiveness in
Costa Rica, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic is also
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Figure II.1
UNITED STATES: APPAREL IMPORTS (SITC, Rev. 3, 841-845) FROM COSTA RICA, HONDURAS,
JAMAICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1989-2002
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United States
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attributable to external factors. Starting in 1994 the impact
of Mexico’s improved access to the United States market
under NAFTA was most keenly felt in Costa Rica and
Jamaica, especially in terms of their jeans exports
(ECLAC, 2000, chap. IV). In contrast, the Dominican
Republic’s shipments to the United States continued to
grow, enabling it to reorganize production in its
assembly plants and to modernize its facilities with new
machinery, equipment and technology. Increased
productivity, combined with the containment of labour
costs, were key determinants of this phenomenon
(Buitelaar, 2000).
Despite these gains in terms of market share, the
situation of the apparel industry in the Caribbean Basin
countries is a far cry from what it has become in the Asian
economies. For one thing, the former group of countries
exports to only one market –North America, and
particularly the United States– and the sector’s impact in
terms of industrialization and development of the
production system has been much less pronounced. In
this regard, the very nature of the production sharing
mechanism has exacerbated these problems by
accentuating the fragility of the production system’s
development and generating a form of competitiveness
that is temporary rather than lasting (Mortimore, 2003b;
Vergara, 2004; Schrank, 2003). In none of the cases
considered has the production sharing mechanism
resulted in the development of major supply chains or
of locally produced yarn, thread, fabric or accessories.
Likewise, TNCs have done very little to boost industrial
and technological upgrading in the host countries through
technology transfer, production linkages or business
development. Some progress has been made in terms of
human resources training, but only from a strict “cost
centre” approach.
Lastly, the industry’s future prospects –particularly
in Honduras and the Dominican Republic, where it is
still very important– are not very promising, and
questions arise as to the competitive development of this
activity. The growth of competition as a result of China’s
engagement in world trade and changes in some of the
rules of international trade, such as the WTO agreement
that export subsidies should be eliminated by 2007, the
phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and the phase-
in of new requirements under the Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing, together with the loss of competitiveness
vis-à-vis Mexico in terms of rules of origin, labour costs,
tariffs and transport costs, have darkened the outlook
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for attracting new investment and strengthening export
activities.9
In summary, the four economies analysed started out
in similar circumstances but achieved different degrees
of success, as measured by their share of United States
imports. All of them, however, share certain core
9 Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, all countries with a GNP per capita of more than US$ 1,000 per
annum must eliminate export subsidy programmes by 2007. This means that producers in the Dominican Republic will face much stiffer
competition in the United States market. Moreover, under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,
apparel manufacturers will be subject to all the rules and procedures set out in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by the
end of 2004.
characteristics: on the positive side, they attracted
important ISIP nodes of United States corporations; on
the negative side, they did not reach the level of industrial
and technological upgrading needed to sustain exports,
and some of these countries are caught in the low-value-
added trap.
2. The electronics industry: a broken chain?
In the 1990s the presence of electronics-industry TNCs in
the Caribbean Basin countries was concentrated in Costa
Rica. As part of their strategy of efficiency seeking with a
view to capturing export markets, several electronic
components manufacturers chose Costa Rica because of
its high-quality human resources, proximity to the United
States market, appropriate service infrastructure, EPZs and
special access to the United States market, basically
through the production sharing mechanism.
High-technology firms first came to Costa Rica in
the 1970s, with the most notable arrival being Motorola.
In the 1980s, while the subregion was going through a
period of political and economic upheaval –including a
number of civil wars–, Costa Rica was an exception, and
therefore attracted new firms in the electronics subsector.
However, this activity did not really take off, in the sense
of attracting large inflows of FDI and generating an export
boom, until the mid-1990s. In 1995 the country saw the
arrival of the United States firms DSC Communications
Corporation –which made the biggest manufacturing
investment ever recorded in Costa Rica up to that time–
and Sawtek Merrimac.
As the first electronics firms were setting up
operations in Costa Rica, the country was progressing
towards the design of a national strategy for boosting
certain areas of production. To that end, the authorities
drew up proactive policies for channelling investment
into the electronics industry. A determining factor in their
change of orientation was a 1995 study, prepared by the
World Bank’s Foreign Investment Advisory Service
(FIAS), that gave a positive assessment of the country as
a possible site for investments in high-technology
industries. The new strategy set the objectives of
progressing towards skill-intensive activities and
developing competitive advantages based on high-
technology activities. In fact, Costa Rica had been losing
competitiveness in the apparel industry and its prospects
in that area were not encouraging, given the
implementation of NAFTA. The Costa Rican authorities
therefore decided to redirect their efforts towards
attracting FDI to certain incipient subsectors such as
electronics. The country’s new image highlighted its
political stability, geographical location and relatively
high levels of education and human development, as well
as the authorities’ commitment to a development strategy
based mainly on electronics, in contrast to the prior
emphasis on apparel.
Thanks to the experience it had gained in facilitating
the arrival of DSC Communications Corporation and
Sawtek Merrimac, CINDE was able to play a key role in
implementing the new strategy for attracting investment
(see box II.4). The crowning achievement in this regard
was the arrival of Intel, the industry leader in the
manufacture of microprocessors, whose decision to open
a plant in Costa Rica helped to strengthen the new
strategic approach. Intel’s arrival was significant not only
because of the size and economic impact of its
investment, but also because it raised the country’s profile
as a possible site for other leading high-technology firms
(see box II.6).
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Box II.6
SETTING ITS SIGHTS ON INTEL: THE IMPACT ON COSTA RICA
In the mid-1990s Intel was looking for a
new site for a microprocessor assembly
and testing plant. The main criteria for
its decision included economic and
political stability, economic openness,
an adequate labour supply, a business-
friendly environment, streamlined
administrative procedures and, owing
to the labour-intensiveness of the work
to be performed in the new plant, a
location well suited to a cost-cutting
strategy (Mortimore and Vergara,
2004).
The significance of Intel’s selection
of Costa Rica is apparent in the light of
its decision-making process (Shiels,
2000; Spar, 1998). Its long list of
possible sites included both Asian
countries (Indonesia, Singapore, India
and Thailand) and Latin American ones
(Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and
Costa Rica). During the selection
process the Costa Rican authorities
decided to negotiate directly with the
company. They felt that Intel’s investor
profile fit the country’s new strategy
and represented a good starting point
for channelling FDI into high-technology
activities (Salazar, 1998). Initial contact
with Intel was made by the director of
the CINDE office in New York, probably
in 1995. As the first fruit of this effort, in
early 1996 Intel sent a team of legal,
tax and site selection experts to Costa
Rica, whose activities were coordinated
by the CINDE investment programme
staff. Intel staff made numerous trips to
the country in 1996, visiting the plants
of firms such as Motorola and DSC
Communications. Conversely, as part of
the negotiations, CINDE executives
toured the company’s Arizona facilities.
The preparatory process even included
a visit by the then-President of Costa
Rica, José María Figueres.
As the evaluation progressed, Intel
became more and more convinced that
the new plant should be located in Latin
America. As a result, the short list of
candidates consisted mainly of Latin
American countries, including Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico, while the
only remaining Asian countries were
Indonesia and Thailand. After
painstaking study, the competition
came down to Mexico and Costa Rica.
Although Mexico had considerable
advantages, such as a more fully
developed electronics subsector,
appropriate labour costs and skills and
proximity to the United States, Intel
finally settled on Costa Rica because
the country had demonstrated good
organization and targeting in its
negotiations with the firm. Also
important in this regard was the
authorities’ willingness to act quickly
and efficiently to accommodate Intel’s
needs.
Among the specific government
actions that facilitated the firm’s arrival
were the modification of the
programmes of study of the Costa
Rican Institute of Technology (ITCR);
the building of two electricity
substations and the setting of special
rates; a variety of road projects to
facilitate the plant’s construction and
the transport of its products; an “open
skies” policy to increase the frequency
of flights between Costa Rica and the
United States; the opening of
consulates in the Philippines and
Malaysia, where Intel already had
assembly and testing plants; and the
establishment of an exclusive-use call
centre (Spar, 1998). In addition, to
make certain of fully meeting the firm’s
requirements in setting up the plant
and putting it into operation, the
authorities mounted an all-out effort to
coordinate the various spheres of
government, such as CINDE, the
Ministry of Energy and the
Environment, the Ministry of Finance
and ITCR. Thus, Costa Rica offered
not only stability, a low-cost bilingual
workforce and tax and tariff incentives
for free-zone exports, but also flexibility
and an institutional structure that
would facilitate Intel’s establishment in
the country.
Five years after Intel’s arrival, the
impact it has generated is significant at
both the macroeconomic and
microeconomic levels. In terms of
aggregate impact, the most obvious
effects are those on Costa Rica’s GDP,
FDI inflows and exports. Intel’s initial
investment amounted to US$ 400
million and was reflected in the
country’s growth rate: in 1999 Costa
Rica’s economy grew by 8.4%, but if
the “Intel effect” had been excluded
this figure would have reached only
3% (Bortagaray, 2001). The impact on
exports and competitiveness,
meanwhile, has been tremendous.
External sales rose fast enough to
turn the country’s US$ 500-million
trade deficit in 1997 into a US$ 600-
million surplus in 1999, the first
positive balance in 50 years. In
addition, the contribution of trade to
GDP increased from 57% in 1991 to
more than 83% in 1999. Moreover, the
country’s competitive position in the
United States market has changed
radically in recent years as a direct
result of Intel’s impact (see table II.1).
Another aggregate effect is the one
observed in terms of the country’s
image. Intel’s decision, taken after a
rigorous selection process, has given
Costa Rica a “certificate of quality”,
and many other firms are looking to
this country as a possible investment
site (Rodríguez-Clare, 2001). Even
more significantly, several companies
(Remec, Sawtek, Reliability, Protek
and Sensortronics) have already set
up operations in the electronics
subsector, while others have done so
in activities such as medical
equipment manufacturing (Abbott and
Baxter). At the same time, Intel
“satellite” firms have established
subsidiaries in the country (Robotic
Vision Systems, Inc. (RVSI), Nortek,
Tiros and Delta Design, among
others). These subsidiaries generally
have few employees and do not
contribute much to the creation of an
electronics cluster, but they are
examples of how Intel’s presence has
given rise to a range of activities than
go beyond the operations of Intel itself.
Intel’s impact has also been
significant at the microeconomic level.
In terms of linkages with other kinds of
activities, some of the firm’s suppliers,
for example, have received direct
training from Intel, revamped their
organizational practices or even
changed their product lines as a result
of Intel’s arrival. Moreover, there is
evidence that Intel has generated
changes in the inputs market that
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    (Box II.6 concluded)
have even benefited its competitors
(Larraín, López-Calva and
Rodríguez-Clare, 2001). In the area
of human resources, Intel employs
some 2,200 people at relatively high
pay levels. Training is provided in two
ways: training of Intel’s own
workforce, which is usually quite
specific and generates few
externalities, and collaboration with
ITCR. In view of this relationship,
ITCR has adapted its programmes to
meet the need for professionals
trained in semiconductor fabrication;
Intel, meanwhile, promotes teacher
training, awards scholarships and
donates equipment to build
institutional capacity in the area of
What is wrong with this picture, of
course, is that local value added is still
low, with the result that linkages with
the local economy are limited. Most of
the work still consists of manual
assembly and visual quality control. It
must be admitted that, owing to the
nature of the product, not much can
be expected in terms of supplying
physical inputs. In the end, the way to
benefit from this type of investment is
to attract a number of investment
projects similar to Intel’s to generate a
cluster of interrelated activities. In any
event, it is clear that Intel’s impact has
been very significant, but needs more
time to create competitive advantages.
electronics. In terms of logistics, Intel’s
arrival lured companies such as
Federal Express, United Parcel
Service (UPS) and AirExpress
International to Costa Rica. Thus, the
benefits produced span the areas of
technology transfer, production
linkages and human resources and
business development, albeit with
differences in terms of their extent and
depth. Costa Rica’s potential for
software development was
demonstrated by two decisions taken
by Intel in 2001: to establish a centre
for software development and
semiconductor design and to invest in
one of the country’s leading software
firms.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Costa Rica now hosts some 50 electronics firms
directly employing about 10,000 technicians and
professionals (www.cinde.or.cr). In addition to Intel and
the two pioneering companies mentioned earlier, Remec,
Conair, Reliability, Protek, Sensortronics and Colorplast
have operations in the country. Intel “satellite” firms such
as RVSI, Nortek, Philips, Tiros and Delta Design have
also established subsidiaries there. The firms in this group
are the ones that have given exports the biggest boost
and are the main generators of employment in EPZs,
where pay levels are 20% higher than in the rest of the
private sector (Robles, 2000). These firms have also
enabled a number of local companies to compete
successfully in the software industry, making Costa Rica
the leading exporter (per capita) of this product in Latin
America (Rodríguez-Clare, 2001).
The impact of the operations of Intel and other
electronics firms is directly reflected both in the
spectacular growth of exports and in the shift in their
composition. In terms of its market share of North
American (United States and Canadian) electronics
imports, Costa Rica had a very small share until 1995,
after which its share leapt from 0.05% in 1996 to a peak
of 0.48% in 1999 (see figure II.2). Major changes also
took place in its export structure (see table II.1). In 2001
its external sales of electronics, primarily
microprocessors, totalled US$ 1.3 billion (26% of total
exports) (www.procomer.com). Thus, the dramatic
upsurge in FDI and in electronics exports, together with
the formation of an institutional structure capable of
targeting a specific type of FDI, have made Costa Rica
one of the “winners” in terms of enhanced
competitiveness (UNCTAD, 2002).
Costa Rica’s pursuit of the Intel investment enabled
it to learn some important lessons and to continue to wage
its investment promotion campaign consistently, in the
context of a better-defined national strategy. To the extent
that the country consolidates its strategic framework,
firms may expand their operations and form a cluster of
interrelated activities. This plan entails a number of risks,
however, and demands ongoing assessment of the results
with a view to making any changes deemed necessary.
In practice, electronics firms occupy market segments
characterized by fierce international competition, owing
to the key role of technological innovation in this industry.
Since they belong to ISIP, they need to take global
decisions concerning the advantages of locating in a given
country. When this happens, the incentives offered by
individual countries to attract these firms are less
important. This means that if advantages in terms of
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human resources, local suppliers and other factors are
not maintained and constantly regenerated, firms may
decide to close their operations.
Costa Rica has demonstrated a growing capacity to
carry out a proactive strategy that demands coordination
among its institutions and a commitment to national
priorities and objectives and to finding ways to link these
aims to the strategies of TNCs that are reconfiguring their
global ISIP. The Intel experience shows how a small
developing country can understand and visualize the
strategies of TNCs with a view to coordinating its
development policies with those strategies and achieving
mutual benefits. In the future, this country’s primary
challenge will be to attract more firms in order to form
an electronics cluster and forge more linkages with the
rest of the economy.
The Dominican Republic has also begun to achieve
solid growth in the electronics subsector, albeit on a
considerably smaller scale (see figure II.2). Electronics
firms currently account for 5% of all the companies
operating in EPZs, electronics exports amount to some
US$ 500 million and investments in this area represent
about 14% of the total (Vergara, 2004). In addition,
electrical apparatus for making electrical circuits (SITC
group 772) has become the country’s seventh most
important export (see table II.2). Moreover, the
Dominican Republic is trying to follow in Costa Rica’s
footsteps by developing an FDI targeting strategy. The
poor outlook for the development of the apparel industry
has prompted the authorities to make some initial efforts
to bolster TNC activities in high-growth, technology-
intensive segments. Accordingly, to diversify EPZ
activities and increase the use of high technology, the
government, together with private investors, created the
Santo Domingo Cyberpark. The aim of this, the first
technological free-zone industrial park, is to use
telecommunications infrastructure to lure manufacturers
of computer hardware and software and medical
instruments, in addition to providing a range of
telecommunication services.
In short, Costa Rica’s success in the field of
electronics indicates that the apparel industry’s loss of
competitiveness is forcing the Caribbean Basin countries
to identify realistic options for designing and
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Figure II.2
COSTA RICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MARKET SHARE OF THE ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC
PRODUCTS SUBSECTORS IN NORTH AMERICAN IMPORTSa
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the TradeCAN
software, 2002 edition.
a Includes 11 product groups in divisions 71, 75, 76 and 77 of SITC, Rev. 2.
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3. Medical devices: the new frontier
Costa Rica and, to a lesser extent, the Dominican
Republic have begun to see the arrival of a new group of
manufacturers: producers of medical devices. The key
element attracting these new ventures is the availability
of a well-educated, high-quality workforce at very
competitive wages.
About 15 medical instruments companies
employing over 3,000 people are now located in Costa
Rica. Between 1999 and 2002 the medical technology
industry became the fastest-growing segment of the
Costa Rican economy, with export growth of over
200%. Medical devices are the country’s fourth most
important export (see table II.1) and have gradually
gained market share in North America (see figure II.3).
The principal foreign firms with locations in Costa Rica
are Abbott Laboratories and Baxter Healthcare
Corporation. In 1987 Baxter became the first company
in this subsector to position itself in the Costa Rican
market. It began production in 1991 and has continued
to expand since then. It now manufactures some 200
products and employs nearly 1,400 people.  Abbott
Laboratories set up operations in the country in 1999,
with a US$ 60-million investment. Today it has about
1,200 employees.
As in the earlier case of the electronics subsector,
the Costa Rican authorities saw the arrival of these firms
as an opportunity to create a production cluster for the
manufacture of medical devices in the country. In 2002
they launched a project to design a specific action plan
for better coordinating the factors that affect activities in
the medical devices subsector, eliminating obstacles and
seizing the opportunities identified as priorities.
One of this industry’s advantages over electronics is
that it is among the ones that purchase the most inputs
on the local market. For this reason, special attention is
being paid to the supplier chain which firms in this area
are generating in the country. For example, Baxter buys
plastic packaging or molds and certain other locally
produced goods in Costa Rica. The medical instruments
and appliances subsector is the one that makes the most
use of high-value-added production chains and involves
the widest participation by local firms. New investments
in this industry are expected in the next few years, since
these plants are among the most efficient in the world.
In the case of the Dominican Republic, the rapid
erosion of its competitiveness in this area (see figure II.3)
shows that success may be short-lived if it is not backed
up by dynamic policies that are quick to respond to
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Figure II.3
COSTA RICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MARKET SHARE OF NORTH AMERICAN IMPORTS OF
MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS AND APPLIANCES (SITC, Rev. 3, 872)
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the TradeCAN
software, 2002 edition.
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4. Efficiency seeking in the service sector
In recent years, given the global trend towards
outsourcing and the technological advances made in the
field of telecommunications, the Caribbean Basin
countries have attracted FDI for the establishment of
companies providing specialized services. The workforce
profile, beyond the availability of low wage levels, is of
paramount importance for this type of activity. In general,
these firms demand bilingual (English- and Spanish-
speaking) personnel with specific knowledge in the areas
of information technology and electronics, among other
qualifications. The relatively high quality of Costa Rica’s
human capital and the existence of an adequate
technological platform for telecommunications were the
factors that led to the proliferation of call centres, business
centres, data centres, software developers and shared
services for the delivery of back-office functions, all
under free-zone regimes. These firms seek efficiency
through outsourcing or the establishment of subsidiaries
abroad that can provide high-quality service at lower
cost. The most successful operations of this type in
Costa Rica include Procter & Gamble (P&G), with 28
administrative services (finance, human resources,
logistics) for 55,000 P&G employees of 16 subsidiaries
in the United States, Canada and Latin America (see
box II.7), and Sykes, with a specialized call centre
providing technical support and customer service in
several different languages and regions. Since 2001
services of this kind have been receiving considerable
amounts of FDI, on the order of US$ 56 million
annually (BCCR, 2003).
Box II.7
PROCTER & GAMBLE: REAPING THE BENEFITS OF COSTA RICA’S EDUCATION POLICY
Many efficiency-seeking firms are
transferring some of their administrative,
logistical and operational functions, as
well as the technological elements of
their business (back-office functions),
beyond the borders of their home
countries. The purpose of these cross-
border movements is to build
competitiveness on the basis of labour
cost savings. As United States
employees became more averse to
performing certain tasks, such as
telemarketing, firms began to transfer
these operations to countries with a low-
cost, well-prepared workforce.
Moreover, in view of the increase in the
number of knowledge workers –who, it
is estimated, will contribute 75% of
United States GDP in 2024– and the
growing importance of managing them,
more jobs that are less knowledge-
intensive can be moved offshore
(Hodges, 2003).
Procter & Gamble was one of the
first companies to adopt this strategy,
which led to the establishment of three
call centres (Global Business Services)
in the Philippines, the United Kingdom
and Costa Rica. These centres bring
together business activities such as
accounting, human resource systems,
order management and information
technology into a single global
organization to provide these services
to all P&G business units at best-in-
class quality, cost and speed (Procter
& Gamble, 1999).
The biggest and most important of
these centres is located in San José,
Costa Rica, and serves the entire
western hemisphere. With a US$ 60-
million investment, some 300 jobs were
created in 2000 and the centre expects
to have about 1,200 bilingual,
university-educated employees by
2005 (Luxner, 2000). Projections
indicate that this location will save the
company about US$ 100 million a year
(Country Monitor, 2000).
The selection of Costa Rica was not
based on any special or extraordinary
incentive. P&G was offered the standard
package of eight-year tax and tariff
exemptions. The determining factor was
the quality, skill and flexibility of the
local workforce, even though labour
costs are higher in Costa Rica than in
other Central American countries and
Mexico. P&G needed an educated,
multilingual workforce, and found it in
Costa Rica. In addition, the
combination of proximity to the United
States and location in the same time
zone enables the centre to stay in
constant contact with the home office.
These factors, along with the
country’s history of political stability,
transparency and appropriate
infrastructure, put San José ahead of
its competitors, which included
Caracas and Mexico City.
Although the quality of Costa
Rica’s labour force was a key factor
in the firm’s decision, there are still
some weaknesses in terms of
English-language proficiency in areas
such as accounting and finance. To
address these problems, P&G is
providing English courses for staff
working in these areas, advising them
that without an adequate mastery of
the language, their opportunities for
advancement within the company will
be limited. It is expected that, in the
future, more advanced P&G
operations will be handled from Costa
Rica.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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D. CONCLUSIONS
Mention was made, at the end of chapter I of this report,
of the gaps that sometimes emerge between host
countries’ expectations and the problems associated
with the different strategies of TNCs investing in the
region. In relation to TNCs that seek efficiency with an
eye to capturing third markets, host countries aspire to
improve the competitiveness of their manufactures
exports, gain access to new technologies, train their
human resources, deepen production linkages, boost
domestic business development and, in more advanced
cases, evolve from an assembly platform into a
manufacturing centre. And yet the experiences
considered in the region suggest that there are specific
problems associated with efficiency-seeking strategies:
stagnation at the level of basic assembly, concentration
in static rather than dynamic advantages, limited
linkages, strong dependence on imported inputs, slow
progress towards the formation of production clusters
and the crowding out of local businesses. As noted in
the introduction to this chapter, two problems arise in
relation to TNCs that seek efficiency based on cheap
labour: (i) the advantages that initially attract such FDI
are not sustainable over time, and (ii) the countries
involved risk falling into the low-value-added trap.
Consequently, with few exceptions, there is a wide gap
between expectations and results in the Caribbean Basin
countries, and this implies that the competitiveness
achieved by these countries is more illusory than real
(see box II.8).
What is most remarkable about the Caribbean
Basin’s competitive position is that many countries still
cling to outdated arrangements that offer little
opportunity to achieve genuine competitiveness. Unlike
the Asian EPZs, many of which were converted into
industrial zones and became linked to science and
technology parks (ESCAP, 1994), the Central American
and Caribbean EPZs often get stuck in a rut. The impact
of the transmission mechanisms associated with
technology transfer and absorption, the building and
deepening of production linkages, human resources
training and business development has clearly been more
limited than or different from what has generally been
assumed in the literature on spillovers (see chapter I).
In summary, these countries have succeeded in
attracting ISIP nodes of leading United States TNCs
seeking to cut production costs in order to compete better
with Asian imports in their own market. Unfortunately,
these countries have reaped little benefit from this
achievement in terms of the industrial and technological
upgrading of the activities in question, since the
advantages they used to attract TNCs were not sustainable
and, instead, caused them to fall into the low-value-added
trap.
However, these countries do have options for
breaking out of the impasse represented by the production
sharing mechanism in the apparel industry. Costa Rica,
in particular, has shown the way in this regard. The
essence of the country’s success is that it was based on
the design of a national strategy for developing the
production system that involved setting priorities,
designing policy tools and establishing appropriate
institutions for meeting the primary goals, defining the
role of FDI and TNCs within the national strategy and
using the technique of targeting a specific kind of FDI
and then working to attract the TNCs best suited to the
strategy formulated.
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Box II.8
ILLUSORY OR GENUINE COMPETITIVENESS?
If a kind of textbook were to be
prepared on the apparel industry’s
capacity to propel the process of
industrialization and production-
system development in the
Caribbean Basin countries, some
interesting conclusions could be
drawn from their experience. First, in
terms of intensifying the
industrialization process, reliance on
the production sharing mechanism
(HTS 9802) actually truncates the
domestic industrialization process in
respect of apparel. Only the
assembly stage is located in the
country and, aside from labour, no
significant local inputs are
incorporated into the final products.
Moreover, the tax incentives offered
for EPZ activities so limit the fiscal
revenues generated by this central
export activity that it cannot be said
to provide resources for public-
sector tasks such as stimulating the
national industrialization process,
promoting new exports and
improving the economy’s systemic
competitiveness through the
development of infrastructure and
basic services, and even the training
of human resources to perform more
sophisticated and better-paid kinds of
work.
Second, as regards gaining genuine
competitiveness, it is increasingly clear
that these apparel exports are not
linked to the domestic economy in any
integral way. They are competitive only
in the United States market, not in
other markets. The question that needs
to be asked is whether the apparel
industry is creating domestic
companies that evolve into major
players in international markets, as did
the full-package suppliers in Asia. The
answer, however, is that the opposite
occurred when the opening-up of the
countries’ economies gave rise to
competition from imports that
destroyed most of the integrated
operations of domestic firms built on
import-substitution-based
industrialization. These firms do not
have a Caribbean Basin network of
assembly operations, and their
fortunes wax or wane in keeping with
demand from the United States market.
Even their ability to compete for buyers’
contracts is severely limited by the size
and characteristics of the local
economy and by whether they can
manufacture (rather than just
assemble) apparel. They have a hard
time surviving because their operations
are not integrated.
It is clear, then, that the assembly
model of the apparel industry in the
Caribbean Basin contributes very little to
the development of the production
system. It is based on a mechanism
designed exclusively to make United
States apparel firms more competitive in
their own market. What is needed is a
mechanism that explicitly and
consciously aims at strengthening the
long-term growth of the host economy,
and especially at achieving a steady rise
in per capita income. The current model
truncates domestic industrialization
instead of deepening it. Also, instead of
producing exports that represent the
international extension of the
industrialization process, it involves the
simple assembly of foreign components.
Such assembly activities were a starting
point for the industrial activities of some
Asian countries, but those countries had
policies that promoted integrated
activities as a means of developing the
production system. Lastly, instead of
giving birth to domestic companies that
evolve into global competitors, the
assembly model threatens their very
existence.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Michael Mortimore, “Illusory
Competitiveness: The Garment Assembly Model in the Caribbean Basin”, Comercio exterior, vol. 53, No. 4, Mexico
City, April 2003.
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III. INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES
IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
International systems of integrated production (ISIP)
designed to increase the efficiency of FDI-based TNCs
are bringing about significant changes in the industries
that adopt them. Two of the most strongly affected sectors
have been the electronics and automotive industries. It
may therefore be useful to examine the principal changes
that have taken place in the electronics sector, which is
the most globalized industry, with a view to predicting
how events may unfold in the automotive industry. An
analysis of the automotive industry is also of interest
because it differs significantly from the apparel industry
(see chapter II). Both these industries are important
magnets for FDI in the region. However, automobile
production is much more technologically sophisticated
and generates greater added value, its supplier networks
are more complex and it provides more training for its
human resources.
Following the recovery of United States
manufacturers vis-à-vis Asian –and especially Japanese–
companies in the information technology and
communications sectors, a new North American model
of industrial organization has emerged based on the use
of “turnkey” suppliers, that is, large outsourcers with
modular production networks (Sturgeon, 2002).
According to Sturgeon and Lester (2002):
In the early 1990s, some brand-name electronics
firms in the United States moved beyond the tactical
use of their contractors as providers of overflow
capacity and began to use the most capable of them
for more strategic purposes. The advantages
included: manufacturing close to end markets or
with low-cost labour; subjecting internal operations
to market forces; keeping abreast of fast moving
assembly technologies; and focusing their own
activities on increasingly challenging “core
competencies” such as product definition, design,
sales and marketing. Today, production outsourcing
in electronics has become a widely accepted
practice for both large and small brand-name
electronics firms based in the United States.
More recently, globally-operating lead firms
have been in the process of consolidating their
contract manufacturing relationships by giving a
larger share of their manufacturing to a smaller
group of large, technologically-sophisticated
contract manufacturers, nearly all of them of
American origin. Brand-name electronics firms are
increasingly demanding that their contractors have
a “global presence” as a way of streamlining the
management of their outsourcing relationships. As
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a result, American contract manufacturers have
themselves been aggressively internationalizing
since the mid-1990s. (Sturgeon and Lester, 2002).
The growth of modular production networks
generated two major benefits, principally for United
States electronics companies. First, it allowed brand-
name TNCs to focus on their own competitive
advantages, such as product strategy, product research
and development, functional design, form design and
prototype fabrication, and to allocate other tasks to
outsourced manufacturers, such as process research and
development, manufacturing design, parts purchasing,
production, testing and packaging (see diagram III.1).
Second, it allowed large manufacturers to improve their
efficiency through economies of scale based on a
reduction in processes and increased use of their plants’
installed capacity, which led TNCs that manufacture
branded products to lower their prices (see diagram III.2).
Hence, the overall production chain became more
competitive. The large United States outsourcers focused
on basic manufacturing processes common to most
systems and began to carry out other, more complex
activities related to the assembly of complete products.
Therefore, an unprecedented transition is being witnessed
in the electronics industry as it shifts from in-house
production to complete outsourcing (Sturgeon, 2002).
In other words, in the electronics industry, competition
tends to take place between production chains rather than
between individual companies, and success hinges
increasingly on the efficiency of the supplier network.
Therefore, since the electronics industry is much more
globalized than the automotive industry, the question arises
as to whether changes in the former presage changes for
the latter. This chapter examines the changes that have taken
place in the automotive industry, especially in the North
American market, and its consequences for the principal
Latin American sites of this activity: Mexico and Brazil.
B. CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
As indicated in the 1998 edition of Foreign Investment
in Latin America and the Caribbean, during the twentieth
century automobile production played a very important
–at times, a decisive– role in the industrialization of many
countries. This activity was a pioneer in introducing
innovations that later radically transformed the
organization of manufacturing processes. In the second
half of the twentieth century, the principal innovations
in vehicle assembly were systematized in the
revolutionary “Toyota Production System” (ECLAC,
1998). Current innovations are in modular assembly. This
section will discuss the competitive advantages of these
new systems and examine their significance for the
automotive industry in Mexico and Brazil.
a) Competitive advantages of the Toyota Production
System
The second most important episode in the
automotive industry’s development –after the mobile
production line introduced by Ford at the beginning of
the last century– originated in Japan, after the Second
World War, when Toyota radically redesigned the
manufacturing of automobiles and autoparts. E. Toyoda
and T. Ohno proposed a different way of organizing
vehicle manufacturing, which would later come to be
known as the Toyota Production System, or “lean
production”. Their contribution allowed Japan’s
automotive industry to make extraordinary gains in
productivity, improve its quality and consolidate its
supplier network, thereby transforming itself into a major
competitor in the global market (Womack, Jones and
Roos, 1990).
This system was based on an integrated concept of
the manufacturing process, seen as a medium- and long-
term commitment between the automaker and its
employees, suppliers and distributors to generate added
value all along the production chain. This commitment
stressed teamwork and a less hierarchical structure on
the assembly line. This collective effort, together with
better and more fluid communication among the
participants, makes it possible to detect and quickly
eliminate potential sources of inefficiencies in all phases
of production.  It has three core elements:
• Flexible organization of production. With regard to
the workforce, this system entails a multi-task
training model so that workers will be able to
perform a variety of production, supervision and
quality-control tasks. With regard to layout and
capital assets, it means that the plant can profitably
manufacture small production lots and quickly
modify the various characteristics of the final product
in response to sudden changes in demand and in
order to meet the requirements of differentiated
market niches. Production is thus responsive to
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consumer preferences, unlike the Ford system, which
is based on mass consumption, imposed on the
market by the need to increase economies of scale.
Toyota has achieved a truly global production
system, through its global chain of automotive body
assembly, by which the same line and equipment is
used both in small-volume, labour-intensive plants
and in larger-volume, more automated plants.
• The emphasis on “zero defects” to eliminate unnecessary
costs. Unlike the concept of quality control based on
detection of errors in the final phase of manufacturing,
this system seeks to eliminate any possibility of defects,
periods of inactivity or interruptions in the use of the
installed capacity at the source. Thanks to this concept,
the proportion of defective units has been drastically
reduced, and operating costs have been lowered even
further. The Toyota system currently represents best
practice in motor vehicle quality.
• Better long-term relations among producers, suppliers
and distributors, and an enormous reduction in the
transaction costs inherent in short-term commercial
relationships. Such alliances include, for example, multi-
year purchasing schedules and the distribution of
responsibility for the design of parts, models and methods
in order to boost quality or cut costs. By fostering long-
term relationships between suppliers and final
assemblers, the system has created more room and
momentum for the development of suppliers and
outsourcing, in contrast to the vertical integration pattern
of the big United States automakers. New inventory
management methods have also been introduced based
on an agreement with the suppliers to provide inputs
and raw materials at the right times and in the exact
proportions in which they would be needed at each phase
of vehicle production. This inventory management
practice became known as just-in-time production.
Box III.1
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
Toyota Motor Corporation of Japan is the
world’s second-largest automaker, after
General Motors, and makes a broad range
of models, from mini-vehicles to trucks. Its
sales, including those of its subsidiaries
Lexus and Daihatsu, rose from 4.1 million
vehicles in 1994 to 6.3 million in 2003.
While its sales in Japan (36%) levelled off,
sales abroad increased, particularly in
North America (32%), Europe (12%) and
East Asia (10%). Its production structure
comprises 12 manufacturing plants and 11
subsidiaries in Japan and close to 45
plants in 26 countries; the firm employs
nearly 250,000 persons (up from 111,000
in 1994) and sells its products in 160
countries.
Starting in 1959, Toyota began
developing an initial internationalization
strategy with a small investment in
Brazil (which continues to be small),
primarily as a means of surmounting
trade barriers, and continued with the
installation of modestly sized
manufacturing plants in markets
inaccessible to its exports from Japan.
The attempt to establish a regional and
international production system began
in earnest in 1984. Whereas 3.6% of
the firm’s production took place outside
Japan in 1985, by 1990 this figure had
risen to 14%, by 1995 it had increased
to 28.3% and by 2002 to 38.2%.
Toyota’s global-production structure
comprises a series of plants that are
based on various strategies. First, in
Japan, the firm has very productive and
efficient plants, with large-scale
production and a high propensity to
export, linked to an efficiency-seeking
strategy for exploiting the international
market. Second, it has efficient plants
outside Japan that are part of a regional
and global integrated production system
and that are linked to an efficiency-
seeking strategy for moving into regional
markets. Toyota has devised a large
North American production system in the
form of NUMMI (1984), TMMK (1988),
TMMI (1988), TMMC (1988), TMMWV
(1998), TMMAL (2003) and, currently,
TMMBC (2004) and TMMTX (2006).
Toyota is now accelerating the
investments programmed for this market.
For the European market, the firm has a
system based on plants in the United
Kingdom (TMUK in 1992), Turkey (TMMT
in 2000), France (TMMF in 2001) and
Poland (TMMP in 2002) and is currently
building one in the Czech Republic
(TPCA in 2005). A plant in Thailand
(Siam in 1989 and TMT in 1995) was
retooled for the Asian market and will be
the first in that regional system. In
addition, Toyota has a system for
Oceania that is based on the retooling of
its plant in Australia (TMCA in 1997).
Third, there are plants with smaller
scales of production and efficiency
outside Japan, mainly in developing
countries, that cater to the local markets
and are based on a local-market-seeking
strategy. Starting in the late 1950s,
Toyota invested in Brazil (1959), Thailand
(1964), Malaysia (1968), Portugal (1969),
Indonesia (1970), Venezuela (1981),
Bangladesh (1982), Taiwan Province of
China (1986), the Philippines (1989),
Colombia (1992), Pakistan (1993), India
(1999) and China (2000). The plants in
China can be converted into part of an
Asian regional system.
A breakdown of Toyota’s sales in
2002 by region indicates that 36% of its
sales were made in the Japanese
market. In the rest of the world, more
than 4 million units were sold, principally
in North America, with 49% of that sum
(1.9 million units); trailing far behind were
sales in Europe, which represented 19%
(770,000 units) of the company’s total
sales outside Japan, and East Asia,
where nearly 600,000 units accounted
for 15% of the total. With substantially
smaller figures, the regions of southern
Asia and the Middle East, Oceania, Latin
America, and Africa accounted for 6%,
5%, 4% and 2%, respectively, of the
firm’s international sales.
Toyota’s competitiveness was seen
not only in its market shares but also in
its market value (US$ 112.8 billion in
February 2004, whereas General
Motor’s and Ford’s numbers were
below US$ 28 billion) and in its stable
and mutually beneficial relations with
its principal suppliers (Just-autos.com,
2004d, and Toyota, 2003).
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TOYOTA: PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF ITS INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCTION SYSTEM
Affiliate/year of Economy Models Export Output Exports
initiation markets 2002 2002
Subtotal North America 1 205 500 156 045
New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.
(NUMMI) (1984) United States Corolla, Tacoma Canada, Puerto Rico 310 300 2 703
Toyota Motor Manufacturing United States Avalon, Camry Taiwan, Canada, Japan, 490 591 17 831
Kentucky (TMMK) (1988) Middle East
Toyota Motor Manufacturing United States Tundra, Sequoia, Sienna Canada, Oceania 186 573 8 022
Indiana (TMMI) (1988)
Toyota Motor Manufacturing Canada Camry Solara, Corolla, United States, 218 018 127 489
Canada Inc. (MTC) (1988) Matriz Puerto Rico, México
Toyota Motor Manufacturing
West Virginia (TMMWV) (1998) United States Motors, gearboxes
Toyota Motor Manufacturing
Alabama Inc. (TMMAL) (2003) United States Engines
Toyota Motor Manufacturing
Texas (TMMTX) (2006) United States Tundra
Toyota Motor Manufacturing Mexico Rear Boxes for
Baja California (TMMBC) (2004) Tacoma (2005) North America
Subtotal Europe 344 600 168 113
Salvador Caetano I.M.V.T. (1969) Portugal Dyna, Hiace, Optimo United Kingdom,
Spain, Germany 3 587 87
Toyota Motor Manufacturing (UK)
(TMUK) (1992) United Avensis, Corolla, Europe, Africa,
Kingdom engines South America, Japan 209 016 120 636
Toyota Motor Manufacturing
Turkey Inc. (TMMT) (1994) Turkey Corolla Europe, Middle East 39 039
Toyota Motor Manufacturing
France (TMMF) (2001) France Yaris Europe 135 406 47 390
Toyota Motor Manufacturing
Poland (TMMP) (2002) Poland Gear Boxes
Toyota Motor Industries Poland
(TMIP) (2005) Poland Engines
Toyota Peugeot Citroen Automobile
Czech (TPCA) (2005) Czech New small car Europe
Republic 2005
Subtotal East Asia 345 700 71 053
Assembly Services Sdn. Bhd/(1968) Malaysia Camry, Avenis, Corolla, 28 000
Dyna, Hiace, Vios
P.T. Toyota-Astra Motor (1970) Indonesia Camry, Corolla, TUV, Brunei, etc. 84 864 22
Dyna
Kuozui Motors Ltd. (1986) Taiwan province Camry, Corolla, TUV, 89 000
of China Hiace, Dyna, Vios
Toyota Motor Thailand (1964)
(TMT) (1995) Thailand Camry, Corolla Hilux, Pakistan, Philippines, 140 246 11 800
Solana Singapore, Australia
Siam Toyota Manufacturing Co. (1989) Thailand Engines
Toyota Philippines Corp. (1989) Philippines Camry, Corolla, TUV 21 269
Toyota Motor Vietnam Vietnam Corolla, Hiace, Camry 7 138
LandCruiser, TUV, Vios
Sicuani Toyota Motor Co. (2000) China Coaster, Land Cruiser 2 800
Prado
Tianjin Toyota Motor Co. (2002) China Vios 2 147
Subtotal Asia Meridional y Oceanía 65 100
(Box III.1 continued)
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The Toyota system was soon adopted by other
Japanese companies and then by firms in the Republic
of Korea, and it has allowed them to reduce costs and
adapt their production processes to the varying demands
of consumers more readily. For four decades, Japanese
automakers have increased their market share at the
expense of the United States and Western European firms
that had dominated this market. Between 1970 and 1990,
this increase was fuelled by exports, which rose from
1.1 million units in 1970 to 5.8 million in 1990, although
they subsequently fell to 4.2 million in 2002. Later on,
thanks to investment in new plants in those markets,
annual output outside of Japan rose from 3.3 to 6.3
million units between 1990 and 2002 (Iwami, 2002).
Today, Toyota and Honda are global players, since about
half their production takes place outside of their country
of origin, and more than half of their total sales are made
abroad. Meanwhile, the large United States (General
Motors, Ford and DaimlerChrysler) and European
(Volkswagen, Groupe PSA, Fiat, BMW and Renault)
automakers have become important players but at the
regional level, as attested to by the fact that their sales
abroad, as well their production outside their regions of
origin, do not amount to half the total in either case.
Heightened competition led to a strong concentration
in this industry. The number of independent vehicle
manufacturers has declined from more than 50 to about
10 during the last 30 years, and more than half of global
sales are now made by the five largest firms. United States
and European manufacturers have tended to purchase
existing plants, whereas the leading Japanese automakers
(Toyota and Honda) have preferred to expand
internationally through investments in new plants, since
their production system were superior.1  The production
1 When, starting in the 1990s, domestic demand in the Japanese market suffered the negative effects of the financial bubble, several of its
automakers were destabilized, and some of their European and American competitors seized the opportunity to acquire ownership or
increase their holdings of these companies’ capital stock. This was the case of Renault (Nissan), Chrysler (Mitsubishi), Ford (Mazda), and
GM (Isuzu, Suzuki and FHI-Subaru), among others. This did not affect the leading companies, Toyota and Honda, which managed the
Japanese market crisis more successfully.
(Box III.1 concluded)
Aftab Automóviles Ltd. (1982) Bangladesh Land Cruiser 319
Toyota Kirlokar Motor (1999) India Qualis 26 030
Indus Motor Company (1993) Pakistan Corolla, Hilux 9 887
Subtotal Oceania 86 558 59 231
Toyota Motor Corp. Australia Ltd. Australia Camry, Corolla, Avalon New Zealand, 86 558 59 231
(1963) TMCA (1997) Thailand, Oceania,
Middle East
Subtotal Latin America 28 100 16 899
Toyota do Brasil Ltda. (1959) Brazil Corolla Argentina 16 074 1 350
Toyota de Venezuela (1963) Venezuela Corolla, Land Cruiser Colombia, Ecuador 7 333 738
SOFASA (1992) Colombia Hilux, Land Cruiser Prado Ecuador, Venezuela 7 823 8 159
Toyota Argentina S.A. (1997) Argentina Hilux Brazil, Uruguay 11 173 7 904
Subtotal Africa 82 222 2 224
Toyota South Africa Motors (1962) South Africa Corolla, Dyna, Hilux, 81 555 2 224
TUV, Hiace
Outside of Japan 2 157 780 473 565
In/from Japan 4 138 873 1 749 041
Total 6 296 653 2 222 606
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on Toyota (http://www.toyota.com); United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2002. Transnational Corporation and Export Competitiveness (UNCTAD/WIR/
2002), New York/Geneva, 2002. Publication of the United Nations, sale no. E.02.II.D.4; Michael Mortimore and Sebastián Vergara, “Targeting
winners: can FDI policy help developing countries industrialize?”, European Journal of Development Research, forthcoming.
Note: The companies listed are those in which Toyota Motor Corporation holds direct equity interest.
Affiliate/year of Economy Models Export Output Exports
initiation markets 2002 2002
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system implemented by Toyota and copied by other
assembly plants was the main reason for Japanese success
(Mortimore, 1997).
Outside Japan, this system has had major
repercussions, especially in the United States automotive
industry. The United States market is the world’s largest,
with annual sales of some 17 million vehicles. From 1965
to 2002, the market share of the big three domestic
automakers –GM, Ford and Chrysler (now
DaimlerChrysler)– declined from 95% to 61%, while the
share held by Japanese manufacturers increased from
near zero to 28%. Two-thirds (2.6 million vehicles) of
the Japanese automakers’ sales originate in their North
American plants (United States Department of
Commerce, 2003b). Indeed, Toyota (and Honda) has
penetrated deeply into that market.2
b) Modular assembly
United States and European transnational
automakers have attempted to meet the Japanese
challenge in a variety of ways, such as by copying the
efficient methods of United States electronics TNCs, i.e.,
by using modular networks and stepping up specialization
and outsourcing. These companies sought to raise the
profitability of vehicle design and manufacture by using
common platforms that allow for greater coordination
and the multiple use of parts, while maintaining the ability
to adapt specific vehicle models to local tastes and driving
conditions. This strategy –just as in the electronics sector–
required supplier networks with a global presence and
greater coordination of design efforts worldwide.
Although modular assembly is still a new trend and is
not yet widespread, it has yielded highly positive results
in some of the companies that have incorporated it into
their production systems.
The assembly lines of United States and European
automakers’ modular plants now have far fewer functions
than they did in the past (see diagram III.1). The
production lines are thus better coordinated and more
efficient. In these new plants, workers handle modules
that have been pre-assembled by outside suppliers; the
modules are delivered completely assembled to the
receiving area of the final assembly plants, ready to be
mounted onto vehicles as they move down the assembly
line. Diagram III.3 depicts the path followed by the basic
parts as they move through the modules and are then
integrated into the systems.
As vehicle manufacturers carry out fewer tasks in
the new assembly plants, suppliers must do increasingly
more (Fourcade and Midler, 2003). Some estimates
suggest that 75% of a vehicle’s value corresponds to just
15 modules, including the suspension; doors; headliners
(which may come with grip handles, lights, electrical
connections, a sunroof, sun visors and trims already
assembled); heating, ventilation and air conditioning
units; seats; dashboards; and the drivetrain (that is, the
engine, transmission and axles). The tendency to use
modules translates into working with systems or groups
of modules. At the most advanced modular plants, the
leading suppliers are responsible for the part of the
vehicle-assembly process at which their respective
systems are installed.
The trend toward modularization is linked to the
consolidation of supplier networks, as the companies that
sell raw materials directly to assembly plants buy up the
firms that provide the raw materials to them. Because
the largest modules are the most difficult and expensive
to move, the adoption of the modular assembly process
is linked to the establishment of assembly plants next to
suppliers’ plants. Hence, parts delivery is synchronized
with demand, with modules being delivered according
to the sequence of vehicles moving down the assembly
line. This creates natural “breakpoints” in the value chain
and makes the outsourcing and relocation of module
design and production more feasible.3  The current trend
to create global platforms therefore involves the
formation of global supplier bases.
Although outsourcing is common throughout the
sector, there are significant differences among
automakers in terms of the speed, extent, and nature of
the shift being made from a vertical structure to a more
horizontal one (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002). GM and
Ford, which were displayed a high degree of vertical
integration, have sharply increased their use of
outsourcing to reduce costs, and their use of external
suppliers by converting their internal subsidiaries into
independent companies (Delphi and Visteon,
respectively).
The recent trend towards globalization in the motor
vehicle industry has led to a change in the stratified
relationship between producers and their largest suppliers
2 In recent decades, the Toyota Camry, Honda Accord and Ford Taurus have become the best-selling passenger vehicles in the United States.
In February 2003, a top Ford executive explained the success of the Camry by saying, “Frankly, the Camry is currently a better product that
the Taurus” (CNNMoney, 2003).
3 Modularization can also be an in-house strategy, however. For example, at Volkswagen, internal subsidiaries have gone from the manufacture
of parts to the assembly of modules and systems, which streamlines the assembly line and makes it more efficient.
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Diagram III.3
FROM PART TO SYSTEM
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on Timothy Sturgeon and Richard Lester, “Upgrading East Asian
Industries: New Challenges for Local Suppliers”, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Industrial Performance Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), 18 January 2002, unpublished.
(Graziadio and Zilboricius, 2003). First-tier suppliers are
focusing on modular integration; second-tier suppliers,
on their production; and third-tier suppliers, on the
manufacture of components and the provision of local
content in emerging markets (see box III.2). Modular
assembly obliges suppliers to play a much more
important role. Assembly plants require their suppliers
to invest in and develop products, acquire specialized
tools, improve their logistics and the modules and
systems they produce, and even to provide guarantees to
consumers and supervise the second-tier suppliers (Auto
Business, 2002; Just-auto.com, 2004a).
Most leading suppliers of modular systems and
modules are of United States origin. Many first-tier
suppliers have responded with a wave of vertical
integration (through mergers, acquisitions and joint
operations)4  and geographic expansion in an effort to
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4 The increased competition between suppliers will likely lead to a strong trend towards their rationalization, concentration and consolidation,
as has occurred in the vehicle assembly industry. It is estimated that, of the 600 to 800 lead suppliers and more than 10,000 secondary
suppliers that existed in 2001, from 25 to 100 lead suppliers and from 2,000 to 4,000 secondary suppliers will remain by 2010 (OESA,
2003a).
110 ECLAC
modules on a global scale (ATKearney, 2003; Booz-Allen
& Hamilton, 1999). The entry of GM’s and Ford’s parts
divisions into the vehicle-parts market as Delphi and
Visteon created the largest, most diversified and
geographically farthest-flung suppliers of the automotive
industry in one fell swoop. Together with Johnson
Controls, Lear, Magna, TRW, Bosch and Siemens
Automotives, among others, they have become the
preferred suppliers of automakers outside Japan.
Hence, the growing need to supply automakers with
modules on a global scale is generating a wave of
consolidations and geographic expansion among first-
tier suppliers. In the future, suppliers, rather than
producers, may undertake most of the flows of FDI in
the sector.
c) An evaluation
This appears to be a case in which the similarity in
the changes in the electronics and automotive industries
is more apparent than real. The Toyota system has
maintained its technological leadership in the automotive
sector, despite the changes introduced by United States
and European TNCs. Neither United States initiatives in
modular assembly nor those of European companies have
derailed the Japanese supplier networks, unlike what
occurred in the electronics industry, especially in
information and communications technologies. We need
to ask why this is.
Toyota representatives have indicated that the
company’s strength stems from the strength of its
Box III.2
NEW CONCEPTS FOR UNDERSTANDING CHANGES IN
AUTOPARTS MANUFACTURING
Assembly plants’ new procurement
policies, which imply not only more
outsourcing but also the transfer of
activities to vehicle parts
manufacturers, are transforming the
sector so quickly that some basic
concepts are losing their meaning. For
example, the definition of lead or
secondary suppliers, or the
stratification of suppliers into tiers
depending on whom they sell their
products to, are concepts that are
evolving as people attempt to interpret
the new state of affairs. A 0.5 tier of
suppliers, corresponding to suppliers
that assemble the systems, has
recently been added to the traditional
classification of suppliers into first-tier
(direct sales to assembly plants) and
tiers two through four (more indirect
sales and sales of progressively less
sophisticated inputs). Indeed, a new
stratification of suppliers, covering the
following categories, is emerging:
(1) Suppliers of integrated systems:
those that offer assembly plants a
broad range of services. They produce
modular systems, such as interiors and
electric and electronic systems. Their
success depends on their experience
and capacity for physical and functional
integration, the degree of efficiency of
their principal modules and
components, sound management of
the supplier chain, extensive
knowledge of consumers and a solid
understanding of the vehicle as a unit.
(2) Module suppliers: those that
offer experience in the design and
manufacture of modules consisting of
multiple components with a common
functionality, including seats, “corners”
and ignition, brakes and shut-off
systems. Their success hinges on their
ability to develop the functional
integration of these modules and
increase the competitiveness of the
systems of the most important
components, on their full
understanding of the consumer’s
requirements, on their proper handing
of their own suppliers and on an
adequate understanding of the vehicle
as a whole.
(3) Component suppliers: those that
handle parts that perform key functions
and components with a high density of
technical know-how and engineering
capacity. They produce, among others
components, instruments, wire
harnesses for the electrical system,
shock absorbers, auxiliary motors,
crankshafts, radiators and
compressors. Their success depends
on their operational efficiency,
economies of scale, the low cost of
their inputs, their ability to optimize
costs in design, their management of
operational complexity and
technological innovations and their
identification of value for consumers.
(4) Suppliers of standardized
products: these are traditional firms
that produce standardized part, metal
parts and connectors. The maturity of
the product leaves little room for
differentiation. Their success depends
on their operational efficiency,
economies of scale, and the cost of the
factors of production.
In this new model, the
competitiveness of the companies in
the last group depends primarily on
production costs, while those in the
first category are more dependent on
innovation and R&D. Some autoparts
manufacturers are thus playing an
increasingly important role in vehicle
assembly.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on Original Equipment Suppliers Association (OESA)/
McKinsey & Co., “Profitable growth strategies in the automotive supply industry”, pp. 14 and 15, 1999; F. Bouvard, M. Cesari and J. Luciat-
Labry, Retooling the Way to Profitable Growth, McKinsey Research, 2002.
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suppliers (EIU/McKinsey & Co., 1999) and that Toyota
is so clearly the leader of the sector that it has become
the frame of reference for best practices (OESA, 2003b).
Toyota currently has a world-class supplier network both
in the United States and in Japan. The Toyota system
depends on its human resources management policy,
which stimulates employee creativity and loyalty, but
also, and very importantly, on the high efficiency of the
components-and-parts supplier network (Financial
Times, 2002).
Moreover, modular assembly in the automotive
industry does not appear to have the same effects as it
has in the electronics industry. Traditional sourcing
methods are still common at companies such as GM and
Ford, which have globally centralized organizations and
short-term relationships with their suppliers that have
caused conflicts. There has been some experimentation
with the use of short lists of suppliers and with their
participation prior to project authorization, which consists
in asking suppliers to bid on the modules and parts that
they would like to design and produce. However, the
tendency to focus exclusively on cutting costs, including
procurement costs, is still very strong. Some United States
assembly plants are, then, endangering the future quality
and the long-term commitment of their supplier networks
by requiring disproportionate short-term cost reductions
(Auto Business, 2002). This leads to tension within the
assembly plant itself between its purchasing division,
which pushes for lower prices, and the manufacturing
division, which attempts to favour modularization, local
content and physical proximity between the company’s
plants and those of its suppliers.
The performance of J.I. López as Vice President of
the Purchasing Division of General Motors opened up a
wide rift between the United States assembly plants and
their suppliers in the midst of a crisis situation (Leuliette,
2003).5  The shortcomings of the United States “purchase
price” model were seen in excess production capacity,
meagre profits, the additional, non-remunerated
responsibilities that were transferred to suppliers, United
States assembly plants’ strong dependence on suppliers
in that country, and limited cooperation between the two
groups of companies (OESA, 2003b).6  Moreover, United
States plants have been unable to overcome the problem
posed by their more limited flexibility vis-à-vis their
Japanese competitors (Just-auto.com, 2003c, 2003d).
Complaints of harsh treatment have also come from
Europe, where Ford has been accused by its suppliers of
being interested only in short-term cost-cutting without
respecting their intellectual property rights or rewarding
their efforts to improve quality, innovate or suggest ways
to lower costs, which increases their risks. Ford is also
criticized for unnecessary confrontations and for
resorting to unacceptable tactics (Just-auto.com, 2004d).
From this perspective, it is clear that United States (and
European) companies have not matched the advantages
of the Toyota system, despite their efforts to introduce
modular assembly processes and other practices (Sako,
2003). United States automakers have only succeeded
in partially and superficially replicating the benefits of
Toyota’s system, as evidenced by their financial
statements and market capitalization.7
To understand the nature of this chain of events, the
fundamental differences between Japanese and United
States supplier networks must be taken into account. The
starkest differences have to do with their function,
structure and the incentives system. The supplier network
is more important for Japanese automakers, which
produce less than 40% of their parts, than it is for United
States firms, where this proportion is 60% or more (Tsuji,
2003). In addition, Japanese supplier networks have a
broader structure, which includes four or more tiers of
5 In April 1992, J.I. López took over as General Motors Vice President for Purchasing worldwide and became famous for his harsh treatment
of suppliers in his drive to establish a new system for defining vehicle-part prices based on the vehicle’s total expected value. He opened
up existing contracts to bids, ceased to give preference to GM-owned suppliers and demanded a 50% productivity increase. His emphasis
on cutting short-term costs damaged the long-term relationship with suppliers (Moffett and Youngdahl, 1998; Fortune, 1997). J.I. López,
during his time with Volkswagen, also played a decisive role as the person responsible for the installation of the first modular plant in
Resende, Brazil, in 1996.
6 The largest vehicle parts manufacturer, Delphi, has expressed its preference for doing business with Japanese assembly plants because of
the treatment it receives from United States automakers (Just-auto.com, 2003c). Delphi gauges its progress in terms of the increasing share
of its business not carried out with its former parent company, General Motors (PPT, “Delphi”, 10-11 November 2003). Delphi’s revenues
from activities unrelated to General Motors rose from 18% to 39% between 1997 and September 2003. Furthermore, over half these sales
were to customers outside North America (Delphi, 2003). Delphi is now the largest foreign autoparts supplier in China (Just-auto.com,
2004b).
7 For example, GM’s and Ford’s market capitalization, taken together, is equivalent to half of Toyota’s. Moreover, in 2003, Ford came close
to bankruptcy (The Economist, 2003a and 2003b; America Economy, 2003c) and General Motors posted uncovered financial liabilities in
connection with the pensions of former workers on the order of US$ 20 billion, which approached its value on the stock exchange at the
end of that year (Yahoo.finance, 2003).
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suppliers, and are less vertically integrated, as they are
composed of a smaller number of large suppliers
possessing more specialized engineering capacity. Hence,
the small number of direct suppliers simplifies
procurement, at both the firm level and the plant level,
for Japanese assembly plants. The interdependence
among the elements of the supplier base is predicated on
the idea that some of the same directors sit on the various
boards or the existence of minority shareholdings in these
companies, is linked to significant intrafirm trade within
their group or keiretsu, and is not based exclusively on
market relations. This promotes cooperation, especially
with regard to the sharing of technical information, in
the context of the automaker’s integral support for the
parts manufacturer.8
These relations influence the incentives system,
given that belonging to a group with long-term contracts
and relatively certain profit margins has translated into
exemplary performance by the overall organization.
Guaranteed profit margins were reduced over time to
encourage improvements in productivity and quality, as
well as safety. Toyota encourages its lead suppliers to
invest in specialized equipment and to train its human
resources, which in the long run benefits both companies.
The first-tier supplier, in turn, has similar relations with
the second-tier suppliers, and so on, and this is positively
reflected in design, productivity and price, all along the
chain. By contrast, the traditional system in the United
States for parts purchasing is based on short-term
contracts with multiple suppliers, which compete to
maintain their position. This is a rather conflictive
relationship, based on continual demands for price cuts
and the use of competitive bidding. Hence, the automaker
reaps the benefits of productivity improvements, while
the supplier assumes the cost. This asymmetry diminishes
the supplier’s incentives to raise its productivity and
strains the relationship between both firms (EIU/
McKinsey & Co., 1999). The differences between the
Toyota system and the system used by United States
automakers is also reflected in the financial positions of
their principal suppliers (e.g., Denso, in the case of
Toyota, and Visteon, in the case of Ford) (Just-auto.com,
2004d and 2004c).
Toyota’s gains in the United States market
demonstrate not only this firm’s strength but also the
significance of the challenge it poses for its competitors.
In North America, Toyota has constructed a base of 500
suppliers to support its local production operations (1.2
million vehicles in 2002) in assembly plants in Alabama,
Kentucky, West Virginia and California, in the United
States, and in Ontario, in Canada. Annual purchases of
inputs exceed US$ 20 billion. Moreover, Toyota has
succeeded in raising its competitiveness by using
common parts in numerous models, upgrading and
integrating the design process, increasing output and
simplifying logistics. As a result, Toyota has lowered the
cost of its vehicles by 16% since 1997, winning many
awards for quality, delivery time and initiatives to support
its suppliers.  Teruyuki Minoura, Senior Managing
Director and Chief Officer of the Business Development
Group and of the Purchasing Group (and former
Managing Director of Global Purchasing), captures the
essence of Toyota’s guiding principles in the advice he
gives his suppliers:
“You are going to have to start analyzing the needs
and wants of the end user. You’re going to be finding
out what end users want and working to develop
suitable components. Then you’re going to be
offering what you’ve developed to carmakers like
us, who are going to incorporate these components
into our designs. That’s the kind of shape that the
industry is going to take. When that happens, terms
like carmakers and suppliers will become
inappropriate. The two will have come together as
partners, and together develop high-quality, low-cost
products that meet the needs of the end users. To
survive, you are going to need to use knowledge you
gain on the shop floor to trim costs, and to funnel
the funds from those cost savings into development.
You need to put extra effort into knowing yourselves
and knowing your competitors. You need to build
structures that allow you to know your own strengths
and benchmark them against those of your
competitors.” (Toyota, 2003, p. 4)
The modular assembly initiative in the automotive
industry has not had the same effects as it has had in the
electronics industry. United States automakers are
attempting to use this initiative to obtain advantages
similar to those afforded by the Toyota system; however,
a core element of Toyota’s success is still missing: the
construction of long-lasting relationships with the
component companies in their system as a means of
achieving stable, long-term, mutually beneficial growth
(Gritton, 2003). This conclusion is important for Latin
America’s automotive industry.
8 Like other vehicle producers, Toyota has asked its parts suppliers for large cost reductions (of 30%, according to its competitiveness-and-
cost-reduction program for 2001). The difference is that, to the extent possible, Toyota selects and cooperates actively with its keiretsu
suppliers to increase their competitiveness as tier-0.5 and first-tier systems suppliers (Ikeda and Nakagawa, 2001).
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C. COMPETITIVENESS IN BRAZIL’S AND MEXICO’S
AUTOMOTIVE SECTORS
This sector accounted for 32.9%, 29.9% and 10.5%,
respectively, of the sales of the 100 largest subsidiaries
of TNCs, of the 100 largest manufacturing firms and of
the 500 largest companies of the region in 2002, and for
21.8% of the exports by the region’s 200 largest exporters.
Nonetheless, competitiveness in Mexico and Brazil
–where the bulk of the industry in the region is located–
differs significantly.
In addition, Mexico’s share of the sales of the 100
largest subsidiaries of TNCs, of the 100 largest
manufacturing firms and of the 500 largest firms in Latin
America has increased from 18.9%, 21% and 7%,
respectively, in 1999 to 26.5%, 25% and 8.5% in 2002,
and Brazil’s share has declined from 7.7%, 7% and 2.3%
in 1999 to 5.6%, 5% and 1.7% in 2002, whereas in both
countries the share of the exports of the region’s 200
largest exporters fell –from 23% to 19.5% in Mexico,
and from 2.3% to 1.8% in Brazil.
In other words, Latin America’s automotive industry
has changed drastically. These changes have been
promoted –as part of new domestic policies– primarily
by the revised business strategies of transnational
automakers that privilege the search for efficiency over
the search for markets in order to establish, using FDI,
international or regional production systems.
From 1985 to 2001, Mexico’s share of total world
imports increased from 1.58% to 2.81%, and its goods
exports, once mainly natural resources and manufactures
based on those resources (63.7% in 1985), were
dominated by non-resource-based manufactures (78.3%
in 2001), mainly medium-technology exports (17.9% in
1985 and 38.1% in 2001), with automotive-industry
products being particularly prominent (see table III.1).
The leading ten products in 2001 –representing half the
value of goods exports– include passenger vehicles
(11.2%), vehicles for the transport of goods (3.8%) and
autoparts (3.4%), which, in 2001, accounted for 18.4%
of the value of Mexico’s exports. In 1985, these three
items’ share of total exports was merely 3.9%, slightly
more than one-fifth the 2001 level, with the most
important item being autoparts (2.5%). The country’s
share of total world imports of passenger vehicles
increased from close to zero in 1985 to more than 6% in
2001, and autoparts imports rose from less than 2% to
4%, while in the United States market Mexico’s share of
vehicles increased from nearly zero to close to 14%, and
autoparts grew from 3% to more than 11% the same
period. The automotive industry was, therefore, one of
Latin America’s automotive industry has gone through
three stages of development, dictated, in varying degrees,
by firms’ strategies and the national development policies
promoted by each national Government (ECLAC, 1998
chapter IV). In the first stage, which lasted through the
1950s, automotive plants assembled inputs imported from
developed countries and produced vehicles with little
differentiation from those made in the firms’ home
countries. At the same time, the affiliates in the region
had few links with the local economies, since practically
all inputs were imported.
The impetus given to many productive activities
under the import-substitution industrialization (ISI)
model allowed the automotive industry to enter a second
phase of development, which lasted until the early 1980s
(ECLAC, 1987). Market-seeking FDI by TNCs in the
sector was essential for industrial development. This stage
was characterized by trade and industrial policies
designed to encourage the establishment of automotive
plants in the region and to ensure that vehicles, which
were intended primarily for the domestic market, had a
high degree of local content. The sector went from
assembly plants that functioned as isolated enclaves to
plants having strong linkages with the local economy,
thanks to the –at times onerous– local content
requirements and barriers to automobile and autoparts
imports. Although this arrangement allowed for a
significant degree of industrialization in several countries
of the region, it eventually led to a clear technological
gap vis-à-vis the modern automotive plants in developed
countries and to diminishing international
competitiveness.
This context of deterioration of the region’s industry
marked the beginning of the third stage in the evolution
of the automotive sector in Latin America, which is still
underway. This period has witnessed an important
opening of regional economies, with FDI once again
playing an essential role. In MERCOSUR, and
specifically in Brazil, the search for local markets gave
way to a search for regional ones, whereas in Mexico, it
led to a search for efficiency through the establishment
of export platforms. In the remaining countries the
industry was reduced to a minimum or even disappeared.
As a result of their different approaches, Mexico’s and
Brazil’s industries evolved differently, as seen in the
international competitiveness of the two countries.
Latin America’s automotive industry is moderately
important, accounting for 7.6% of world output in 2001.
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the main determinants of the Mexican economy’s
improved international competitiveness from 1985 to
2001.
By contrast, Brazil’s share of world imports fell from
1.38% to 0.98% during the same period. The make-up of
export goods from that country changed only slightly, as
the share corresponding to natural resources and natural-
resource-based manufactures (63.3% in 1985) decreased,
and that of non-resource-based manufactures rose (45.2%
in 2001) (see table III.2). The ten most important products
–accounting for more than one-third of the value of goods
exports– include passenger vehicles (3.2%), whose share
has more than doubled since 1985, when this item
represented 1.3% of Brazil’s total exports. Nonetheless, most
exports were natural resources or natural-resource-based
manufactures. The share of world imports of passenger
vehicles from Brazil increased from close to 0.37% in 1985
to 0.62% in 2001, and that of autoparts, from 0.96% to
1.03%. In the Latin American market –where Brazil placed
most of its automotive exports– its share of vehicle imports
fell from 15.90% to 10.91%, and that of autoparts, from
6.57% to 4.03% during the same period. Moreover, total
exports of the different categories of vehicles in the
automotive sector (passenger vehicles, autoparts, trucks,
engines and road vehicles), which represented 14.4% of
Brazil’s total exports to Latin America in 1985, rose to 21.1%
in 2001. Nevertheless, the market share of exports from
Brazil to Latin America decreased from 4.31% in 1985 to a
3.6% in 2001 (see table III.3). This shows that the automotive
industry was not one the main determinants of the
international competitiveness of the Brazilian economy,
neither globally nor in the Latin American market.
a) Performance of the automotive industry in Brazil
and Mexico
Mexico’s and Brazil’s automotive industries
followed a similar pattern until the 1980s. Under the
Table III.1
MEXICO: SHARE OF WORLD IMPORTS AND EXPORT STRUCTURE, 1985-2001
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 1999 2001
I. Market share 1.58 1.30 1.75 2.56 2.81
II. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resourcesa 54.8 30.7 16.9 12.2 12.6
Natural-resource-based manufacturesb 8.9 8.1 6.6 5.4 5.1
Non-resource-based manufacturesc 33.6 57.1 72.7 78.4 78.3
- Low technologyd 5.8 10.5 13.6 15.1 14.0
- Medium technologye 17.9 31.7 39.8 38.4 38.1
- High technologyf 9.9 14.9 19.4 24.9 26.2
Othersg 2.6 3.9 3.6 3.9 3.9
III. 10 Leading exports by relative shares h i 55.6 47.1 45.5 48.1 51.8
781 Passenger automobiles * + 0.8 5.8 9.6 10.2 11.2
333 Crude petroleum oils - 41.8 19.3 9.2 7.2 8.2
764 Telecom equipment and parts and accessories * + 3.3 3.0 3.7 5.3 6.5
752 Automatic data-processing machines and units thereof * + 0.2 1.7 2.4 4.5 5.5
782 Motor vehicles for the transport of goods + 0.6 0.6 2.8 3.3 3.8
931 Special transactions and unclassified commodities * + 2.1 3.4 3.2 3.6 3.7
773 Equipment for distributing electricity * + 2.3 4.3 4.8 4.3 3.7
784 Motor vehicle parts and accessories * + 2.5 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.4
761 Television receivers * + 0.5 2.4 3.5 3.7 3.3
772 Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits * + 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the TradeCAN software, 2002 Edition. Product groups
based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Rev. 2.
a Contains 45 simply processed commodities, including concentrates.
b Contains 65 elements: 35 agricultural/forestry groups and 30 others (mainly metals –except iron and steel– petroleum products, cement, glass, etc.).
c Contains 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Contains 44 elements: 20 groups from the textiles and clothing division plus 24 others classified as paper products, glass and steel, jewellery.
e Contains 58 elements: 5 from the automotive industry, 22 from the processing industry and 31 from the engineering industry.
f Contains 18 elements: 11 groups from the electronics division plus 7 from pharmaceutical products, turbines, aircraft, instruments.
g Contains 9 groups of items not elsewhere classified (mostly from section 9).
h Corresponds (*) to the 50 fastest-growing groups in world imports from 1985 to 2001.
i Groups in which Mexico gained (+) or lost (-) market share of world imports from 1985 to 2001.
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import-substitution industrialization model, the sector
was strongly regulated by State policies that provided
incentives for local production, as part of a protection
system, both tariff- and non-tariff-based, that also covered
important performance and other requirements, including
minimum local-content requirements. Production was
principally intended for the domestic market. This began
to change in the 1980s in Mexico and in 1990 in Brazil,
when the new public policies focused on bringing about
greater integration with the international economy.
In Mexico, attracting FDI was made a priority, in
keeping with the automakers’ strategy. In this context,
the implementation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) proved pivotal; this was an
“investment-driven” integration model, with the gradual
elimination, during a transition period, of existing
restrictions and the adoption of rules of regional origin.
Thus, Mexico went from an actively interventionist policy
in the automotive industry to a much more passive one,
in which the business strategy of seeking efficiency to
establish an export platform has had a decisive impact.
The country’s production structure was profoundly
transformed, and the country became an important export
platform, especially to its NAFTA partners, the United
States and Canada (see box III.3).
Brazil’s evolution has contrasted strongly with
Mexico’s, since both countries rescinded their import-
substitution policies (see box III.4). Brazil privileged its
automotive industry through MERCOSUR, a “policy-
driven” integration model, and through national incentive
policies to promote “popular” (economy) automobiles
and FDI. At the MERCOSUR level, the main policy tools
were tariff protection and foreign-trade compensation or
equilibrium among MERCOSUR members. This
facilitated the integration of operations of companies
established in Brazil and Argentina. The most important
domestic tools were the incentives programmes for FDI,
at the federal and state levels (see box III.5). Despite the
Table III.2
BRAZIL: SHARE OF WORLD IMPORTS AND EXPORT STRUCTURE, 1985-2001
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 1999 2001
I. Market share 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.95 0.98
II. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resourcesa 31.7 26.1 25.3 22.8 23.1
Natural-resource-based manufacturesb 31.6 29.3 30.4 29.8 29.2
Non-resource-based manufacturesc 35.8 43.6 42.6 45.1 45.2
- Low technologyd 13.5 15.0 14.1 11.7 11.7
- Medium technologye 19.3 24.8 25.1 25.3 23.3
- High technologyf 2.9 3.8 3,3 8.1 10.1
Othersg 0.9 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.4
III. 10 Leading exports by relative shares h i 43.0 38.1 33.9 36.9 37.2
281 Iron ore and concentrates + 8.5 9.0 7.5 7,2 6.9
222 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits, whole or broken, soft + 2.2 2.9 2.7 3.9 4.8
792 Aircraft and associated equipment and parts thereof * + 0.2 1.3 0.4 3.5 4.4
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals) - 6.1 5.5 5.5 3.4 3.7
781 Passenger automobiles * + 1.3 1.6 1.1 2.7 3.2
251 Pulp and waste paper + 1.5 2.0 2.8 3.0 3.1
851 Footwear - 4.4 4.3 3.5 3.0 3.0
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes - 12.3 5.5 5.0 4.4 2.9
011 Meat and edible meat offal, fresh, chilled or frozen + 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.6
058 Fruit, preserved, and fruit preparations - 4.7 4.2 3.2 3.3 2.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the TradeCAN software, 2002 Edition. Product groups
based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Rev. 2.
a Contains 45 simply processed commodities, including concentrates.
b Contains 65 elements: 35 agricultural/forestry groups and 30 others (mainly metals –except iron and steel– petroleum products, cement, glass, etc.).
c Contains 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Contains 44 elements: 20 groups from the textiles and clothing division plus 24 others classified as paper products, glass and steel, jewellery.
e Contains 58 elements: 5 from the automotive industry, 22 from the processing industry and 31 from the engineering industry.
f Contains 18 elements: 11 groups from the electronics division plus 7 from pharmaceutical products, turbines, aircraft, instruments.
g Contains 9 groups of items not elsewhere classified (mostly from section 9).
h Correspond (*) to the 50 fastest growing groups in world imports from 1985 to 2001.
i Groups in which Brazil gained (+) or lost (-) market share of world imports from 1985 to 2001.
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Table III.3
BRAZIL: SHARE OF LATIN AMERICAN IMPORTS AND
EXPORT STRUCTURE, 1985-2001
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 1999 2001
I. Market share 4.31 3.90 4.32 3.77 3.60
II. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resourcesa 9.2 5.9 6.7 7.3 8.3
Natural-resource-based manufacturesb 26.2 23.2 21.4 19.8 19.7
Non-resource-based manufacturesc 64.3 69.7 70.5 72.3 71.3
- Low technologyd 11.1 14.1 17.1 15.8 16.1
- Medium technologye 45.3 47.8 47.2 46.0 43.9
- High technologyf 7.9 7.8 6.2 10.6 11.3
Othersg 0.2 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.4
III. 10 Leading exports by relative shares h i 27.5 29.6 30.7 35.2 35.0
781 Passenger automobiles * - 7.0 4.8 3.8 7.4 8.8
784 Motor vehicle parts and accessories * - 3.1 4.2 7.0 5.3 4.7
641 Paper and cardboard + 2.8 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.7
764 Telecom equipment and parts and accessories * - 1.2 1.2 0.3 2.8 3.6
782 Motor vehicles for the transport of goods * + 1.6 3.2 3.5 4.6 3.3
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products * - 3.9 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.8
713 Internal combustion piston engines, and parts thereof * + 1.2 1.6 2.6 2.4 2.4
625 Rubber tyres, inner tubes, etc * - 1.2 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.9
783 Road vehicles + 1.4 2.4 2.8 2.4 1.9
281 Iron ore and concentrates + 4.1 3.8 2.2 2.2 1.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the TradeCAN software, 2002 Edition. Product groups
based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Rev. 2.
a Contains 45 simply processed commodities, including concentrates.
b Contains 65 elements: 35 agricultural/forestry groups and 30 others (mainly metals –except iron and steel– petroleum products, cement, glass, etc.).
c Contains 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Contains 44 elements: 20 groups from the textiles and clothing division plus 24 others classified as paper products, glass and steel, jewellery.
e Contains 58 elements: 5 from the automotive industry, 22 from the processing industry and 31 from the engineering industry.
f Contains 18 elements: 11 groups from the electronics division plus 7 from pharmaceutical products, turbines, aircraft, instruments.
g Contains 9 groups of items not elsewhere classified (mostly from section 9).
h Correspond (*) to the 50 fastest growing groups in Latin American imports from 1985 to 2001.
i Groups in which Brazil has won (+) or lost (-) market share of Latin American imports from 1985 to 2001.
attempt to raise the international competitiveness of
Brazilian industry through regional-market- and, to a
lesser extent, efficiency-seeking strategies, the economic
difficulties of MERCOSUR’s principal members made
it necessary to redefine policies so as to rekindle domestic
demand, which, in turn, affected these countries’ external
accounts.
The differences between Mexico’s and Brazil’s
automotive sectors are well known. Investment in the
automotive and autoparts industry in Mexico focused on
the search for efficiency, to cater to the demanding North
American market. In Brazil, although investment flowed
into the country principally in search of regional markets,
it has been saddled by crises, both domestic and in the
other MERCOSUR countries, reflected in successive
policy changes; nonetheless, part of the investment in
some assembly plants also sought efficiency (Mortimore,
1998a and 1998b).
In the 1990s, FDI gave a strong impetus to
Mexico’s and Brazil’s automotive industries. From
1997 to 2000, FDI in Mexico totalled US $11.3 billion,
as the country became an important link for the ISIP
of transnational automakers from the United States.
Mexico’s vehicle-parts industry had already been
transnationalized, principally through of the purchase
of Mexican companies by North America ones; hence,
in this period, new FDI in this sector mostly targeted
new plants. By contrast, in Brazil, FDI rose to
US$ 31.2 billion (US$ 18.3 billion in assembly plants
and the rest in parts manufacturing) between 1990 and
2001. Similarly, from 1994 to 2002, the vehicle-parts
industry became transnationalized: foreign companies’
share of capital stock, sales and investment in the
sector’s domestic industry rose from 48.1%, 47.6%
and 48% to 78.4%, 75.6% and 85.9%, respectively
(SINDIPEÇAS, 2003).
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Box III.3
THE DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICO’S AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
parts exports and vehicle-production
quotas were eliminated). Export
models were required to have only 30%
domestic content, and the progressive
incorporation of inputs from
maquiladora firms into these models
was facilitated; this policy was later
extended to vehicles for the domestic
market. Lastly, rules on the balanced
foreign-exchange budget and
restrictions on foreign equity in
autoparts firms were made more
flexible. In other words, import
substitution, as defined by the
authorities, ceased to be the main
goal, and more attention was paid to
the corporate strategies of the auto
manufacturers established in Mexico
that were interested in selling in
external markets.
The second stage in the evolution
of the automotive industry privileged to
the utmost the priorities set forth in
vehicle assemblers’ strategies, through
free-trade agreements, especially
NAFTA and the accord signed with the
European Union, which entered into
force in 1994 and 2000, respectively.
Under NAFTA, tariff protection fell from
9.9% in 1994 to zero in 2004 (although
certain quotas were maintained), and
the level of obligatory domestic content
declined from 34% in 1994 to zero in
2004 for vehicles and from 20% to zero
for parts. Foreign-exchange
compensation, by firm, decreased from
80% to zero. The share of parts
assembled by maquiladora firms
allowed to be sold in the domestic
market increased from 55% to 100%.
At the same time, the regional content
(for the treaty members) rose from 50%
in 1994 to 62.5% in 2004, and
remained at this level. Thus, North
America’s automotive industry was
consolidated. The situation under the
Free Trade Agreement between Mexico
and the European Union is similar,
although its coverage and scope are
substantially lower. Approximately 4%
of vehicle exports in 2003 (49,164
vehicles) went to Europe (AMIA, 2003).
The MERCOSUR-Mexico Economic
Complementation Agreement on the
automotive sector, although not a free-
trade agreement, offers certain access
to this subregional market and allows
for the specialization of vehicle
assemblers and parts manufacturers
with affiliates in both markets. Only
0.1% of vehicle exports in 2003 (1,733
vehicles) went to Brazil (AMIA, 2003).
Since 2004, almost the only policy tool
of the Mexican automotive industry
–regarding its access to other
markets– has been the regional rules
of origin in each treaty. Through the
transition from a first stage of active
policies in the framework of a closed
economy to a second stage of
increasingly passive policies in an
open economy, Mexico succeeded in
becoming an important automotive-
export platform.
Two stages can be distinguished in the
evolution of Mexico’s automotive
industry. In the first, the principal
policies regarding the sector took the
form of decrees, which gave way to
transition instruments of free-trade
agreements in second stage. During
the period in which the decrees
remained in force, from 1962 to 1994,
the country went from active,
interventionist policies –that is, the
promotion of industrial-import
substitution, basically with regard to
vehicle parts– to more liberal policies,
which promoted vehicle exports. The
first decrees (1962, 1972 and 1977)
were characterized by high tariff and
non-tariff protection and strict
performance requirements, namely,
obligatory domestic production of
certain parts, a limitation on the
number of assembled lines and brands,
a minimum level of domestic content
(60%), a balanced foreign-exchange
budget for each firm, vehicle assembly
plants’ obligation to export vehicle
parts, and a maximum level of foreign
equity (49%) in autoparts firms (de
María y Campos, 1991).
In response to the industry’s
ongoing trade-deficit problem, an
attempt was made to implement more
appropriate policies. The 1983 and
1989 decrees were reoriented towards
the promotion of vehicle exports, and
performance requirements were
reduced (for example, requirements on
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
orientation was strengthened, since, in addition to the
increase in exports, the propensity to export more than
doubled, from 34.4% to 74.7%, surging especially in
1995, when the crisis besetting the country led to
declining output and an increase in production for
export.9  Moreover, imports also saw sharp growth in
the same period: in 1990 only 1% of sales in Mexico
were imported vehicles, compared with 55% in 2002.
This increase stems from the distinctly export-oriented
nature of Mexico’s automotive industry, whose plants
have been designed for this purpose and which are less
and less important for domestic consumption (see table
III.4).
The policies implemented to promote the industry
in Mexico and Brazil permitted explosive growth in the
sector starting in the 1990s, even though completely
different approaches were used in each country. Between
1990 and 2003, automotive production in both countries
grew at an average yearly rate above 5%, translating into
the near doubling of output in this period (see table III.4).
The difference in the focus of the policies is
reflected in the two countries’ automotive-sector trade
structures. In Mexico, which became an export platform
under NAFTA, exports increased nearly fivefold
between 1990 and 2002, with annual growth averaging
13.9%. In the same period, the sector’s export
9 The propensity to export is equal to the share of domestic output sold abroad.
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Box III.4
CHANGING POLICIES IN BRAZIL’S AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
Since the 1950s, the automotive
industry has been a priority of Brazilian
public policy. Government actions were
initially aimed at limiting imports and
adopting domestic-content
requirements. Domestic production,
intended primarily for the domestic
market, grew quickly and steadily.
Between 1959 and 1974, annual output
multiplied nearly tenfold, accounting for
over 50% of Latin American production.
In these years, transnational
automakers saw Brazil as a market
with a great deal of potential that
absorbed most of the local production
and required new investments.
In the mid-1970s, initiatives aimed
at improving the automotive industry’s
integration into world markets were
introduced. To guarantee that part of
production would be exported, a
policy known as Tax Benefits to
Special Export Programmes
(Benefícios Fiscais a Programas
Especiais de Exportação, BEFIEX)
was created. At the same time,
integration of production with
Argentina began to be valued.
Companies with operations in both
countries began to trade finished
products, especially parts and
components. In the second half of the
1980s, a series of steps was taken to
strengthen economic integration
between Argentina and Brazil. In the
automotive sector, Protocol N° 21
was established, intended to achieve
greater integration between the two
countries’ automotive industries. This
initiative was well received by final-
assembly companies, particularly
Ford and Volkswagen, which formed a
joint venture (Autolatina), thereby
implementing a strategy of productive
complementarity between their
subsidiaries in Argentina and Brazil.
In the early 1990s, regional
integration was seen as a tool for trade
and financial opening and for fostering
domestic economic stability more than
for promoting development. This new
orientation was ratified with the
creation of MERCOSUR. As part of this
regional initiative, agreement was
reached on a common external tariff
and a zero tariff among member
countries for automotive trade, and
incentives on investments in the sector
were prohibited, starting 1 January
2000. These policy agreements moved
up the deadlines for TNCs to
restructure their production, with a view
to competing under the new economic
opening. However, Argentina’s and
Brazil’s economic difficulties changed
priorities and exacerbated problems
between the two countries in the
automotive sector.
Brazil once again focused its
priorities on the domestic market. Tax
breaks for export programmes were
eliminated, and in 1995 a programme
providing incentives for the production
of low-cost vehicles was established to
rekindle domestic demand. This
programme reduced tax rates on
industrialized products for automobiles
with engines up to 1,000 cc as well as
on the importation of vehicle parts for
that category. Vehicle import quotas
were established; the corresponding
tariffs were increased to 70%; and
import quotas were reduced to 2.8%
for parts and components and to 2.0%
for machines and equipment. The
automotive industry was the only
industrial sector to have a broad set of
incentive policies after the economic
opening (IPEA, 1998b). Although these
measures did rekindle domestic
demand, they began to generate
serious trade-balance problems.
In late 1996, the Federal
Government established special rules
creating additional incentives for final-
assembly companies that set up
operations in the north, northeast and
west-central regions of the country. To
receive the benefits of this temporary
programme, automakers were required
to establish operations before 31 May
1997; however, in early July 1999, the
Senate extended the deadline to the
end of that year. This step was taken to
allow Ford Motor Co. to set up a new
plant in the State of Bahia. Incentives
could be extended until 31 December
2010 (IPEA, 1997, and IPEA, 1999).
With the adoption of these special
rules, the tug of war among Brazilian
States to attract foreign investments
ceased to be a domestic issue and
created a new conflict within
MERCOSUR. In late April 1997, a new
agreement on the number of vehicles
that could be imported by Brazil was
established. Hence, final-assembly
companies established in Argentina
and not benefiting from these rules
because they did not have
manufacturing operations in Brazil were
incorporated into the quota system.
As the deadline for establishing
common rules for the automotive
industry in MERCOSUR approached, the
discrepancies in member countries’
objectives became clear. In late 1998
negotiations resumed, and an agreement
was reached on the implementation of a
MERCOSUR automotive policy, setting
forth a transition period for free trade
within the group, a common external
tariff (35% for vehicles, buses and
trucks) and 60% minimum regional
content. In mid-2000, Argentina and
Brazil approved this policy, which
regulates trade in the sector between the
two countries during the transition
period, from 2000 to 2005. The new rules
attempt to maintain a regulated-trade
mechanism –based on the productive
specialization of assembly plants and the
assignment of models to each country, to
increase the scale of production and
raise competitiveness– to define a
minimum domestic content and to avoid
letting new Brazilian subsidies distort
investment flows. Nonetheless, the
agreement was significantly modified two
years later, in July 2002, amid
Argentina’s acute financial crisis.
Regional content was set at 60%, the
common external tariff at 35% and the
trade-balance policy was made more
flexible. Moreover, it was decided that all
domestic-content requirements must be
eliminated by 1 January 2006, with which
the free-trade area will fully enter into
force. This new stage should favour
Brazil, in light of its large market and the
greater efficiency of its manufacturing
plants.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Box III.5
UNSUSTAINABLE INCENTIVES IN BRAZIL’S AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
Tax incentives have always been used
by governments –at the municipal,
state and federal levels– to encourage
industrialization. The mechanisms
range from loans and infrastructure to
tax cuts, exemptions and deferments.
These incentives have been used in
Brazil since the 1970s, but in the 1990s
they became common, causing an
authentic “tax war” in the country, with
widespread disputes to attract new
investments. The Federal Government
lost control of the process and the
respective negotiations, which came to
be handled by the State governments.
Exemptions from and deferments
on payment of the main State-level tax
–the sales tax on merchandise and
transportation services (imposto sobre
operações relativas à circulação de
mercadorias e sobre prestações de
serviços de transporte, ICMS)– have
been the principal weapons of the tax
war. Far from having positive results,
this practice probably had a negative
effect on cash-strapped State budgets,
local economies and, in the end, the
country (De Silva Alves, 2001).
Starting in the mid-1990s, the
automotive sector was one of the focal
points of the tax war among Brazilian
States seeking to attract investments
–needed for the restructuring and
modernization of the industry. All final
assemblers received basic incentives,
including land, infrastructure, and loans
for equipment purchases. Thanks to the
postponement of ICMS collections,
State governments ended up granting
working capital to new companies,
which, as a rule, benefited these firms,
because companies already
established in the country faced a
heavy tax burden and high interest
rates.
Recent research shows that
subsidies given by State governments
to three vehicle assemblers to woo
plants to their States were almost
equivalent to the initial investments
made by the companies (De Silva
Alves, 2001). The 29-year subsidies
given to General Motors to build a
factory in Gravataí, Rio Grande do Sul,
worth 759.6 million reais, outstripped
the capital invested by the firm, 600
million reais. In the case of Mercedes
Benz’s facilities in Juiz de Fora, Minas
Gerais, the incentives, granted for 22
years, total 690.7 million reais, and the
investments, 695 million reais. Only at
Renault’s factory in São José dos
Pinhais, Paraná, is the amount of the
subsidies (353.7 million reais), to be
given over 10 years, less than the
initial capital (one billion reais).
The majority of these benefits
corresponds to long-term deferments
on ICMS payments, along with special
conditions at the time the accumulated
debt is paid. The incentives include, in
addition, disbursements of State-
budget resources to give land to
vehicle assemblers and the creation of
infrastructure for the factories.
The land subsidies, whose value
was calculated based on the land’s
market value, were disbursed by each
State. In the case of General Motors,
the State of Rio Grande do Sul
purchased a plot of land for 12 million
reais and sold it to the firm for one
million reais, thereby granting a subsidy
of 11 million reais. Infrastructure value
was calculated on the basis of an
estimate. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that an analysis of the loans and
tax exemptions should also consider the
firms’ future payments, estimating their
present value.
In the final analysis, the investment
that GM, Mercedes Benz and Renault
made over a four-year period
amounted to less than 2.3 billion reais,
whereas the total subsidies obtained
by these firms will probably amount to
1.8 billion reais, in values of 1996, the
year when the contracts were signed.
This calculation was based on
available information regarding the
agreements signed between the
governments of Rio Grande do Sul,
Minas Gerais and Paraná and the
respective vehicle-assembly
companies. The selection of the three
projects was also influenced by the fact
that they corresponded to 45% of the
nearly 6.0 billion reais that the
automotive sector planned to invest in
Brazil between 1995 and 2002.
The fiscal benefits require an
immediate disbursement by the
government, whereas the tax benefits
do not necessarily mean payouts;
rather, the government will cease to
collect revenue that did not exist before
the new investment was made. At the
end of the subsidy period, the firms will
begin to pay normal taxes, and State
revenues will increase.
From the standpoint of State
governments, the tax war may be
understood as a rational policy, since
the benefits they have granted will
allow them to receive revenue that they
would not have received without the
arrival of these companies. However,
for the country as a whole, the results
have been less than satisfactory. The
automotive-sector investments would
likely have taken place even without
the tax inducements, since investment
decisions are predicated on additional
factors, including parent companies’
global strategies. Hence, the amount of
the subsidies –more than 1.8 billion
reais– represented a waste of
resources. Moreover, the State
governments offered these resources
to companies able to obtain financing
in international markets, while many
domestic companies in other sectors
faced serious financing difficulties and
accounted for a much larger number of
jobs than did the automotive industry.
Nor was the tax war very profitable for
employment. The three factories
studied created a total of 4,500 to
5,500 direct jobs, at a cost of between
328,000 and 400,000 reais each.
The results were very costly for the
country financially. as well.
Nevertheless, the location of new
automotive investments in less
advanced regions did encourage those
regions’ development.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Table III.4





Domestic sales Domestic sales
Output Domestic Imports Exports Output Domestic Imports Exports
output output
1990 803.7 527.5 5.4 276.9 914.5 712.6 0.1 187.3
1991 960.9 605.5 9.4 350.7 960.2 770.9 19.8 193.1
1992 1 051.2 667.4 8.8 388.7 1 073.9 740.3 23.7 341.9
1993 1 055.2 567.2 8.5 471.5 1 391.4 1 061.5 69.7 331.5
1994 1 097.4 523.1 74.0 567.1 1 581.4 1 206.8 188.6 377.6
1995 931.2 191.8 34.3 781.1 1 629.0 1 359.3 369.0 263.0
1996 1 211.3 244.9 80.2 975.4 1 804.3 1 506.8 224.0 296.3
1997 1 338.0 346.5 135.1 983.0 2 069.7 1 640.2 303.2 416.9
1998 1 427.6 447.9 196.2 972.0 1 586.3 1 187.7 347.2 400.2
1999 1 493.7 421.6 245.7 1 073.5 1 356.7 1 078.2 178.7 274.8
2000 1 889.5 451.1 402.7 1 434.1 1 691.2 1 315.3 174.2 371.3
2001 1 817.8 445.9 473 1 403.7 1 817.1 1 423.0 178.3 390.9
2002 1 774.4 439.4 538.1 1 325.8 1 792.7 1 383.3 104.4 414.8
2003 1 540.6 370.4 607.5 1 170.1 1 827.7 1 354.3 74.3 535.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of information from Mexican Automotive Manufacturers
Association (AMIA) (http://www.amia.com.mx), and Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores (ANFAVEA), Anuário
Estatístico da Industria Automobilística Brasileira 2003 (http://www.anfavea.com.br).
In Brazil, although exports nearly tripled between 1990
and 2003, the propensity to export has remained at much
lower levels than in Mexico and varied little in this period
–around 20% of total output. The growth of exports in recent
years is explained by the search for external markets to sell
the industry’s output, in light of decreased domestic demand.
The decision to export stems more from macroeconomic
crises than from a predefined strategy, as in the Mexican
case. The inward orientation of Brazilian industry can clearly
be seen by examining domestic sales, which easily account
for more than three-fourths of domestic output. In 2002,
domestic production accounted for 93% of the industry’s
total sales, and sales of imported vehicles fell to their lowest
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Figure III.1
MEXICO AND BRAZIL: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN THE ASSEMBLY INDUSTRY
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
on the basis of information from Secretaría de Economía de México,
and Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores
(ANFAVEA), Anuário Estatístico da Industria Automobilística Brasileira
2003 (http://www.anfavea.com.br); Sindicato Nacional da Indústria
de Componentes para Veículos Automotores (SINDIPEÇAS),
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Figure III.2
MEXICO AND BRAZIL: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN THE AUTOPARTS INDUSTRY
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC) on the basis of information from Secretaría de
Economía de México, and Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes
de Veículos Automotores (ANFAVEA), Anuário Estatístico da
Industr ia Automobilística Brasileira 2003 (http://
www.anfavea.com.br); Sindicato Nacional da Indústria de
Componentes para Veículos Automotores (SINDIPEÇAS),
Performance of Autoparts’ Sector, 2003.
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The main effect of the entry of important flows of
FDI into Brazil’s and Mexico’s automotive sectors is the
increase in production capacity. In both countries, this
increase was led by United States companies such as
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler (before it was
purchased by Daimler Benz) and European firms, such
as Volkswagen, Fiat, PSA and Renault/Nissan. Neither
Japanese industry, through Toyota and Honda, nor
Korean industry (with Hyundai), both characterized by
high competitiveness, played important roles in the
establishment of new production capacities.
Two important differences exist between Brazilian
and Mexican industries: installed capacity and utilization
of that capacity. In 2003, installed capacity in Brazil was
above 3.1 million units, while Mexico’s stood at some
2.1 million units. However, Mexico’s utilization of its
installed capacity was above 80% from 1995 to 2003,
while Brazil’s contracted from close to 90% in the mid-
1990s to 55% at the beginning of this decade (see tables
III.5 and III.6 and figure III.3). The difference lies in
each country’s ability to define its production and trade
strategies. The clear export orientation of Mexico’s
industry allows it to maintain a low level of idle installed
capacity, whereas Brazil’s industry is much less outward
looking and has a high level of surplus capacity, as a
result of the crisis in the local and subregional markets.
Each country’s propensity to export is, naturally,
reflected at the company level. The propensity to export
of the principal firms that operate in Mexico, led by
Chrysler, Ford, General Motors and Volkswagen, has
shown a common cyclical pattern, while Nissan’s
propensity to export has steadily declined, currently
standing at about 40% (see figure III.4).
Brazilian companies also showed a common cyclical
pattern and a propensity to export of approximately 30%
in 2002. By contrast, exports by Fiat, whose parent
company is weathering a major crisis, have steadily
declined since 1993, despite its implementation of an
export strategy; at present it is the least important exporter
of the large automotive TNCs in the country (see figure
III.5).
Once again, the difference between firms in Mexico
and those in Brazil is a reflection of the export orientation
of each country’s industry at the aggregate level. Firms
in Mexico focus on producing for export to the countries
of North America, while Brazilian firms traditionally sell
in the domestic market and export according to prevailing
macroeconomic conditions in that market.
Differences between Mexican and Brazilian
industries are also found in their type of specialization.
Mexican industry focuses on producing models that are
more expensive and more suitable for the needs of
consumers in the countries to which it exports –passenger
vehicles, sport-utility vehicles and trucks, with an average
wholesale value above US$ 16,000 (Scheinman, 2004).
Brazil’s automotive industry has specialized in small,
low-cost vehicles with high fuel economy, which are
affordable for consumers with lower purchasing power.
The average wholesale value of this type of vehicles is
not more than US$ 6,500.
In light of devaluations and MERCOSUR’s
automotive policy, Brazil’s automotive industry, like
Table III.5
MEXICO: INSTALLED CAPACITY FOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION, BY FIRM, 2003
Firm Plant Assembled models Capacity (units)
General Motors (GM) Ramos Arizpe Monza, Joy/Swing, Cavalier/Sunfire 240 000
Silao Suburban, Escalade, Avalanche 250 000
Toluca Silverado, Kodiak 10 000
500 000
Nissan/Renault Aguascalientes Sentra, Tsuru y Platina y Clio de Renault 260 000
Cuernavaca Sentra, Tsuru y Scenic de Renault 170 000
430 000
DaimlerChrysler (DCX) Toluca PT Cruiser 260 000
Saltillo Ram 170 000
430 000
Volkswagen (VW) Puebla New Beetle y Jetta 425 000
Ford Motor Co. Hermosillo Focus 180 000
Cuautitlan Ikon y serie-F 110 000
290 000
Honda Guadalajara Accord 30 000
BMW Toluca Serie 3 5 000
Total 2 120 000
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of information provided by the companies.
122 ECLAC
Table III.6
BRAZIL: INSTALLED CAPACITY FOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION, BY FIRM, 2003
Firm Plant Assembled models Capacity (units)
General Motors São Caetano do Sul, São Paulo Astra, Vectra and Corsa Wind 180 000
(GM) São José dos Campos, São Paulo Corsa, Meriva, S10 pickup, Blazer 350 000
Gravataí, Rio Grande do Sul Celta 200 000
730 000
Ford São Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo Ka, Courier, F-250 pick-up and trucks 200 000
Camaçari, Bahía Fiesta, EcoSport and Courier 250 000
450 000
Volkswagen Anchieta, São Bernardo Gol, Santana, Kombi, Saveiro, Nuevo Polo 524 000
(VW) do Campo, São Paulo
Taubate, São Paulo Gol, Parati 305 000
Resende, Rio de Janeiro trucks 30 000
São José dos Pinhais, Golf A4, Audi A3 160 000
Curitiba, Paraná
1 019 000
Renault-Nissan a Ayrton Senna, São José Clio, Scenic (Renault) 120 000
dos Pinhais, Curitiba, Paraná Frontier pickup and the Xterra sport-utility
vehicle (Nissan)
Fiat Betim, Minas Gerais Uno, Palio, Siena, Doblo, Marea, Strada 610 000
Sete Lagoas, Minas Geraisb Iveco Daily and Fiat Ducato 60 000
672 000
DaimlerChrysler São Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo Trucks and buses 60 000
(DCX) Campo Largo, Paraná Dodge Dakota (pickup) 12 000
Juiz do Fora, Minas Gerais Class A and Class C 70 000
142 000
Peugeot-Citröen Porto Real, Rio de Janeiro Citroën Xsara and Peugeot 206 100 000
(PSA)
Volvo Curitiba, Paraná Trucks ...
Honda Sumaré, São Paulo Civic 45 000
Toyota Indaiatuba, São Paulo Corolla 15 000
Mitsubishi Catalão Goiás c L200 pickup 3 000
Total 3 296 000
Automobiles 3 106 000
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of information provided by the companies. Note: Modular
plants are indicated in bold.
a In 1998, Renault opened its first factory in the Ayrton Senna Complex, in São José dos Pinhais, in the metropolitan area of Curitiba, Paraná (PR). A year
later, a second industrial unit of the complex, an engine factory, began operating. In late 2001, the sport-utility vehicle factory was completed. These
new investments in Brazil also marked the beginning of a new chapter in Renault’s history, its alliance with Nissan. In December 2001, the sport-utility
vehicle factory opened, as did the first factory in the world of the Renault-Nissan alliance to produce Nissan vehicles. With the opening of this factory,
Nissan effectively became a domestic producer, a key element in the firm’s strategy to enhance its presence in MERCOSUR.
b Fiat and Iveco formed a 50/50 joint venture, with an overall investment of US$ 240 million. The State of Minas Gerais contributed US$ 15 million for the
development of infrastructure for water, road paving and electricity.
c MMC Automotores do Brasil is owned by Brazilian businessman Eduardo Souza Ramos and is the brand’s official importer. The Japanese parent
company contributes the production license, the unit plan and the manufacturing technique. Mitsubishi assembles L200 trucks in Brazil, with diesel
engines and double cabins. Initial production will consist of 3,000 vehicles per year, all for the domestic market.
Argentina’s, understood that the only way to remain
viable was to expand its export markets beyond
MERCOSUR. In Mexico, local production was
insufficient to meet increased demand for compact
automobiles, which made the country an attractive market
for the low-cost vehicles produced by Brazil’s industry;
consequently, the difficulties translated into options for
growth and earnings for the different actors involved.10
10 In negotiating automotive agreements, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina have sought to form a three-way free trade area. The value of Brazilian
exports to Mexico more than doubled over a period of three years, from 1999 to 2001. Shipments from Mexico to Brazil were less
successful, because Mexico’s industry produces larger, more expensive and less appealing cars given the depressed domestic demand in
Brazil. The next accord was signed in 2002, when Brazil’s and Argentina’s economic situations had improved. This new agreement calls
for the creation of a free-trade area in 2006 as well as successive tariff reductions and higher import quotas.
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This has favoured TNCs with affiliates in both Mexico
and Brazil, especially Volkswagen and Ford. In 2002,
Mexico replaced Argentina as the leading destination of
Brazilian automotive exports.
In the late 1990s, modular plants were established
in Brazil –and, strangely enough, not in Mexico–
constituting one of the core elements of the restructuring
of the world automotive industry. Brazil now has four
modular industrial complexes: Ford’s, in Camaçari
(Bahia), which produces the Fiesta; General Motors’, in
Gravataí (Río Grande do Sul), for the Celta; PSA-Peugeot
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Figure III.3
BRAZIL AND MEXICO: UTILIZATION OF PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
TO MANUFACTURE VEHICLES, 1995-2003
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of information from Mexican Automotive Manufacturers
Association (AMIA) (http://www.amia.com.mx), and Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores (ANFAVEA), Anuário
Estatístico da Industria Automobilística Brasileira 2003 (http://www.anfavea.com.br).
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Figure III.4
MEXICO: PROPENSITY TO EXPORT, BY FIRM, 1993-2003a
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of information from Mexican Automotive Manufacturers
Association (AMIA) (http://www.amia.com.mx).
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model; and Volkswagen’s, in Resende (Rio de Janeiro),
which makes trucks (see box III.6). In addition, to attract
FDI, Brazilian States offered generous tax and financial
incentives, on the order of US$ 3.3 billion (see box III.5).
However, these modern plants –which currently account
for 20% of the country’s productive capacity– have not
succeeded in conquering external markets with their new
products; that is, they have not proven to be sufficiently
competitive. The firm that has taken the greatest
advantage of the automotive agreement with Mexico is
Volkswagen, with its traditional Gol (Pointer) model,
produced in its old plants on the outskirts of São Paulo.
In Mexico, where important links have been established
with ISIP, Ford recently decided to build its first modular
plant. This ratifies the conclusion that the new modular
plants have been unable to surpass the advantages of the
Toyota Production System.
b) Recent changes in supplier networks in Brazil and
Mexico
Supplier networks in Mexico and Brazil have had to
cope with economic opening and transnationalization,
with very different results in each case. Originally,
Mexico had two vehicle-parts industries: a domestic
sector, promoted by the first automotive-industry decrees,
which limited FDI in the sector to 40% of manufacturers’
capital stock and required vehicle assembly plants to
incorporate certain domestic parts in their vehicles as
well as to export parts, and a foreign-owned sector, which
assembled parts with imported inputs, within in the
context of Mexico’s maquiladora industry and the access
mechanism to the United States market known as shared
production –HTS 9802, explained in chapter II (de María
y Campos, 1991). Until the entry into force of NAFTA,
Mexico’s autoparts industry had a larger market share of
United States imports than did the country’s automotive
industry.
NAFTA ushered in two major changes in Mexican
industry: it consolidated the transnationalization of the
domestic autoparts industry and it allowed the use of an
increasingly large share of parts produced by the
maquiladora industry (from 55% in 1994 to 100% in
2001) in vehicles assembled in Mexico. The autoparts
industry currently accounts for 6.9% of manufacturing
GDP, employs 15% of the labour force and generates
10% of the country’s manufacturing exports. There are
875 registered suppliers –60 first-tier and 815 second–
or third-tier companies (BANCOMEXT, 2002). United
States companies such as Delphi and Visteon dominate
the industry (CEESP, 2001). As a result, Mexico’s
autoparts industry specialized in labour-intensive
products, and the value of the industry’s output rose from
some US$ 10 billion in 1993-1995 to nearly US$ 17
billion in 2000-2002. The 1993-1995 trade surplus
nevertheless turned into a deficit of some US$ 7 billion
in 2000-2002 (INA, 2003). The greater international
competitiveness of Mexico’s autoparts industry was,
therefore, based on static advantages such as lower wages,
geographic proximity and special access to the United
Figure III.5
BRAZIL: PROPENSITY TO EXPORT, BY FIRM, 1993-2003a
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes
de Veículos Automotores (ANFAVEA), Anuário Estatístico da Industria Automobilística Brasileira 2003 (http://www.anfavea.com.br).
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Box III.6
NEW MODULAR PLANTS IN BRAZIL: AN EXPERIMENT
WITH INCOMPLETE RESULTS
In recent years, Brazil’s automotive
industry has seen important changes in
the relationships among the firms that
make up the production chain, in the
geographic location of production, in
product engineering and development
and in the organization of the
production processes. Amid these
changes, automakers sharply curtailed
the use of vertical integration, by
intensifying outsourcing and
establishing longer-term relationships
with their suppliers. The establishment
of new modular plants by some leading
vehicle manufacturers (Ford, in
Camaçari; General Motors, in Gravataí;
PSA-Peugeot Citroën, in Porto Real;
and Volkswagen, in Resende) has been
one of the clearest signs of these
changes.
In the second half of the 1990s, the
advent of the modular system
profoundly changed relationships
between automakers and suppliers. At
the global level, this new production
model began to be used by TNCs
seeking efficiency to capture export
markets. Brazil pioneered the
construction of new modular plants,
thereby becoming a privileged
laboratory for testing the global
automotive industry (Lung, Chanaron,
Fujimoto and Raff, 1999). With this new
form of organizing production, the
automakers reduced the number of
direct suppliers from nearly 500 to
about 150 and created a new level of
hierarchy for the chain: a modular
supplier, characterized by the delivery
of modules, subsets or systems
(Zilbovicius, Marx and Salerno, 2002).
In this new setting, most
automakers use similar criteria for
selecting their suppliers: quality
certification; financing capacity –to
reduce the risk of interruptions in
delivery and attempt to ensure
technological updates; rating potential
suppliers’ production processes; and
engineering and product-development
capacity. The last criterion is the
decisive factor for models whose
design was defined locally by the
Brazilian subsidiary (Salerno, Marx and
Zilbovicius, 2003). Hence, once the
automakers define a new model’s
characteristics and verify potential
suppliers’ suitability, a bid is conducted
for the contracts.
The new Brazilian modular plants
underscore a strong similarity among
the companies in the industrial
condominiums. These companies
include those that provide the systems
containing panels, seats, wheels and
tires, suspension, brakes, doors,
lighting, heating and air conditioning,
among other components. In general,
companies that have set up in these
industrial condominiums are module
suppliers that have logistical problems
(transportation costs, fragility) or that
favour the diversification of models and
greater flexibility for the manufacturing
firm. Still, evidence shows that only
final manufacturing and partial
subassembly operations are carried out
at the industrial condominiums
(Graziadio and Zilbovicius, 2003).
The added value incorporated at
industrial condominiums is quite low.
For example, in General Motors’
Gravataí plant, engines and
transmissions come from the firm’s
plant in São José dos Campos in São
Paulo. Similarly, a significant portion of
the parts assembled or stored by
modular suppliers in the condominiums
are manufactured at these suppliers’
plants near São Paulo and, on a much
smaller scale, in southern Minas
Gerais. The remaining parts are
imported or, in the case the least
expensive components, come from
companies in Rio Grande do Sul.
Therefore, the strategy of the
companies that took part in the
modular system within the industrial
condominiums is quite clear: minimize
the risk of capital devoted to a single
customer and reduce redundant
capacity to a minimum, to optimize
capacities already installed in their
central units, basically in the São Paulo
area. This, together with a higher
content of imported parts, makes the
new assembly units very different from
the supplier network that existed prior
to the investment boom in the second
half of the 1990s, which had a higher
degree of vertical integration.
Therefore, the original expectations
behind the establishment of suppliers
in the industrial condominiums where
modular plants are located have not
been completely realized. Only 5% of
all suppliers of modular plants are
located within condominiums or similar
complexes. Moreover, 76% of the
autoparts plants more than 50 km from
the assembly complexes (EPUSP/
PRO/TTO, 2003). In addition, these
units operate more according to a logic
of just-in-time supplying to the
assembly line rather than producing the
modules, systems and components
necessary for the final assembly of
vehicles at a single location.
Modular plants’ lacklustre
performance in strengthening the
production chains stems from two core
factors: the incentives war and
macroeconomic instability. Moreover,
considering the difficulties these plants
have faced in placing their production
in international markets, the second
factor has been compounded by
Brazil’s policy favouring low-cost
vehicles, which encourages productive
specialization in vehicles with low profit
levels and that are harder to export.
The incentives war encouraged the
establishment of new industrial
complexes in relatively less-developed
regions within the country, far from
large industrial centres. São Paulo
gradually lost its position as the host of
new plants in the automotive chain —
72% of all new plants between 1970
and 1979 were established there,
compared with 60.5% between 1980
and 1989. Since 1995, the decline has
been even sharper, as São Paulo has
hosted only 35.4% of all new plants.
These changes are more dramatic
when measured in investments.
Between 1997 and 2001, 92% of
investments in new vehicle plants took
place outside São Paulo, in States
such as Paraná (33%), Minas Gerais
(19%) and Bahia (18%) (Burity and
Medeiros, 2002).
Lastly, the macroeconomic
instability that has beset Brazil in
recent years has substantially altered
the expectations that automakers
once harboured regarding the
performance of the local market.
Economic decline meant a sharp fall
in domestic demand, leaving a
significant portion of productive
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States market. As Mexico’s autoparts industry became
tightly integrated with the United States supplier network,
it came to reproduce the same conflictive relationships
without reaping the corresponding benefits (the new role
of systems suppliers for modular plants). Industrial and
technological advancement was limited, most notably to
human-resources training and some productive linkages,
since there was little transfer and assimilation of
technology or entrepreneurial development (Mortimore
and Barron, 2004). The autoparts industry’s heightened
international competitiveness was accompanied by the
drastic curtailment of its domestic content, which in turn
brought about a vicious circle between foreign autoparts
manufacturers wishing to set up in Mexico but facing
difficulties in finding local suppliers that met their input
requirements and local suppliers interested in selling to
foreign firms but lacking the required capability to do so
(see box III.7).
In Brazil, the automotive chain has seen major
transformations in the last decade (Salerno, Marx and
Zilbovicius, 2003; Posthuma, 2001). Especially
following the trade opening, automakers sought a
significant reduction in the number of suppliers, and
encouraged these suppliers to begin their transformation
into manufacturers of modules or systems. The largest
suppliers were acquired by foreign companies. Domestic
companies currently account for little more than 20% of
the capital stock in the subsector.
The transnationalization of the sector in Brazil has
brought about significant changes. First, the automakers
have reduced the number of direct suppliers from some
500 to about 150, significantly increasing the importance
of first-tier suppliers in the production chain (see diagram
III.4). Second, the new module suppliers develop parts
and components for new models outside Brazil, in close
collaboration with vehicle assemblers. This has meant a
significant loss in the local capacity for technological
development that many Brazilian autoparts companies
once possessed. The models in which Brazil specializes
make it very difficult for a local supplier to compete in
the international market. Lastly, the proportion of
imported components used in the modules produced by
leading (first-tier) Brazilian suppliers has increased
substantially.
These structural changes are reflected in the
subsector’s performance in Brazil. In 2002, because of
strong concentration and the disappearance of many
companies, the subsector recorded a sales volume similar
to that of 1992 (US$ 10 billion), down from a high of
US$ 17.458 billion in 1997, and employment declined
from 231,000 to 168,000 jobs (from 1992 to 2002). These
transformations have not greatly altered the target market
of Brazil’s autoparts production, with the leading clients
continuing to be vehicle assemblers (nearly 60% of sales).
Although parts exports have, in fact, increased –from
US$ 2.312 billion to US$ 3.882 billion between 1992
and 2002– imports have grown at a faster pace, from
US$ 1.252 billion to US$ 3.980 billion. Since 1997, this
has translated into a rising trade deficit, while total idle
capacity stands at nearly 40% (SINDIPEÇAS, 2003).
Changes in the hierarchical levels of the production
chain have not clearly corresponded to the new
strategies of automakers and their modular plants.
Autoparts firms have attempted to minimize the risk of
betting their capital on a single customer and have
avoided expanding their productive capacity and
optimized existing capacity, normally at their central
units, located principally in the São Paulo area;
therefore, it would appear unrealistic to expect these
new modular plants to be highly verticalized suppliers
capacity idle. Given the high degree
of specialization in vehicles
intended for domestic consumption,
the firms’ strategies and public
policy have focused on stimulating
domestic demand, although with
unencouraging results. Moreover,
these special characteristics of
Brazilian production have greatly
constrained the country’s capacity to
export, especially since this new type
of plant was originally conceived to
increase efficiency in the conquest of
third markets. Nonetheless, this
experience has not yet produced the
expected benefits; but with better
domestic economic conditions the
results might improve.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of Priscilla Burity and Angela M. Medeiros M. Santos,
“O complexo automotivo”, BNDES 50 Anos - Histórias Setoriais, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES),
Brasilia, December, 2002; Grupo de Estudos em Trabalho, Tecnologia e Organização (EPUSP/PRP/TTO), A nova configuração da cadeia
automotiva brasileira, Escola Politécnica da Universidade de São Paulo, Departamento de Engenharia de Produção, São Paulo, 2003;
Thaise Graziadio and Mauro Zilbovicius, “Exploring the Reasons for Different Roles of Module Suppliers in a Car Assembly Plant”,
Eleventh Gerpisa International Colloquium, Ministère de la Recherche (Paris, 11-13 June 2003); Yannick Lung, Jean-Jacques Chanaron,
Takahiro Fujimoto and Daniel Raff (eds.), Coping with variety: flexible productive systems for product variety in the auto industry, Aldershot,
Ashgate, 1999; Mario Sergio Salerno, Roberto Marx and Mauro Zilbovicius, Strategies of Product Design, Production and Suppliers
Selection in the Auto Industry: Final Findings of a Broad Research in the Major Brazilian Assemblers’ Subsidiaries, Headquarters and
Suppliers, Eleventh Gerpisa International Colloquium, Ministère de la Recherche (Paris, 11-13 June 2003); Mauro Zilbovicius, Roberto
Marx and Mario Sergio Salerno, “A Comprehensive Study of The Transformation of The Brazilian Automotive Industry: Preliminary Findings”,
International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management, vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 10-23, 2002.
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Box III.7
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE AFFECTING MEXICO’S SUPPLIER NETWORK
A vicious circle of sorts affects the
Mexican automotive industry’s supplier
network. Foreign companies, especially
autoparts manufacturers, want to
extend and consolidate their network to
take advantage of the opportunities
afforded by free-trade agreements
other than NAFTA. They are, however,
hard-pressed to find local input
suppliers that meet their requirements.
Suppliers, particularly Mexican
suppliers, express much interest in
selling to foreign companies but lack
the required capability to do so, among
other reasons because they do not
receive the national-policy support they
need to close the gap between their
current performance and the
requirements of purchasers. To better
understand the nature of this vicious
circle, ECLAC applied a questionnaire
to 41 autoparts companies and
5 vehicle-assembly plants that operate
in Mexico.
Companies that purchase autoparts
and inputs thereof made in Mexico are
normally very demanding and careful in
certifying the quality and verifying the
efficiency in their suppliers’ operational
performance. For a firm to qualify and
apply to be a supplier, it normally must
meet a series of conditions in minimum
quality-qualification levels (ISO 9000,
ISO 14000, QS9000, etc.), in addition
to minimum levels of sales volume,
degree of specialization and
technological capabilities, among other
requirements. Nearly all purchasers
rigorously evaluate the quality, service
and prices of their local suppliers’
products; many audit the supplier firm’s
quality system, and some take detailed
measurements in parts per million




Consequently, only if local suppliers
meet purchasers’ quality, service and
price requirements can the coverage
be extended and can the quality of the
supplier network in Mexico be
improved. Many suppliers are, however,
far from meeting these requirements.
According to the companies
interviewed, the most important
opportunities to improve their
operational performance, in the case of
Mexican-owned companies, are in
quality (23%), service (21%)
–understood principally as complying
with delivery times and flexibility of
supply– financial capacity and
business culture (10%), and
technological development (9%).
Although the numbers indisputably
indicate that quality and service are the
most significant factors –especially for
first-tier suppliers, given the opening to
global competition– the most urgent
issue to address for the second and
third tiers can be viewed as that of a
modern business culture. Nearly all
other problems stem from this issue,
which also offers an important platform
to solve them. “Business culture” is
understood as the combination of
know-how, attitude and skills
possessed by companies’ top
executives, which encourages them to
seek ongoing improvement –
incrementally, progressively and
steadily– in every area of the
organization and to attempt to bring it
ever closer to the highest business-
performance standards currently seen
in the world. This is the main difficulty
faced by tiers two and three, but it is
also the same difficulty faced by the
entire automotive chain, to the extent
that it seeks to rely on domestic
suppliers for its operations.
A comparison of inputs supplied
with the level of the participating
supplier confirms the hypothesis that
tiers two and three are far from
providing inputs and services with high
added value. They have not, on their
own, succeeded in fully inserting
themselves into the Mexican
automotive industry’s supplier network.
To a large extent, several of the inputs
most frequently imported for
manufacturing autoparts by companies
in the sector established in the country
are concentrated, in their contribution
to the industry’s total value, in some of
the same categories: smelting, forging,
stamping, machining and welding
(35%), and rubber, plastics and fibres
(23%). This suggests that there is,
roughly speaking, a strong demand
that might –under the right conditions–
be met locally. The decision to
purchase locally or to import depends
principally on the strategic acquisition
policies of the large TNCs’ head
offices. Most of them are, apparently,
not yet convinced that they should
distance themselves from their supplier
networks in the United States with the
support of their Mexican affiliates and
rely more on domestic companies.
Clearly, there is a much room for
national policy.
Programmes to develop suppliers
and production chains are implemented
by various government agencies
(Ministry of the Economy,
BANCOMEXT, NAFIN, State-
government development ministries,
among others) and the domestic
private sector (Centros de Desarrollo
de Proveedores-CEDEP, ITESM) as
well as the foreign private sector
(Japanese External Trade
Organization, JETRO). The main
question regarding the Mexican
automotive industry is whether current
policies for productive development
related to extending, integrating and
consolidating the supplier network
–principally tiers two and three– into
the automotive chain are sufficient to
contribute to the incorporation of
Mexican suppliers into an
internationally competitive supplier
network. Thus far, neither Mexico’s
policy for strengthening the Mexican
supplier network nor the efforts of
foreign companies in Mexico to transfer
and assimilate technology and
establish and deepen productive
linkages and entrepreneurial
development have been sufficient to
break this vicious circle.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of Michael Mortimore and F. Barron, “Informe sobre la
industria automotriz mexicana”, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL)/Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores
de Monterrey (ITESM), January 2004.
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integrated into the assembly line (EPUSP/PRP/TTO,
2003). Only Ford and GM have incorporated producers
of most of the modules they need into their assembly
lines, but they have done so without incorporating much
added value into the modular plants.
In other words, Brazil’s autoparts industry has lost
local-development capacity and domestic added value
as a result of automaker requirements. Sharp contraction
in domestic demand, improved product quality and good
relations with the assembly plants and their parent
companies allowed the industry to raise its international
competitiveness, albeit by using imported inputs and
reducing domestic content. Although new technologies
have been incorporated, productive linkages have been
reduced, and the industry thus appears to be following a
path increasingly similar to that of Mexico.
c) Challenges for Brazil’s and Mexico’s automotive
industries
Mexico and Brazil face a common challenge but
different domestic problems. The common challenge is
to see that the genuinely most advanced firms in the
automotive industry –Toyota and Honda– set up major
operations in their countries, so as to take advantage of
all the benefits these firms might offer in international
production systems, organizational practices and supplier
networks (Mortimore, 2003a). To have world-class
automotive industries, they need the presence of cutting-
edge companies.
They also face different domestic challenges. To
continue expanding its automotive industry, Mexico
needs to take advantage of free-trade agreements that it
Diagram III.4
BRAZIL: STRUCTURE OF THE PRODUCTION CHAIN FOR A
GENERIC ASSEMBLER
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Escola politécnica da Universidade de São Paulo,
Departamento de Engenharia de Produção, Grupo de estudos em Trabalho, Tecnologia e Organização (EPUSP-PRO/TTO), Mapeamento da
nova configuração da cadeia automotiva brasileira, São Paulo, 2001.
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has signed other than NAFTA and to increase local
content, in compliance with these agreements’ rules of
origin. Brazil must use more of its existing capacity by
seeking access to new markets. Along with revitalizing
the domestic market, it must make better use of modern
modular plants with an appropriate, world-class supplier
network, to offer quality products to global markets.
Mexico’s automotive industry: made in Mexico?
Mexico currently depends excessively on autoparts
imports from the United States and lacks a suitable
supplier network allowing it to benefit from its free-trade
agreements with other countries –including the
agreement it is negotiating with Japan– and to comply
with rules of origin set out in these agreements. To take
advantage of its access to these markets, Mexico needs
to significantly increase the Mexican content of its
vehicles and autoparts intended for export (see
diagram III.5).
In this, the Mexican automotive industry has been
only partially successful. The main problem is the
significant imbalance between vehicle assemblers and
parts manufacturers. Between 1990 and 2000, vehicle
assemblers raised their labour productivity by 57%, their
added value by 59% and their employment by only 5%.
Diagram III.5
MEXICO:  PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO LEADING MARKETS
THROUGH FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a Regional content required by each agreement.
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In the same period, autoparts firms operating outside
the maquiladora structure increased their labour
productivity by 11%, their added value by 39% and their
employment by 33%, whereas the firms within the
system of parts-manufacturing maquiladoras raised their
labour productivity by only 8%, added value by 52%
and employment by 52% (McKinsey & Co., 2003).11
This opened an increasingly wide gap in Mexico’s
automotive industry, insofar as the competitiveness of
the vehicle-assembly industry improved much more than
did that of companies manufacturing parts and
components.
Vehicle assemblers better utilized Mexico’s
advantages to augment output, raise labour productivity
and increase added value, without excessively expanding
their labour force. To a certain extent, they were able to
do so because their Mexican suppliers specialized in
labour-intensive activities. The supplier network of
United States vehicle assemblers continued to have a
strong effect on assembly operations in Mexico, whereas
suppliers in Mexico maintained a subsidiary or
complementary role, basically limited to lowering
production costs. Consequently, the progress by vehicle
assemblers was different from that of manufacturers of
parts and components in Mexico. That is, the problems
between vehicle assemblers and parts suppliers that
characterize the United States automotive industry were
replicated in Mexico.
The key issue is the difficulty in establishing in
Mexico an autoparts supplier network sufficiently
integrated, competitive and sophisticated to support
efforts to position Mexico’s automotive industry in the
global market as well as in the North American market
(Carillo, 2001; Dussel, 1997; Romo, 2003). The current
network of parts and components suppliers is dominated
by subsidiaries of TNCs, especially from the United
States, that import a high proportion of their inputs from
that country (USITC, 2002; United States Department
of Commerce, 2003a). This particular characteristic
greatly weakens the multiplier effect of the value added
by the Mexican automotive industry, in contrast with
the remarkable increase in the country’s foreign trade
(UNCTAD, 2003a). This reflects the weakness of the
network of Mexican autoparts suppliers, which continue
to specialize in reducing costs for the United States
automotive industry, rather than aiming to consolidate a
world-class base in which factors related to the capacity
for innovation (research and development, organizational
practices, etc.), the management of complex technologies
and the establishment of ISIP predominate (Ordorica,
2003).
Transnational vehicle producers with plants in
Mexico have limited their efficiency seeking to reducing
production costs through savings in wages –without
establishing a supplier network in the country– unlike
the cutting-edge firms in the industry, which have gained
market share on the basis of competitive advantages
created, among other means, through innovation in
advanced manufacturing-production systems, the
establishment of supplier networks, technological
capabilities, organizational practices, design capacity and
training of skilled human resources.
To successfully compete in other markets, the
Mexican automotive industry must design and implement
appropriate policies allowing it to move forward from an
export platform –based on low wages and privileged
access and geographic proximity to a single market–
towards an integrated manufacturing centre that will
compete on the basis of skilled human resources,
technological capabilities and an integrated chain of
world-class suppliers.
In recent years there has been some indication that
these changes have begun to take place. The Mexican
Automotive Manufacturers Association (AMIA) and the
Ministry of the Economy proposed doubling Mexico’s
automotive-production capacity by 2010, to four million
units per year.12  Some firms have, moreover, announced
new investments for production in Mexico of special
models for the world market. Ford expects to invest
US$ 1.6 billion to build an industrial park of suppliers
–along the lines of Brazil’s modular plants– and to
modernize its Hermosillo plant for the production of its
new Futura model, to be sold in the United States market
starting in 2005 (América Economía, 2003). Volkswagen
announced that it would invest some US$ 2.0 billion over
the next five years, to begin production of trucks for the
Mexican market and of three passenger automobiles: the
Golf and the Jetta for the United States market, and the
Bora for the world market (Just-auto.com, 2003d).
Another element that could instil confidence in the
country’s situation and its future possibilities is that many
plants in Mexico already surpass those in the United States
11 Maquiladoras had special rules allowing for the temporary importation of machinery, equipment, materials and components to be assembled
in Mexico and subsequently exported. During the NAFTA transition phase a progressively higher percentage of maquiladora products was
permitted in the assembly of vehicles in Mexico.
12 This would mean increasing export production from 1.5 to 3 million vehicles and output capacity for the domestic market from five
hundred thousand to one million units. The programme has not yet been officially approved, however.
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and Canada in labour productivity (United States, USITC,
2002). This is the case of the General Motors plant in
Silao and DaimlerChrysler’s factories in Saltillo and
Toluca (J.D. Power & Associates, 2003). Therefore, since
40 assembly plants in the world might have to be shut
down, including 12 in North America, Mexico would
appear to be poised to take advantage of the restructuring
of the United States and global automotive industry
(United States, USITC, 2002).
Nonetheless, the challenge currently faced by
Mexico’s automotive industry is more complex than it
appears on the surface. In a context of worldwide idle
capacity on the order of 25% to 33% and in light of the
decrease in domestic output in recent years, expecting
Mexico to double its productive capacity would seem
extremely optimistic.13  That is, the problem would
appear to be the quality of the production process rather
than the number of vehicles produced. Another important
problem is that the supplier network specializing in
labour-intensive products is beginning to lose its
competitive edge. Delphi –with extensive operations in
Mexico– has stated that the country has become less
attractive for establishing links in the firm’s ISIP vis-à-
vis competitors such as China (Just-auto.com, 2003e;
Expansión, 2003; Lara and Carrillo, 2003).
In sum, in its current stage of development, Mexico’s
automotive chain lacks two of the decisive driving forces
behind the worldwide restructuring of the automotive
industry. First, it has a very minor stake in the ISIP of
the most technologically advanced firms in the industry,
most notably Toyota, and, second, it does not have the
supplier network needed to comply with the regional
rules of origin set out in its free-trade agreements with
countries other than the United States (Automotive
Intelligence News, 2003).
Brazil’s automotive industry: exporting to survive
In Brazil, the introduction of production at modern
modular plants coincided with the contraction of
domestic demand, leading to enormous idle capacity. The
strategies of the vehicle assemblers, the national policies
for the sector, and the specific characteristics of
specialization by Brazil’s automotive industry have
greatly limited the possibilities for placing part of the
excess output in international markets.
Specialization in compact automobiles has allowed
Brazilian industry to gain economies of scale, protect its
domestic market vis-à-vis the trade opening and take
advantage of new trade agreements, inasmuch as Brazil’s
potential trading partners do not specialize in this
category of vehicles. This specialization and, especially,
the programme to promote the production of low-cost
vehicles are, nonetheless, the main obstacle to Brazilian
industry significantly increasing its exportable supply.
The main challenge for Brazil is, then, to adapt its
production to global, regional and national needs, so as
to increase the scale of production and promote linkages
with the international economy.
It appears inevitable,  then, that Brazil will
consolidate a model of specialization in larger compact
(platform “B”) vehicles, to maintain and enhance the
competitiveness of the domestic production chain.
Brazilian industry should move beyond the low profit
levels of economy models and the stagnant domestic
market and focus on more sophisticated, powerful and
expensive vehicles that will be more accepted in
international markets, using the same platform as its
compact cars. Brazil could gradually specialize in
fully-equipped compact vehicles, or simply small
vehicles, but not economy models. Noteworthy
examples are the new Volkswagen Polo and General
Motors Corsa, and, particularly, several recently
launched models –the Ford EcoSport, General Motors
Meriva, Citroën C3 and Honda Fit.14  These upscale
compact vehicles compete with midsize models such
as the Volkswagen Golf and the General Motors Astra,
and they target younger, more active consumers. These
new models have been quite well received in the
Brazilian market and have had good results in other
Latin American markets, as well. Automotive executives
say these upscale vehicles should close the strategic
equation and translate into a locally and internationally
integrated production chain.
13 Consequently, some analysts doubt that this objective of Mexican automotive policy can be met. Among developing countries expected to
have an output above one million units in 2010, Mexico will likely not show a very significant increase. Indeed, these analysts expect
Mexico to increase output by 14.8% between 2003 and 2010, while they put forth more encouraging estimates for other developing
countries, such as China (85.7%), Thailand (61.2%), Iran (47.2%) and Brazil (44.9%) (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004).
14 The EcoSport is a good example of how production platforms can be shared. This model has much of the same equipment as the new
Fiesta, but on the outside it is another vehicle. It established a new segment that used to consist of only imported vehicles. The same is true
of the General Motors Meriva, which uses the Corsa’s platform, engine and gearbox. Still, it is a very different vehicle, with a 1.8 engine,
and it has introduced the segment of compact sport-utility vehicles. Another example is the Citroën C3, made by PSA Peugeot Citroën
since 2003 at the Porto Real plant. These models are joined by the Honda Fit, produced on the platform recently inaugurated by this
Japanese firm.
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In Brazil’s domestic market, the automakers’ strategy
has been to attract consumers to this new segment of
midsize vehicles and thereby raise their profit margins.
To this end, the automakers have proposed changes in
the tax structure that would set a uniform Tax on
Industrialized Products (imposto sobre produtos
industrializados, IPI) for all types of vehicles, regardless
of their cylinder capacity.15  Some of these changes began
in mid-2002.
This policy is a tentative solution that will allow
automakers to improve operational profitability, although
it does not sustainably and permanently solve the
underlying problem of the competitiveness of the
automotive industry’s production chain. To date, the most
important market-expansion efforts have been made
through MERCOSUR and, more recently, through
agreements with Mexico.
Increasing exports to new markets is not a simple
process. Given the fact that Brazil’s currency has been
depreciating since 1999, which has resulted in lower local
costs measured in foreign currency and, therefore,
increased competitiveness, exports have remained
relatively constant and concentrated in a few markets. A
sharply undervalued exchange rate has not been an
efficient export-promotion instrument, amid heightened
competition in external markets and the depreciation of
the currencies of some of the country’s competitors.
Moreover, the financial costs of recent investments and
operational costs linked to higher imported content
diminish the profitability and competitiveness of
Brazilian products (Sarti, 2003).
Devaluation hurt the interests of the affiliates of
foreign companies in Brazil. The orientation towards the
domestic market produced a strong imbalance between
the country’s dollar-denominated debt and its income
from sales in local currency. Companies have attempted
to improve their economic and financial indicators by
increasing their exports. Brazilian authorities, in turn,
have sought to improve and expand incentives to export,
so as to encourage the generation of a surplus in the
sector’s trade balance. In the recent process of
restructuring production in Brazil’s automotive industry,
investments by TNCs were largely matched by
contributions of government resources and tax breaks at
the federal, state and municipal levels. In addition, IPI
rates were recently cut to stimulate domestic demand and
encourage lines of financing for exports.
Hence, government and firms should join forces to
raise Brazilian industry’s propensity to export.
Policymakers and economic authorities could seek
alternatives to expand and diversify the external markets
for the different products made by this industry, while
affiliates could promote better intrafirm trade
relationships, basically in engines and parts, and between
TNCs and autoparts companies in Brazil or within
MERCOSUR.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The automotive industry is being transformed on the basis
of large investments by the leading TNCs seeking
efficiency in their ISIP. To an important degree, the
sector’s new competitiveness comes from the supplier
networks. A small group of developing countries has tried
to seize this opportunity.
An analysis of the automotive industry in Mexico
and Brazil provides some lessons to better understand
this phenomenon. As noted in the conclusions to chapter
I, the host country seeks to attract TNCs to benefit from
their presence in the domestic economy. Clearly, the
benefits are not automatic but come from an appropriate
combination of quality FDI with sound national policies.
Table I.6 in chapter I pointed to the kind of problems
that have emerged in Latin America when the underlying
goals of FDI and national policy did not match.
Mexico and Brazil have been favoured, to a certain
extent, by this opportunity. Mexico has improved its
international competitiveness based on FDI by United
States TNCs seeking efficiency for their regional
integrated production systems. Brazil, in turn, had a solid
automotive industry based on United States and European
FDI, which supplied, above all, the domestic market,
enjoyed significant productive linkages and later came
to establish new modular plants.
The TNCs have tended, however, to utilize the host
country’s static advantages, for which reason the positive
effects are not long-lasting. For example, the evolution
of Mexico’s and Brazil’s automotive industries points to
a sort of inverse correlation between international
competitiveness and productive linkages, which limits
the role of each country’s supplier network. The meteoric
15 The Tax on Industrialized Products is a federal tax levied on manufactured products at the factory gate, in the case of Brazilian goods, or
when they are shipped, in the case of imported goods.
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rise in Mexico’s competitiveness was achieved, to a
certain extent, at the expense of an integrated supplier
base. Consequently, Mexico is not currently in a position
to properly take advantage of its free-trade agreements,
since it does not have a supplier network allowing it to
comply with the respective rules of regional origin. In
Brazil, specialization in compact cars limited its
possibilities to export; the opening of the automotive
industry weakened the existing supplier network; and
the new modular plants have not proven sufficiently
competitive in external markets. In both cases, the
supplier network has lacked the competitiveness to allow
for the industry’s sustained growth.
In addition to issues linked to the development
of competitive supplier bases related to transnational
automakers from the United States and Europe, it is
noteworthy that the industry’s most technologically
advanced f i rm –Toyota– which has the most
competitive and least conflictive supplier network,
has such a limited presence in Latin America. Clearly,
this region did not represent a priority for Toyota’s
ISIP. Toyota’s emphasis on establishing a broad
supplier network in North America during the last
10 years suggests that Mexico could have played a
significant role if the country’s authorities had made
an effort to attract the firm (Mortimore and Vergara,
2004).
The weakness of the supplier bases and the absence
of cutting-edge companies are some of the problems
faced by Latin America’s automotive industry. The
industry’s opening to FDI, consistent with the
transnational automakers’ new efficiency-seeking
strategy, led to a sharp scaling back of the industry’s reach
in the region and its concentration in two countries:
Mexico and Brazil. If a proper combination of quality
FDI with sound national policies is not achieved, the
industry’s current international competitiveness could
prove short-lived.
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